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THE

BOOK OF NATURE.

SERIES III.

LECTURE I.

ON MATERIALISM AND IMMATERIALISM.

one part of science, and not the least im-
nt, though the lowest and most element-
o become duly acquainted with the nature
extent of our ignorance upon whatever
ect we propose to investigate *; and it is

* "Our knowledge being so narrow, it will perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our ignorance, which, being infinitely greater than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes and improvement of useful knowledge; if, discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understanding; and launch not out into that abyss of dark-
per-

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probably for want of a proper attentio
branch of study that we meet with
crude and confident theories upon
that the utmost wit or wisdom of man is
incapable of elucidating. The rude unins
peasant, or ignorant pretender, believes
understands every thing before him; the
rienced philosopher knows that he unde
nothing. It was so formerly in Greec
will be so in every age and country: whi
sophists of Athens asserted their pretensio
universal knowledge, Socrates, in oppositi
them, was daily affirming that the only
he knew to a certainty was his own
rance. The shallow Indian sage, as soo
he had made the important discovery that
world was supported by an elephant, and
elephant by a tortoise, felt the most p
complacency in the solution he was now
pared to give to the question, by what
is the world supported in empty space?
it is justly observed by Mr. Barrow, that th
chief reason why the Chinese are so far behin
Europeans in the fine arts and higher branche
of science, as painting for example, and geome-
try, is the consummate vanity they possess,
which induces them to look with contempt upon
the real knowledge of every other nation.

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beyond our comprehension. But to be satisf
of

and dissolves in one common grave with the body.*

There seems a strange propensity among mankind, and it may be traced from a very early period of the world, to look upon matter with contempt. The source of this has never, that I know of, been pointed out; but it will, probably, be found to have originated in the old philosophical doctrine we had formerly occasion to advert to, that "nothing can spring from or be decomposed into nothing*;" and consequently that MATTER must have had a necessary and independent existence from all eternity; and have been an immutable PRINCIPLE OF EVIL running coeval with the immutable PRINCIPLE OF GOOD; who, in working upon it, had to contend with all its essential defects, and has made the best of it in his power. But the moment we admit that matter is a creature of the Deity himself; that he has produced it, in his essential benevolence, out of nothing, as an express medium of life and happiness; that, in its origin he pronounced it, under every modification, to be VERY GOOD; that the human body, though composed of it, was at that time perfect and incorruptible, and will hereafter recover the same attributes of perfection and incorruptibility when

* See Locke, Hum. Underst. book iv. ch. iii. § 6. as also the author's Stud. of Med. Vol. iv. p. 37. 2d Edit. 1825.

† In the words of Democritus, Μ[illegible] μηδὲ ἐις τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀθροίσεσθαι. Diog. Laert. lib. ix. p. 41.

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it shall again rise up fresh from the grave, — contempt and despisal must give way to reverence and gratitude. Nor less so when, with an eye of devotional or even scientific feeling, we look abroad into the natural world under the present state of things; and behold in what an infinite multiplicity of shapes, and forms, and textures, and modifications, this same degraded substrate of matter is rendered the basis of beauty and energy, and vitality and enjoyment; equally striking in the little and in the great; in the blade of grass we trample under foot, and in the glorious sun that rouses it from its winter-sleep, and re-quickens it into verdure and fragrancy; from the peopled earth to the peopled heavens; to the spheres on spheres, and systems on systems, that above, below, and all around us, fulfil their harmonious courses, and from age to age

> In mystic dance, not without song, resound
> His praise who, out of darkness, called up light.

Had the real order of nature been attended to, instead of the loose suggestions of fancy, we should have heard but little of this controversy; for it would have made us too modest to engage in it: it would have shown us completely our own ignorance, and the folly of persevering in so fruitless a chase. Let us then, in as few words as possible, and in order to excite this modesty, attempt that which has been too seldom attempted heretofore, and see how far the subject

is unfolded to us in the book of the visible creation.

It has already appeared to us that matter in its simplest and rudest state is universally possessed of certain active properties, as those of gravitation and repulsion, which in consequence of their universality, have been denominated essential *: but it has also appeared to us that there is an insuperable difficulty in determining whether these properties belong to common matter intrinsically, or are endowments resulting from the presence and operation of some foreign body, the etherial medium of Sir Isaac Newton, and which, if it exist at all, is probably a something different from matter, or if material, different from common, visible, and tangible matter.

It has appeared to us next, that common matter, in peculiar states of modification, is also possessed of peculiar properties, independently of the general or essential properties which belong to the entire mass.† Thus iron and iron ore give proofs of the possession of that substance or quality which we call magnetic; glass, amber, and the muscular fibres of animals, give equal proofs of that substance or quality which we denominate electric or voltaic; and all bodies in a state of activity, of that substance or quality which is intended by the term caloric. But what is magnetism? What is voltaism?

* Vol. I. Ser. I. Lect. iv. p. 83. 89.
† Vol. I. Ser. I. Lect. v. p. 97.

What is caloric? There is not a philosopher in the world who can answer these questions: we know almost as little of them as of gravitation, and can only trace them by their results. We can, indeed, collect and concentrate them, invisible and intangible as they are to our senses; and we have hence some reason for believing them to be distinct substances rather than mere qualities; and consequently denominate them auras. But are these auras material or immaterial? Examined by the common properties of matter, as weight, solidity, impenetrability, they appear to be the latter; for they are all equally destitute of these properties, so far as our experiments have extended; and hence they are either immaterial substances, or material substances void of the general qualities that belong to matter in its grosser forms.

Let us ascend to the next step in this wonderful and mysterious scale. It appeared from the remarks offered in a former lecture*, that independently of that general influence and power of attraction which every particle of matter exerts over every other particle, there are some bodies which exert a peculiar power over other bodies, which separate them from their strongest and most stubborn connections, and as completely run away with them as the fox runs away with the young chicken. And we here behold another power introduced, and of a still higher order; a power, too, of the most complex

* Vol. I. Sect. I. Lect. v p. 105.

variety, and which in different substances exhibits every possible diversity of strength.

Let us take a single example of this curious phænomenon, and let us draw it from facts that are known to almost every one. The water of the sea, and of various land-springs, as that at Epsom for example, is loaded with a certain portion of sulphuric acid, or oil of vitriol; thus impregnated, as it flows over a soil composed either wholly or in part of the earth called magnesia; it evinces a peculiar attraction for this substance, separates it from the bed on which it has been quietly reposing, and so minutely dissolves it, as still to retain its transparency. But the attraction of the sulphuric acid for the magnesia is much less than its attraction for the fixed alkalis, potash and soda: and hence, if, to the water thus impregnated, we add a certain quantity of either of the two latter substances, the connection between the acid and the magnesia will immediately cease: the former will evince its preference for the alkali employed; and the magnesia, no longer laid hold of by the sulphuric acid, will be precipitated, or in other words, fall by its own weight to the bottom of the water in the form of a white powder, and may be easily collected and dried. And this, in reality, is the usual mode by which this valuable earth is obtained in its pure state.

But the sulphuric acid having thus shown a stronger attraction for an alkali than for an

earth, is there no substance for which it discovers a stronger attraction than for an alkali? There are various: it may be sufficient to mention caloric or the matter of heat. And hence, exposed to the action of heat, it soon becomes volatile, unites itself to the heat, flies off with it in vapour, and now leaves the alkali behind as it before left the magnesian earth. Glass-manufacturers take advantage of this superior attraction of the mineral acids for heat compared with their attraction for alkalis, and employ, in their formation of glass, common sea-salt, which is a combination of an acid and an alkali; drive off the former from the latter by the aid of a very powerful fire, and then obtain a substance which is absolutely necessary for the production of this material.

These curious and altogether inexplicable properties and preferences we call chemical affinities and chemical elections: and there are numerous instances in which the substances, thus uniting themselves together, evince an order and regularity of the most wonderful precision, and which is nowhere exceeded in the developement of the most delicate organ of animated nature. And I now particularly allude to the phænomena of crystallization; the different kinds of which, produced by the consolidation of different substances, uniformly maintain so exact an arrangement in the peculiar shape of the minute and central nucleus, or the two or three elementary particles that first unite into a

particular figure, and follow up with so much nicety the same precise and geometrical arrangement through every stage of their growth, that we are able, in all common cases, to distinguish one kind of crystal from another by its geometrical figure alone; and with the same ease and in the same manner as we distinguish one kind of animal from another by its general make or generic structure. The form of these elementary particles we can no more trace to a certainty than the bond of their union; but there is great reason for believing them to be spheres or spheriods, as first conjectured by that most acute and indefatigable philosopher Dr. Hooke, and since attempted to be explained by Dr. Wollaston in a late Bakerian lecture.*

Such are the most striking powers that occur to us on a contemplation of the unorganized world. From unorganized let us ascend to organized nature. And here the first peculiar property that astonishes us is the principle of life itself; — that wonderful principle equally common to plants and animals, which maintains the individuality, connects organ with organ, resists the laws of chemical change or putrefaction, which instantly commence their operation as soon as this agent or endowment ceases; and which, with the nicest skill and harmony, perpetuates the lineaments of the different kinds and species through innumerable generations. It is an agency which exists as completely in

* Phil. Trans. 1813. p. 51.

the seed or the egg as in the mature plant or animal: for as long as it is present, the seed or the egg is capable of specific developement and growth; but the moment it quits its connection, they can no more grow than a grain of gunpowder.

What now is this wonderful principle that so strikingly separates organized from inorganized matter? that, as I have observed on a former occasion, from the first moment it begins to act infuses energy into the lifeless clod; draws forth form, and order, and individual being from unshapen matter, and stamps with organization and beauty the common dust we tread upon?* I have called it an agent or endowment: is it nothing more than these? is it a distinct essence? and, if so, is this essence refined, etherialised matter, freed from the more obvious properties of grosser matter, or is it strictly immaterial? It has been said by different physiologists to be oxygene, caloric, the electric or the galvanic gass; but all this is mere conjecture; and even of several of these powers we know almost as little as we do of the vital principle itself, and are incapable of tracing them in the vegetable system.

The next curious energy we meet with in organized nature, and which also equally belongs to animals and vegetables, is instinct. This I have defined to be "the operation of the vital principle, or the principle of organized life by

* Vol. I. Ser. I. Lect. ix. p. 229.

the exercise of certain natural powers directed to the present or future good of the individual, or of its progeny." * But what are these powers, with which the vital principle is thus marvellously gifted, and which enables it, under different circumstances, to avail itself of different means to produce the same end?— that directs plants to sprout forth from the soil, and expand themselves to the reviving atmosphere; fishes to deposit their eggs in the sands; birds in nests, of the nicest and most skilful contrivance; and the wilder quadrupeds to accomplish the same purpose in lairs or subterraneous caverns; that guides the young of every kind to its proper food, and, whenever necessary, teaches it how to suck? Are these powers also material, or are they immaterial? Are they simple properties issuing out of a peculiar modification of matter, or something superadded to the material frame?

In the confused language and confused ideas of various metaphysical hypotheses, and even of one or two that pretend to great exactness in these respects, instinct is made a part or faculty of the mind: and hence we hear of a moral instinct. But has the polype, then, or the hydatid a mind? Are we to look for a mind in the midst of sponges, corals, and funguses?— in the spawn of frogs, or the seeds of mushrooms? Instinct, however, the operation of the principle of life,

* Vol. II. Ser. II. Lect. IV.

equally superintending the entire frame, and every separate part of it, guiding it to its perfect developement, exciting its peculiar energies, remedying its occasional evils, and providing for a future progeny, is equally to be traced in all of them? Are instinct, then, and mind the same thing? or is the vocabulary of the hypotheses I now advert to, and shall have occasion to examine more at large hereafter, so meagre and limited that it is necessary to employ the same term to express ideas that have no connection with each other, and which cannot, therefore, be thus expressed without the grossest confusion? It is high time to be more accurate, and to have both determinate words and determinate ideas; and it has been one object of this course of instruction to define what ought to be the real distinction between instinct, sensation, and intelligence.

But let us ascend a step higher in the great scale of life; let us quit the vegetable for the animal kingdom. If I take the egg or grain of a mustard-seed, and the egg of a silk-worm, where is the chemist or physiologist that will point out to me the diversity of their structure, or unfold the cause of those different faculties which they are to evince on future developement and growth? At present, so far as they appear to us, they are equally common matter, actuated by the same common living principle, directed to different ends. To give them developement and mature form, we equally expose them to

the operation of the sun and the atmosphere, and, in the case of the mustard-seed, of moisture: and we are not conscious of exposing them to any thing else; all which, again, so far as we are acquainted with them, are nothing but matter in different states of modification. Yet the animal egg produces a new and a much higher power, which we denominate sensation, while the vegetable egg produces nothing of the kind. What is sensation, and from what quarter has it been derived? Is it a mere property, or a distinct essence? Is it material, or is it immaterial?

This, also, has occasionally been called instinct, and been contemplated as of instinctive energy. With equal confusion it has also been called or contemplated as a property of mi[illegible] It is neither the one nor the other: it is equ[illegible] different from both. We trace, indeed, its [illegible] mediate seat of residence; for we behold in the silk-worm a peculiar organ which does not exist in the mustard-plant, and to which, and which alone, sensation always attaches itself; and to this organ we give the name of a nervous system. But to become acquainted with the organ, in which sensation resides, is no more to become acquainted with the essence of sensation itself, than to know the principle of life because we know the general figure of the individual animal or vegetable in which it inheres; or than to know what gravitation is because we see the matter which it actuates.

As simple nerves, or a nervous cord, such as that of the spinal marrow, is the proper organ of sensation or feeling, the gland of a brain, from which the nervous cord usually, though not always, shoots, is the proper organ of intelligence; and as I had occasion to observe in a former study, when lecturing upon the subject of the senses, the degree of intelligence appears, in every instance we are acquainted with, to be proportioned, not, indeed, to the size of the brain as compared with that of the animal to which it belongs, as was conjectured by Aristotle, and has been the general belief almost to the present day, but as compared with the aggregate bulk of nerves that issue from it.* The larger the brain and the less the nerves, the higher and more comprehensive the intelligence: the smaller the brain and the larger the nerves, the duller and more contracted. In man, of all animals whatever, the brain is the largest, and the nerves comparatively with its bulk the smallest: in the monkey tribes it makes an approach to this proportion, but there is still a considerable difference; in birds a somewhat greater difference; in amphibials the brain is very small in proportion to the size of the nervous cord; in fishes it is a bulb not much larger than the nervous cord itself; in insects there is no proper brain whatever; the nervous cord that runs down the back originating near the mouth; sometimes of an

* Vol. I. Ser. I. Lect. xv.

uniform diameter with the cord itself, and sometimes rather larger; and in infusory and zoophytic worms we have no trace either of nerves or brain.

In these last, therefore, it is possible, and indeed probable, as I have already observed, that there is no sensation: the vital principle, and the instinctive faculty, which is the operation of the vital principle, by the exercise of certain natural powers constantly appertaining to such principle, alone producing all the phænomena of life as in plants. In most insects, for the same reason, it is possible, and indeed probable, that though there is sensation, there is little or no intelligence: the brain, which is the sole seat or organ of intelligence, being totally destitute, in most of them, and of very minute compass in the rest. In fishes we have reason to apprehend different degrees of intelligence; in many amphibials somewhat more; more still in birds and quadrupeds, and most of all in man.

But what is intelligence, which is a distinct principle from sensation, and to which, as in the case of sensation, a distinct organ is appropriated? An organ, moreover, which, like that of simple sensation, may be also produced out of an insentient egg by the mere application, so far as we are able to trace the different substances in nature, of a certain proportion of heat; for the egg of the hen, unquestionably insentient when first laid, becomes equally hatched and endowed with the organs and properties both of sensation

and intelligence, by the application of a certain portion of warmth, whether that warmth be derived from the body of the hen, of a dung-hill, an oven, or the sun. But though we know the organ, what information does this give us of the thing itself? In what respect is intelligence connected with the brain? Does it result from its mere peculiarity of structure, secreted, like the blood, but of a finer and more attenuate crasis, or is it a something superadded to the organ? Is it matter in its most active, elaborate, and etherialised form, or is it something more than matter of any kind? and, if so, how has this superadded essence been communicated?

To this point we can proceed safely, and see our way before us: but shadows, clouds, and darkness rest on all beyond, while the gulf on which we sail is unfathomable to the plummet of mortals.

It is something more than matter, observes one class of philosophers, for matter itself is essentially unintelligent, and is utterly incapable of thought. But this is to speak with more confidence than we are warranted; and unbecomingly to limit the power of the Creator. It has already appeared that we know nothing of the essential properties of matter. If it be capable of gravitation, of elective attractions, of life, of instinct, of sensation, there does not seem to be any absurdity in supposing it may be capable of thought: and if all these powers or endowments result from something more

than matter, then is the visible world as much an immaterial as a material system.

On the other hand, it is as strongly contended by an opposite class of philosophers, and the same train of arguments has been continued, almost without variation, from the days of Epicurus, that the principle of thought or the human mind must be material; for otherwise the frame of man, we are told, will be made to consist of two distinct and adverse essences, possessing no common property or harmony of action. But this is to speak with as unbecoming a confidence as in the former case. The great visible frame of the world seems to point out to us in every part of it a co-existence either of different essences or of different natures — of matter and a something which is not matter; or of common matter and matter possessed of properties that it does not discover in its common form. Yet all these, so far from being adverse to each other, subsist in the strictest union, and evince the completest harmony of action. And hence the soul, or intelligent principle, though combined with matter, though directly operating from a material organ, may be a something distinct from matter, and more than matter, even in its most active, etherial, and spiritualised forms: though, whatever be its actual essence, it undoubtedly makes the nearest approach to it under such a modification.

In reality, under some such kind of etherial or shadowy make, under some such refined or

spiritualised and evanescent texture, it seems in almost all ages and nations to have been handed down by universal tradition, and contemplated by the great mass of the people, whatever may have been the opinion of the philosophers, as soon as it has become separated from the body. And the opinion derives some strength from the manner in which it is stated to have been first formed in the Mosaic records, which intimate it to be a kind of divine breath, vapour, or aura, or to have proceeded from such a substance; for "God," we are told, "breathed into man's nostrils THE BREATH OF LIFE, (נשמת חיים) and he became a living soul." *

Opposed as the two hypotheses of materialism and of immaterialism are to each other, in the sense in which they are commonly understood, it is curious to observe how directly and equally they tend to one common result, with respect to a point upon which they are conceived to differ diametrically; I mean an assimilation of the human soul to that of brutes.

The materialist, who traces the origin of sensation and thought from a mere modification of common matter, refers the perception and reflection of brutes to the very principle which produces them in man; and believing that this modification is equally, in both instances, destroyed by death, maintains that "as the one dieth, so dieth the other; so that a man hath

* Gen. ii. 7.

no pre-eminence above a beast*;" whence his hope of future existence, apparently like that of Solomon, who was without the light of the Christian Scriptures, depends exclusively upon a resurrection of the body.

The immaterialist, on the contrary, who conceives that mere matter is incapable, under any modification, of producing sensation and thought, is under the necessity of supplying to every rank of being possessing these powers, the existence of another and of a very different substance combined with it; a substance not subject to the changes and infirmities of matter, and altogether impalpable and incorruptible. For if sensation and ideas can only result from such a substance in man, they can only result from such a substance in brutes; and hence the level between the two is equally maintained by both parties; the common materialist lowering the man to the brute, and the immaterialist exalting the brute to the man. The immaterialist, however, on the approach of dissolution, finds one difficulty peculiar to himself, for he knows not, at that period, how to dispose of the brutal soul: he cannot destroy an incorruptible substance, and yet he cannot bring himself to a belief that it is immortal. This difficulty seems to have been peculiarly felt by the very excellent Bishop Butler. He was too cautious a reasoner, indeed, to enlist the term IMMATERIAL into any part of his argu-

* Eccles. iii. 19.

ment; not pretending to determine, as being a point of no importance whatever, "whether our *living substances* (those that shall survive the body) be material or immaterial:" * but, as a faculty of intelligence is discernible in brutes as well as in man, he thought himself compelled to ascribe it in both to a common principle; and believing this principle to be immortal in the latter, he supposed it also to be immortal in the former; and hence speaks of the "natural immortality of brutes."† But as to what becomes of this natural immortality of the brute creation after death, he says nothing whatever, and even regards the enquiry as "invidious and weak." ‡

By some immaterialists, and particularly by Vitringa and Grotius, it has been conceived that, as something distinct from matter must be granted to brutes, to account for their powers of perception, mankind are in possession of a principle superadded to this, and which alone constitutes their immortal spirit. But such an idea, while it absurdly supposes every man to be created with two immaterial spirits, leaves us as much as ever in the dark as to the one immaterial, and consequently incorruptible, soul or principle possessed by brutes. The insufficiency of the solution has not only been felt but acknowledged by other immaterialists; and nothing can silence the objection, but to advance boldly, and deny

* Analysis of Religion Natural and Revealed, Part i. ch. i.

† Id. Part. i. ch. i. p. 30. Edit. 1802. ‡ Id. p. 29.

that brutes have a soul or percipient principle of any kind; that they have either thought, perception, or sensation; and to maintain, in consequence, that they are mere mechanical machines, acted upon by external impulsions alone. Des Cartes was sensible that this is the only alternative: he, therefore, cut the Gordian knot, and strenuously contended for such an hypothesis: and the Abbé Polignac, who intrepidly follows him, gravely devotes almost a whole book of his anti-Lucretius to an elucidation of this doctrine; maintaining that the hound has no more will of his own in chasing the fox than the wires of a harpsichord have in exciting tones; and that, as the harpsichord is mechanically thrown into action by a pressure of the fingers upon its keys, so the hound is mechanically urged onwards by a pressure of the stimulating odour that exhales from the body of the fox upon his nostrils. Such are the fancies which have been invented to explain what appears to elude all explanation whatever; and consequently to prove that the hypothesis itself is unfounded.

Yet the objections that apply to the conjecture of materialism, as *commonly* understood and professed, are still stronger. By the denial of an intermediate state of being between the death and the resurrection of the body, it opposes not only what appears to be the general tenour, but what is, in various places, the direct declaration of the Christian Scriptures; and by conceiving the

entire dissolution and dispersion of the percipient as well as impercipient parts of the animal machine, of which all the atoms may become afterwards constituent portions of other intelligent beings, it renders a resumed individuality almost, if not altogether, impossible.*

The idea that the essence or texture of the soul consists either wholly or in part of spiritualized, etherial, gaseous, or radiant matter, capable of combining with the grosser matter of the body, and of becoming an object of sense, seems to avoid the difficulties inherent to both systems. It says to the materialist, matter is not *necessarily* corruptible; as a believer in the Bible, you admit that it is not so upon your own principle, which maintains that the body was incorruptible when it first issued from the hands of its Maker, and that it will be incorruptible upon its resurrection. It says to the immaterialist, the term *immaterial* conveys no determinate idea; it has been forcibly enlisted into service, and at the same time by no means answers the purpose that was intended. It tells him that it is a term not to be found in the Scriptures, which, so far from opposing the belief that the soul, spirit, or immortal part of man, is either wholly or in combination, a system of radiant or etherial matter, seem rather, on the contrary, to countenance it, not only as I have already observed, by expressly

* See the author's Life of Lucretius, prefixed to his translation of the poem De Rerum Natura, Vol. I. p. 92.

asserting that it was originally formed out of a divine breath, aura, or vapour, but by presenting it to us under some such condition in every instance in which departed spirits are stated to have re-appeared.

That a principle of the same kind, though under a less active and elaborate modification, appertains to the different tribes of brutes, there can, I think, be no fair reason to doubt. Yet it by no means follows that in them it must be also immortal. Matter, as we have already seen, is not necessarily corruptible, nor have we any reason to suppose, that whatever is immaterial is necessarily incorruptible. Immortality is in every instance a special gift of the Creator; and so wide is the gulf that exists between the intelligence of man and that of the brute tribes, that there can be no difficulty in conceiving where the line is drawn, and the special endowment terminates. It is an attribute natural to the being of man, merely because his indulgent Maker has made it so; but there is nothing either in natural or revealed religion that can lead us to the same conclusion in respect to brutes; and hence, to speak of their *natural immortality* is altogether visionary and unphilosophical.

In reality, the difference between this suggested hypothesis and that of the general body of immaterialists, is little more than verbal. For there are few of them who do not conceive in their hearts (with what logical strictness I stay not to enquire) that the soul, in its separate

state, exists under some such shadowy and evanescent form; and that, if never suffered to make its appearance in the present day, it has thus occasionally appeared in earlier ages, and for particular purposes. Yet what can in this manner become manifest to material senses, must have at least some of the attributes of matter in its texture, otherwise it could produce no sensible effect or recognition. From what remote source universal tradition may have derived this common idea of disembodied spirits, I pretend not to ascertain; the enquiry would, nevertheless, be curious, and might be rendered important: it is a pleasing subject, and embued with that tender melancholy that peculiarly befits it for a mind of sensibility and fine taste. Its universality, independently of the sanction afforded to it by revealed religion, is no small presumption of its being founded in fact. But I throw out the idea rather as a speculation to be modestly pursued, than as a doctrine to be precipitately accredited. Enough, and more than enough has been offered, to show that in the abstruse subject before us, nothing is so becoming as humility; that we have no pole-star to direct us; no clue to unriddle the perplexities of the labyrinth in which we are wandering; that every step is doubtful; and that to expatiate is perhaps only to lose ourselves. To show this has beeen my first object; my second has been to conciliate discordant opinions, and to connect popular belief with philosophy.

But I have also aimed at a much higher mark; and have followed up the aim through the general train of reasoning introduced into the preceding divisions of this course of instruction. I have endeavoured to show that, though every part of the visible creation is transient and imperfect, every part is in a state of progression, and striving at something more perfect than itself; that the whole unfolds to us a beautiful scale of ascension, every division harmoniously playing into every other division, and, with the nicest adjustment, preparing for its furtherance. The mineral kingdom lays a foundation for the vegetable, the vegetable for the animal: infancy for youth, youth for manhood, and manhood for the wisdom of hoary hairs. We have hence strong ground, independently of that furnished us by revelation, for concluding that the scene will not end here: that we are but upon the threshold of a vast and incomprehensible scheme, that will reach beyond the present world and run coeval with eternity. The admirable Bishop of Durham, to whose writings I have already occasionally adverted, pursues this argument with great force in his immortal Analogy, and shows, with impressive perspicuity, the general coincidence of design that runs throughout the natural and the moral government of Providence, all equally leading to a future and more perfect state of things. "The natural and moral constitution and government of the world," says he, "are so connected as to make up together

but one scheme; and it is highly probable that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter: as the vegetable is for the animal, and organised bodies for minds. — Every act, therefore, of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond itself, and its immediate object may have some reference to other parts of God's moral administration and to a genuine moral plan; and every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted beforehand, with a view to the whole of it. — It is hence absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life; or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, which far the greatest part of them are fallen into."*

* Analysis of Religion, Natural and Revealed, Part i. ch. vii. p. 148, 149. 165. Edit. 1802.

LECTURE II.

ON THE NATURE AND DURATION OF THE SOUL, AS EXPLAINED BY POPULAR TRADITIONS, AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS.

We have entered upon a subject in which human wisdom or imagination can afford us but very little aid; and I have already observed, that I have rather touched upon it, in order that, with suitable modesty, we may know and acknowledge our own weakness, and apply to the only source from which we can derive any real information concerning it, than to support any hypothesis that can be deduced from either physical or metaphysical investigations. "The science of abstruse learning," observes Mr. Tucker, and no man was ever better qualified to give an opinion upon it, "when completely attained, is like Achilles's spear, that healed the wounds it had made before. It casts no additional light upon the paths of life, but disperses the clouds with which it had overspread them. It advances not the traveller one step in his journey, but conducts him back again to the spot from whence he had wandered."* But if it do not discover

* Light of Nature Pursued, chap. xxxii.

new truths, it prepares, or should prepare, the mind for apprehending those that are already in existence with a greater facility, and far more accurately appreciating their value.

In our last lecture we took a glance at several of the discordant opinions, supported respectively by men of the deepest learning and research, that have been offered in relation to the essence of the mind or soul; and showed by a scale of analysis conducted through all the most striking modifications of that plastic and fugitive substance which composes the whole of the visible world, that all such discussions must be necessarily uncertain, and considerably less likely to be productive of truth than of error. But there is a question of far more consequence to us than the nature of the soul's essence, and that is, the nature of its duration. Is the soul immortal? Is it capable of a separate existence? Does it perish with the body as a part of it? Or if a distinct principle, does it vanish into nothingness as soon as the separation takes place? What does philosophy offer us upon this subject? This too has been studied from age to age; the wisest of mankind have tried it in every possible direction: new opinions have been started, and old opinions revived; — and what, after all, is the upshot? The reply is as humiliating as in the former case: vanity of vanities, and nothing more; utter doubt and indecision, — hope perpetually neutralized by fear.

If we turn to the oldest hypotheses of the East, —to the Vedas of the Bramins and the Zendavesta of the Parsees, — to those venerable but fanciful stores of learning, from which many of the earliest Greek schools drew their first draughts of metaphysical science, we shall find indeed a full acknowledgement of the immortality of the soul, but only upon the sublime and mystical doctrine of emanation and immanation, as a part of the great soul of the universe; issuing from it at birth, and resorbed into it upon the death of the body; and hence altogether incapable of individual being, or a separate state of existence. If we turn from Persia, Egypt, and Hindustan to Arabia, to the fragrant groves and learned shades of Dedan and Teman, from which it is certain that Persia, and highly probable that Hindustan derived its first polite literature, we shall find the entire subject left in as blank and barren a silence, as the desarts by which they are surrounded; or, if touched upon, only touched upon to betray doubt, and sometimes disbelief. The tradition, indeed, of a future state of retributive justice seems to have reached the schools of this part of the world, and to have been generally, though perhaps not universally, accredited; but the future existence it alludes to is that of a resurrection of the body, and not of a survival of the soul after the body's dissolution. The oldest work that has descended to us from this quarter (and there is little doubt that it is the oldest, or one of the oldest works in ex-

istence *) is that astonishing and transcendant composition, the book of Job: — a work that ought assuredly to raise the genius of Idumæa above that of Greece, and that of itself is demonstrative of the indefatigable spirit with which the deepest as well as the most polished sciences were pursued in this region, during what may be comparatively called the youth and day-spring of the world. Yet in this sublime and magnificent poem, replete with all the learning and wisdom of the age, the doctrine upon the subject before us is merely as I have just stated it, a patriarchal or traditionary belief of a future state of retributive justice, not by the natural immortality of the soul, but by a resurrection of the body. And the same general idea has for the most part descended in the same country to the present day; for the Alcoran, which is perpetually appealing to the latter fact, leaves the former almost untouched, and altogether in a state of indecision, whence the expounders of the Eslam scriptures, both Sonnites and Motazzalites, or orthodox and heterodox, are divided upon the subject, some embracing and others rejecting it. And it is hence curious to observe the different grounds appealed to in favour of a future existence, in the most learned regions of the east: the Hindu philosophers totally and universally denying a resurrection of the body, and supporting the doctrine alone upon the natu-

* Vol. II. Ser. II. Lect. x.

ral immortality of the soul, and the Arabian philosophers passing over the immortality of the soul, and resting it alone upon a resurrection of the body.

The schools of Greece, as I have already observed, derived their earliest metaphysics from the gymnosophists of India; and hence, like [redacted] latter, while for the most part [redacted] for the immortal and inco[redacted] soul, they in like mann[redacted] bated the doctrine of a [redacted] On which account, whe[redacted] degree of address and el[redacted] subject into his discou[redacted] square of Athens, the[redacted] to it carried him to A[redacted] what the new doctrine w[redacted] speaking to the people.

The earliest Greek sc[redacted] derived this tenet from an[redacted] it, for the most part, aft[redacted] And hence, though they adm[redacted] of the soul, they had very c[redacted] mode of existence; and the[redacted] them believed it, like the [redacted] sorbed, after the present life, [redacted] of the world, or the creative[redacted] sequently to have no individual[redacted]

Such, more especially, was [redacted] Orpheus and of the Stoics; an[redacted] timate tendency, that of the Py[redacted] though they conceived that the [redacted]

certain period, an individual being, sometimes involved in a cloudy vehicle, and sleeping in the regions of the dead, and sometimes sent back to inhabit some other body, either brutal or human, conceived also that at length it would return to the eternal source from which it had issued, and [redacted] lose all personal existence in its essen- [redacted] doctrine, under every variety, [redacted]es of the East.

[redacted] principle was imported [redacted]d the Greek schools in [redacted]sophy of India. The [redacted]das will be a sufficient [redacted]e the following splendid [redacted]on which the Vedantis [redacted]s, and which they have, [redacted]minated the Gayatri, or

[redacted]upremacy of that divine [redacted]head, who illuminates all, [redacted]OM WHOM ALL HAVE PRO- [redacted]LL MUST RETURN, whom we [redacted] understandings aright in our [redacted]s holy seat." *

[redacted] the later Platonists was pre- [redacted] kind, and it was very exten- [redacted]th the general principles of the [redacted]by the poets and philosophers [redacted]at the period of the revival of [redacted]nzo de Medici is well known to

* Sir Wm. Jones, vi. p. 417.

have been warmly attached to this sublime mysticism; yet he has made it a foundation for some of the sweetest and most elevated devotional poetry that the world possesses. His magnificent address to the Supreme Being has seldom been equalled. I cannot quote it before a popular audience in its original, but I will beg your acceptance of the following imperfect translation of two of its stanzas, that may give a glance into its merit:

Father Supreme! O let
That sacred seat, and ma
Th' essential fount of
Fount, whence each goo
O, to my view thyself di
The radiant heaven thy
O, lose me in the light

Flee, flee, ye mists! let e
Raise me, and show me w
Great sum and centre o
To thee each thought, in s
To thee the saint, in praye
Thou art the source, the gui
The whole is thine, and thou

* Concedi, O Padre! l'alta e sacr
Monti la mente, e vegga el vi
Fonte ver bene, onde ogni be
Mostra la luce vera alla mia fro
E poichè conosciuto e 'l tuo b
Dell' alma ferma in lui luci pr

Fuga le nebbie, e le terrestre m
Leva da mè, e splendi in la tu

While such, however, were the philosophical traditions, the popular tradition appears to have been of a different kind, and as much more ancient as it was more extensive. It taught that the disembodied spirit becomes a ghost as soon as it is separated from the corporeal frame; a [redacted] misty, or aerial form, somewhat larger than [redacted] ble voice, shadowy limbs; know- [redacted] was possessed while in the [redacted] particular circumstances, [redacted]; and retaining so much [redacted] to be recognized upon [redacted] instances wandering [redacted] od of time after death, [redacted] to a common [redacted] interior of the earth, [redacted] (שאול), hades (ἅδης), [redacted] shades.

[redacted] belief of the multitude [redacted] ies from a very early period [redacted] difference, that the hades of [redacted] supposed to exist in some [redacted] the surface of the earth, and [redacted] the clouds. The first of these [redacted] the general tradition is still to [redacted] many of the African tribes, and

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sommo ben che chiascun vuole;
oso si conduce,
uo fin, vede ogni pio;
ipio, portatore e duce,
ermino, Tu sol Magno Dio.

perhaps all the aboriginal tribes of North America. That most excellent man, William Penn, who appears, with some singularities, to have united in his character as much moral goodness, natural eloquence, and legislative wisdom, as ever fell to the lot of any one, has sufficiently noticed this fact, in regard to the American tribes, in his valuable account of the country ad
"The Free Society of Tr
drawn up from an exten
and constituting, so far a
important and authenti
"These poor people,"
dark night in things re
sure, the tradition of it,
and immortality witho
for they say there is a gr
who dwells in a glorio
ward of them, and tha
shall go thither, where
And it is upon the faith
Mr. Pope drew up that adm
picture of the same traditio
first epistle of his Essay on
to every one.

> Lo! the poor Indian, whose
> Sees God in clouds, or hears hi
> His soul proud science never ta
> Far as the solar walk or milky wa
> Yet simple nature to his hope has
> Beyond the cloud-topt hill, an h

* Clarkson's Life of Wm. Penn,

Some safer world in depth of woods embrac'd,
Some happier island in the watry waste;
Where slaves once more their native land behold,
No fiends torment, no Christians thirst for gold.

The tradition which describes the hades, or invisible world, as seated in the clouds, was chiefly common to the Celtic tribes, and par-

ly to that which at an early age peopled
far the most refined and
tiquity has offered upon
has consequently been
the most sublime, but
criptions to which the
n rise under any form.
of this imagery; and it
tic in the genuine pro-
in consequence, assume
as historical records than
te poetry. Let me, in
fine delineation of the
assage in the second book
best authenticated poems *,
importance of the errand,
friends, "the sons of green
destruction, and to advise
elves by retreat, sufficiently
on. "A dark red stream of

e Committee of the Highland Society
to inquire into the nature and au-
s of Ossian, drawn up, according to
Committee, by Henry Mackenzie,
Chairman, p. 153. and pp. 190—260.

fire comes down from the hill. Crugal sat upon the beam: he that lately fell by the hand of Swaran striving in the battle of heroes. His face is like the beam of the setting moon: his robes are of the clouds of the hill: his eyes are like two decaying flames. Dark is the wound on his breast. The stars dim-twinkled through his form: and his voice was like the sound of a distant stream. Dim and in tears l[illegible] his pale hand over the h[illegible] his feeble voice, like th[illegible] 'My ghost, O Connal! [illegible] my corse is on the sand[illegible] never talk with Crugal, [illegible] on the heath. I am lig[illegible] and I move like the s[illegible] son of Colgar! I see t[illegible] It hovers over the plain[illegible] green Erin shall fall. I[illegible] ghosts.' Like the darke[illegible] the midst of the whistling[illegible]

Let us take another very [illegible] tiful example. "Trenmor [illegible] the voice of his mighty son. [illegible] steed of the stranger, suppo[illegible] His robe is of the mist of La[illegible] to the people. His sword is a[illegible] extinguished. His face is with[illegible] He sighed thrice over the hero[illegible] winds of the night roared arou[illegible] his words to Oscar. He slowl[illegible] mist that melts on the sunny hi[illegible]

The idea of his still pursuing his accustomed occupation of riding with his glittering sword, (its glitter now half extinguished, and of a green hue,) on the steed of the stranger — a steed won in battle — his own limbs rendered airy, and the steed dissolved into the semblance of a cloud — is not only exquisite as a piece of poetic paint-

ing, but as a fact consonant with the popular ountries, which uniformly r ghosts of their respect- assions and inclinations, nents to which they had on earth, and the arms chiefly made use of. bard, Lodbrog, while ng, literally translated tin by Olaus Wormius, manner, the pursuits of er death: "In the halls now seats are prepared, ink all out of the hollow In the house of the mighty laments death. I come not pair to Odin's hall." * r belief was common to the . Thus, Æneas, according to nt to the infernal regions, be- the Trojan heroes still panting sing themselves with the martial h they had been accustomed,

* ir's Dissertation on Ossian.

and with airy semblances of horses, arms, and chariots:

> The chief surveyed full many a shadowy car,
> Illusive arms, and coursers train'd for war.
> Their lances fix'd in earth, their steeds around,
> Now free from harness, graze the mimic ground.
> The love of horses which they had, alive,
> And care of chariots, after death survive. *

Virgil, while true to the t
is well known to have cop
Homer; and in Homer'
tradition was common
through almost all their
who was nearly contem
tirizes the fall of Belsha

> The lowermost HELL is
> To congratulate thy arri
> For thee arouseth he the
> All the chieftains of the

The term MIGHTY DE
phatic. The Hebrew word
the "gigantic spectres,"
mighty ghosts;" exhibiting
observed, a form larger than

* Arma procul, currusque virûm
Stant terrâ defixæ hastæ, passim
Per campos pascuntur equi; qua
Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura
Pascere equos; eadem sequitur t

being, as I have already observed, derived from the doctrine of a future resurrection of the body.

In many parts of the world, though not in all, this common tradition of the people was carried much farther, and, under different modifications, made to develope a very important and correct doctrine; for it was believed, in most countries, that this hell, hades, or invisible world, is divided very distinct and opposite regions by a ulf; that the one is a seat se, or elysium, and the a Gehenna, or Tartarus; preme magistrate and an nging to the infernal ghost must appear, and to the one or the other, one in the body.

d to have been the in- nt and valuable part of and, undoubtedly, it is iest records of Egyptian e wonderful conformity of allel doctrine of the Scrip- at it has a still higher origin, ed a part of the patriarchal d, retained in a few channels, r obliterated in others; and, it was a divine communication e.

traditionary information, how- many philosophers of Greece, reason upon the subject, and

seemed desirous of abiding by the result of their own argument. Of these the principal are, Socrates, Plato, and Epicurus. The first is by far the most entitled to our attention for the simplicity and clearness of his conception, and the strength of his belief. Unfortunately we have no satisfactory relic of the great chain of induction by which he was led to so correct and happy a conclusion; for we must not confound his ideas with those of Plato, who has too frequently intermixed his own with them. From the lucid and invaluable MEMORABILIA of his disciple Xenophon, however, we have historical grounds for affirming that whatever may have been the train of his reasoning, it led him to a general assurance that the human soul is allied to the Divine Being, yet not by a participation of essence, but by a similarity of nature; and hence that the existence of good men will be continued after death in a state in which they will be rewarded for their virtue. Upon the future condition of the wicked, Socrates appears to have said but little; he chiefly speaks of it as being less happy than that of the virtuous: and it has hence been conceived that, as he thoug the sole hope of immortality to the good man founded upon his becoming assimilated to th vine nature, he may have imagined that th assimilated soul of the wicked would peri its body; and the more so, as he allo same common principle or faculty of reas

in a subordinate degree, to all other animals as to man; and hence again, gave sufficient proof that he did not regard this principle as necessarily incorruptible. To me, however, his opinion seems rather to have been of a contrary kind, importing future existence and punishment.

Upon this sublime subject, indeed, he appears at times to have been not altogether free from anxiety: but it is infinitely to his credit, and evinces a testimony in favour of the doctrine itself far more powerful than the force of argument, and even breathing of divine inspiration that, in his last moments, he triumphed in the persuasion of its truth, and had scarcely a doubt upon his mind. When the venerable sage, at this time in his seventieth year, took the poisoned cup, to which he had been condemned by an ungrateful country, he alone stood unmoved while his friends were weeping around him: he upbraided their cowardice, and entreated them to exercise a manliness worthy of the patrons of virtue: "It would, indeed," said he "be inexcusable in me to despise death if I were not persuaded that it will conduct me into the presence of the gods, the righteous governors of the universe, and into the society of [illegible] and good men: but I draw confidence [illegible] the hope that something of man remains [illegible] death, and that the state of the good will [illegible] better than that of the bad." He [illegible] deadly cup, and shortly afterwards [illegible] Such was the end of the virtuous

Socrates! "A story," says Cicero, "which I never read without tears." *

The soul of the Platonic system is a much more scholastic compound than that of the Socratic; it is in truth a motley triad produced by an emanation from the Deity or Eternal Intelligence, uniting itself with some portion of the soul of the world, and some portion of matter. In his celebrated Phædo, Plato distinctly teaches, and endeavours to prove, that this compound structure had a pre-existent being, and is immortal in its own nature; and that as its did exist in a separate state antecedently to its union with the body, it will probably continue to exist in the same manner after death. There are various other arguments in favour of its immortality introduced into the same dialogue, and, like the present, derived from the different tenets of his own fanciful theory; in no respect more cogent, and only calculated for the meridian of the schools.

In the writings of Aristotle there is nothing which decisively determines whether he thought the human soul mortal or immortal; but the former is most probable from the notion he entertained concerning its nature and origin; conceiving it to be an intellectual power, externally transmitted into the human body from the eternal intelligence, the common source

* Mem. Xen. l. i. Nat. Deor. iii. 33. Calix[illegible] qui Socratem transtulit è carcere in cœlum. S[illegible]

tionality to human beings. Aristotle does not inform his readers what he conceived the principle, thus universally communicated, to consist of; but there is no proof that he supposed it would continue after the death of the body.*

The grand opponent of the soul's immortality, however, among the Greeks was Epicurus. He conceived it to be a fine, elastic, sublimated, spiritualized gass or aura, composed of the most subtle parts of the atmosphere, as caloric, pure air, and vapour †, introduced into the system in the act of respiration, peculiarly elaborated by peculiar organs, and united with a something still lighter, still rarer, and more active than all the rest; at that time destitute of name, and incapable of sensible detection, offering a wonderful resemblance to the electric or galvanic gass of modern times. In the words of Lucretius, who has so accurately and elegantly described the whole of the Epicurean system:

Penitus prorsum latet hæc natura, subestque;
Nec magis hac infra quidquam est in corpore nostro;
Atque anima est animæ proporro totius ipsa. ‡
Far from all vision this profoundly lurks,
Through the whole system's utmost depth diffus'd,
And lives as soul of e'en the soul itself.

* De Gen. An. ii. 3. iii. 11. Cic. Tusc. Q. i. 10. Enfield's ...r, i. 285.

† ...the language of Lucretius, iii. 284.

Ventus et aer
Et calor ——

‡ ...274.

The soul thus produced, Epicurus affirmed, must be material, because we can trace it issuing from a material source; because it exists, and exists alone in a material system; is nourished by material food; grows with the growth of the body; becomes matured with its maturity; declines with its decay; and hence, whether belonging to man or brutes, must die with its death.

But this is to suppose that every combination of matter, and every principle and quality connected with matter, are equally submitted to our senses, and equally comprehended by them. It has already appeared that we cannot determine for certain whether one or two of the principles which enters into the composition of the soul, upon this philosopher's own system, are matter, or something superior to matter, and, consequently, a distinct essence blended with it, out of the animal fabric as well as in it. Yet if they be matter, and the soul thus consists of matter, of a matter far lighter, more subtilized and active than that of the body, it does not follow that it must necessarily perish with the body. The very minute heartlet, or corcle, which every one must have noticed in the heart of a walnut, does not perish with the solid mass of the shell and kernel that encircle it: on the contrary, it survives this, and gives birth to the future plant which springs from this substance, draws hence its nourishment, and shoots higher and

higher towards the heavens as the grosser materials that surrounds the corcle are decaying. In like manner the decomposition of lime-stone, instead of destroying, sets at liberty the light gass that was imprisoned in its texture; and the gay and gaudy butterfly mounts into the skies from the dead and mouldering cerement by which it was lately surrounded. Matter is not necessarily corruptible under any form. The Epicureans themselves, as well as the best schools of modern philosophy, believed it to be solid and unchangeable in its elementary particles. Crystallised into granitic mountains, we have innumerable instances of its appearing to have resisted the united assaults of time and tempests ever since the creation of the world. And in the light and gaseous texture in which we are at present contemplating it, it is still more inseparable and difficult of decomposition. Whether material or immaterial, therefore, it does not necessarily follow, even upon the principles of this philosophy itself, that the soul must be necessarily corruptible; nor does it moreover necessarily follow that, admitting it to be incorruptible or immortal in man, it must be so in brutes. Allowing the essence to be the same, the difference of its modification, or elaboration, which this philosophy admits produces the different degrees of its perfection, may also be sufficient to produce a difference in its power of duration. And for any thing we know to the contrary, while some material bodies may be

exempt from corruption, there may be some immaterial bodies that are subject to it.

The philosophers of Rome present us with nothing new; for they merely followed the dogmas of those of Greece. Cicero, though he has given us much of the opinions of other writers upon the nature and duration of the soul, has left us almost as little of his own as Aristotle has done. Upon the whole, he seems chiefly to have favoured the system of Plato. Seneca and Epictetus were avowed and zealous adherents to the principles of the Stoics; and Lucretius to those of Epicurus.

Upon the whole, philosophy seems to have made but an awkward handle of the important question before us. A loose and glimmering twilight appears to have been common to most nations: but the more men attempted to reason upon it, at least with a single exception or two, the more they doubted and became involved in difficulties. They believed and they disbelieved, they hoped and they feared, and life passed away in a state of perpetual anxiety and agitation. But this was not all: perplexed, even where they admitted the doctrine, about the will of the Deity, and the mode of securing his favour after death, with their own abstruse speculations they intermixed the religion of the multitude. They acknowledged the existence of the popular divinities: clothed them with the attributes of the Eternal; and, anxious to obtain their benediction, were punctilious in attending

at their temples, and united in the sacrifices that were presented. Even Socrates, amidst the last words he uttered, desired Crito not to forget to offer for him the cock which he had vowed to Esculapius.*.

In effect, the whole of the actual knowledge possessed at any time, appears to have been traditionary: for we may well doubt whether, without such a basis to have built upon, philosophy would ever have started any well-grounded opinion in favour of a future state. And this traditionary knowledge seems to have been of two kinds, and both kinds to have been delivered at a very early age of the world —the immortality of the soul, and the final resurrection of the body. From the preceding sketch it seems reasonable to suppose that both these doctrines (unquestionably beyond the reach of mere human discovery) were divinely communicated to the patriarchs; and amidst the growing wickedness of succeeding times, gradually forgotten and lost sight of: in some quarters one of them being slightly preserved, in some quarters the other, and in one or two regions, both.

In this last division it is highly probable we are to class the Hebrews at the epoch of Moses: and hence, perhaps, the reason why neither of these doctrines is specially promulgated in any part of his institutes. But in subsequent times

* Xenoph. Mem. l. iv. Plat. Apol. Laert. ii.

both appear to have lost much of their force even amongst this people. The Pharisees and Caraites, indeed, whose opinions (whatever might be their practice) were certainly the most orthodox, supported them; but they are well known to have been both relinquished by the Sadducees, and one of them (the resurrection,) by the Essenes. Solomon, whose frequent use of Arabisms evidently betrays the elegant school in which he had chiefly studied, appears with the language to have imbibed the philosophy of the Arabian peninsula, and hence, to have admitted (in direct opposition to the Essenes, who drew their creed from India,) the doctrine of the resurrection of the body and a state of retribution, while he disbelieved the doctrine of the separate immortality of the soul: and the distinction ought to be constantly kept in view while perusing his writings, since otherwise they may appear in different places to contradict themselves. Thus, in order to confound the pomp and pageantry of the proud and the powerful, and to show them the vanity and nothingness of life, he adverts to the last of these doctrines and confines himself to it, Eccl. iii .19, 20. "That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, even the same thing befalleth them: as the one dieth so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath (or spirit), so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast, for all is vanity: all go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again." But when

addressing himself to the young and giddy pursuer of pleasure, in order to alarm him in the midst of his gay and licentious career, he as distinctly alludes and as carefully confines himself to the first of these doctrines. His language then is, ch. xi. 9. "Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth," — and tread as thou wilt the flowery paths of indulgence and pleasure; "but know thou that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment." There is an equal point, a keen and forcible moral in both addresses, and which could not fail to strike the heart of those to whom they were respectively delivered.

It has been said by some writers that the judgment here referred to relates to the present world, and must be so interpreted to avoid the self-contradiction I have just adverted to. But the wisdom of Solomon stands in no need of the feeble and rushlight illumination of such commentators; nor could it ever be so said by any critic who has diligently attended to the mixed language of Solomon's diction, or rather to the Arabisms he so frequently indulges in; and who, from this and various other sources, has traced out that his early studies must have been passed in Arabia, or under the superintendence of Arabian tutors; and who at the same time calls to mind that the Idumæan cities of Dedan and Teman had the same classical character at Jerusalem that the cities of Athens and Corinth had at Rome.

But are we still abandoned to the same unfixed and shadowy evidence, with just light enough to kindle the hope of immortality, and darkness enough to strangle it the moment it is born? Beset as the world is at all times with physical and moral evils, and doubly beset as it is at present; while virtue, patriotism, and piety are bleeding at every pore; while the sweet influences of the heavens seem turned to bitterness, the natural constellations of the zodiac to have been pulled down from their high abodes, and vice, tyranny, and atheism to have usurped their places, and from their respective ascendants, to be breathing mildew and pestilence over the pale face of the astonished earth*, is it to the worn-out traces of tradition, or the dubious fancies of philosophy, that this important doctrine is alone entrusted? — a doctrine not more vital to the hopes of man than to the justice of the Deity? — No; the fulness of the times has at length arrived: the veil of separation is drawn aside; the mighty and mysterious truth is published by a voice from heaven; it is engraved on pages of adamant, and attested by the affirmation of the godhead. It tells us, in words that cannot lie, that the soul is immortal from its birth; that the strong and inextinguishable desire we feel of future being is the true and natural impulse of a high-born

* This lecture was delivered during the period of the French Revolution.

and inextinguishable principle: and that the blow which prostrates the body and imprisons it in the grave, gives pinions to the soaring spirit and crowns it with freedom and triumph. But this is not all: it tells us too that gross matter itself is not necessarily corruptible: that the freedom and triumph of the soul shall hereafter be extended to the body; that this corruptible shall put on incorruption, this mortal immortality, and a glorious and beatified re-union succeed. By what means such re-union is to be accomplished, or why such separation should be necessary, we know not, — for we know not how the union was produced at first. They are mysteries that yet remain locked up in the bosom of the great Creator: and are as inscrutable to the sage as to the savage, to the philosopher as to the schoolboy; — they are left, and perhaps purposely, to make a mock at all human science; and, while they form the groundwork of man's future happiness, forcibly to point out to him that his proper path to it is through the gate of humility.

LECTURE III.

ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

HAVING taken a brief survey of the essence and duration of the soul, mind, or intelligent principle, as far as we have been able to collect any information upon this abstruse subject, from reason, tradition, and revelation, let us now proceed, with equal modesty and caution, to an examination into its faculties, and the mode by which they develope themselves and acquire knowledge.

"All our knowledge," observes Lord Bacon, "is derived from experience." It is a remark peculiarly characteristic of that comprehensive judgment with which this great philosopher at all times contemplated the field of nature, and which has been assumed as the common basis of every system that has since been fabricated upon the subject. "Whence," enquires Mr. Locke, "comes the mind by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? I answer, in a word, from *experience*. In this all our knowledge is founded, from this the whole emanates and issues."

M. Degerando, and, in short, all the French philosophers of the present day, in adopting Locke's system, have necessarily adopted this important maxim as the groundwork of their reasoning; and though, as a general principle, it has been lately called in question by a few of the ablest advocates for what they have ventured to denominate the Theory of Common Sense, and especially by Professor Stewart *, as I may perhaps find it necessary to notice more particularly hereafter, it is sufficient for the present to observe that the shrewd and learned projector of this theory, Dr. Reid, admits it in its utmost latitude: "Wise men," says he, "now agree or ought to agree in this, that *there is but one way to the knowledge of nature's works, the way of observation and experiment.* By our constitution we have a strong propensity to trace particular facts and observations to general rules, and to apply such general rules to account for other effects, or to direct us in the production of them. This procedure of the understanding is familiar to every human creature in the common affairs of life, and IT IS THE ONLY ONE BY WHICH ANY REAL DISCOVERY IN PHILOSOPHY CAN BE MADE." †

Now the only mode by which we can obtain experience is by the use and exercise of the senses, which have been given to us for this

* Philos. Essays, vol. i. p. 122.
† Inquiry into the Human Mind, p. 2.

purpose, and which, to speak figuratively, may be regarded as the fingers of the mind in feeling its way forward, and opening the shutters to the admission of that pure and invigorating light, which in consequence breaks in upon it.

It must be obvious, however, to every one who has attended to the operations of his senses, that there never is, nor can be, any direct communication between the mind and the external objects the mind perceives, which are usually, indeed, at some distance from the sense that gives notice of them. Thus, in looking at a tree, it is the eye alone that really beholds the tree, while the mind only receives a notice of its presence, by some means or other, from the visual organ. So in touching this table, it is my hand alone that comes in contact with it, and communicates to my mind a knowledge of its hardness and other qualities. What then is the medium by which such communication is maintained, which induces the mind, seated as it is in some undeveloped part of the brain, to have a correspondent perception of the form, size, colour, smell, and even distance of objects with the senses which are seated on the surface of the body: and which, at the same time that it conveys this information, produces such an additional effect that the mind is able at its option to revive the perception, or call up an exact notion or idea of these qualities at a distant period, or when the objects themselves are no longer present? Is there, or is there not, any

resemblance between the external or sensible object and the internal or mental idea or notion? If there be a resemblance, in what does that resemblance consist? and how is it produced and supported? Does the external object throw off representative likenesses of itself in films, or under any other modification, so fine as to be able, like the electric or magnetic aura, to pass without injury from the object to the sentient organ, and from the sentient organ to the sensory? Or has the mind itself a faculty of producing, like a looking-glass, accurate counter-signs, intellectual pictures or images, correspondent with the sensible images communicated from the external object to the sentient organ? If, on the contrary, there be no resemblance, are the mental perceptions mere notions or intellectual symbols excited in it by the action of the external sense; which, while they bear no similitude to the qualities of the object discerned, answer the purpose of those qualities, as letters answer the purpose of sounds? Or are we sure that there is any external world whatever? any thing beyond the intellectual principle that perceives, and the sensations and notions that are perceived; or even any thing beyond those sensations and notions, those impressions and ideas themselves?

Several of these questions may perhaps appear in no small degree whimsical and brain-sick, and more worthy of St. Luke's than of a scientific institution. But all of them, and

perhaps as many more, of a temperament as wild as the wildest, have been asked, and insisted upon, and supported again and again in different ages and countries, by philosophers of the clearest intellects in other respects, and who had no idea of labouring under any such mental infirmity, nor ever dreamed of the necessity of being blistered and taking physic.*

There is scarcely, however, an hypothesis which has been started in modern times that cannot look for its prototype or suggestion among the ancients: and it will hence be found most advantageous, and may perhaps prove the shortest way to begin at the fountain-head, and to trace the different currents which have flowed from it. That fountain-head is Greece, or at least we may so regard it on the present occasion; and the plan which I shall request leave to pursue in the general enquiry before us will be, first of all to take a rapid sketch of the most celebrated speculations upon this subject to which this well-spring of wisdom has given rise; next to follow up the chief ramifications which have issued from them in later periods; and lastly to summon, as by a *quo warranto*, the more prominent of those of our own day to appear personally before the bar of this enlightened tribunal, for the purpose of trying their comparative pre-

* See the Author's Study of Medicine, vol. iv. p. 46. Edit. 2. 1825.

tensions, and of submitting them to your impartial award.

The principal systems that were started among the philosophers of Greece to explain the origin and value of human knowledge were those of Plato, of Aristotle, of Epicurus, and of the sceptics, especially Pyrrho and Arcesilas; and the principal systems to which they have given birth in later or modern times, are those of Des Cartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, Kant, and the Scottish school of Common Sense, at the head of which we are to place Dr. Reid.

I had occasion to observe, in our first series of lectures *, that it was a dogma common to many of the Greek schools, that matter, though essentially eternal, is also, in its primal and simple state, essentially amorphous, or destitute of all form and quality whatever; and I further remarked, that the ground-work of this dogma consisted in a belief that form and quality are the contrivance of an intelligent agent; while matter, though essentially eternal, is essentially unintelligent. Matter, therefore, it was contended, cannot possibly assume one mode of form rather than another mode; for if it were capable of assuming any kind, it must have been capable of assuming every kind, and of course of exhibiting intelligent effects without an intelligent cause.

* Vol. I. Ser. I. Lect. II.

Form, then, according to the Platonic schools, in which this was principally taught, existing distinct from matter by the mere will of the Great First Cause, presented itself, from all eternity, to his wisdom or *logos*, in every possible variety; or, in other words, under an infinite multiplicity of incorporeal or intellectual patterns, exemplars, or archetypes, to which the founder of this school gave the name of *ideas;* a term that has descended without any mischief into the popular language of our own day; but which, in the hands of the schoolmen, and various other theorists, has not unfrequently been productive of egregious errors and abuses. By the union of these intellectual archetypes with the whole or with any portion of primary or incorporeal matter, matter immediately becomes embodied, assumes palpable forms, correspondent with the archetypes united with it, and is rendered an object of perception to the external senses; the mind, or intelligent principle itself, however, which is an emanation from the great intelligent cause, never perceiving any thing more than the intellectual or formative ideas of objects as they are presented to the senses; and reasoning concerning them by those ideas alone.

It must be obvious, however, that the mind is possessed of many ideas which it could not derive from a material source. Such are all those that relate to abstract moral truths, and pure mathematics. And to account for these, it was a doctrine of the Platonic philosophy, that, besides

the sensible world, there is also an intelligible world; that the mind of man is equally connected with both, though the latter cannot possibly be discerned by corporeal organs; and that, as the mind perceives and reasons upon sensible objects by means of sensible archetypes or ideas, so it perceives and reasons upon intelligible objects by means of intelligible ideas.

The only essential variation from this hypothesis which Aristotle appears to have introduced into his own, consists in his having clothed, if I may be allowed the expression, the naked ideas of Plato, with the actual qualities of the objects perceived; his doctrine being, that the sense, on perceiving or being excited by an external object, conveys to the mind a real resemblance of it; which, however, though possessing form, colour, and other qualities of matter, is not matter itself, but an insubstantial image, like the picture in a mirror; as though the mind itself were a kind of mirror, and had a power of reflecting the image of whatever object is presented to the external senses. This insubstantial image or picture, in order to distinguish it from the intellectual pattern or idea of Plato, he denominated a *phantasm*. And as he supported with Plato the existence of an intelligible as well as of a sensible world, it was another part of his hypothesis that, while things sensible are perceived by sensible phantasms, things intelligible are perceived by intelligible phantasms; and consequently that virtue and vice, truth and

falsehood, time, space and numbers, have all their pictures and phantasms, as well as plants, houses, and animals.

Epicurus admitted a part of this hypothesis, and taught it contemporaneously at Mitylene, but the greater part he openly opposed and ridiculed. He concurred in the doctrine that the mind perceives sensible objects by means of sensible images; but he contended that those images are as strictly material as the objects from which they emanate; and that if we allow them to possess material qualities, we must necessarily allow them at the same time to possess the substance to which such qualities appertain. Epicurus, therefore, believed the perceptions of the mind to be real and substantial effigies, and to these effigies he gave the name of εἴδωλα, (idola) or SPECIES, in contradistinction to the insubstantial PHANTASMS of Aristotle, and the intellectual or formative IDEAS of Plato. He maintained that all external objects are perpetually throwing off fine alternate waves of different flavours, odours, colours, shapes, and other qualities; which, by striking against their appropriate senses, excite in the senses themselves a perception of the qualities and presence of the parent object; and are immediately conveyed by the sentient channel to the chamber of the mind, or sensory, without any injury to their texture: in the same manner as heat, light, and magnetism pervade solid substances, and still retain their integrity. And he affirmed further that, instead of the existence of

an imaginary, intelligible world, throwing off intelligible images, it is from the sensible or material world alone that the mind, by the exercise of its proper faculties, in union with that of the corporeal senses, derives every branch of knowledge, physical, moral, or mathematical.

If this view of the abstruse subject before us be correct, as I flatter myself it is, I may recapitulate in few words, that the external perceptions of the mind are, according to Plato, the primitive or intellectual patterns from which the forms and other qualities of objects have been taken; according to Aristotle, insubstantial pictures of them, as though reflected from a mirror; and, according to Epicurus, substantial or material effigies: such perceptions being under the first view of them denominated IDEAS; under the second, PHANTASMS; under the third, idola, or SPECIES.

While such were the fixed and promulgated tenets of Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, there were other philosophers of Greece, or who at least have been so denominated, that openly professed themselves to be without tenets of any kind; who declared that nothing was known or could be known upon any subject; and who, consequently, inculcated an universal scepticism. Of this delirious class of disputants, who were suffered to wander at large without a strait waistcoat, there are two that are pre-eminently entitled to our attention, Pyrrho and Arcesilas. Pyrrho studied first in the atomic school of Democritus, and seems to have lost his senses upon

the question of the infinite divisibility of matter, a question which has not unfrequently given birth to the same disease in modern times. He first doubted the solidity of its elementary atoms, — he next found out, that if these be not solid, every thing slips away from the fingers in a moment — the external world becomes a mere show — and there is no truth or solidity in any thing. He was not able to prove the solidity of the elementary atoms of matter. He hence doubted of every thing; advised all the world to do the same; and established a school for the purpose of inculcating this strange doctrine. In every other respect he was a man of distinguished accomplishments, and so highly esteemed by his countrymen, as to have been honoured with the dignity of chief priest, and exempted from public taxation. But, to such a formidable extreme did this disease of scepticism carry him, that one or more of his friends, as we are gravely told in history, were obliged to accompany him wherever he went, that he might not be run over by carriages, or fall down precipices. Yet he contrived, by some means or other, to live longer than most men of caution and common sense; for we find him at last dying of a natural death, at the good old age of ninety.

Arcesilas was one of the successors to Plato in the academic chair, and founder of the school that has been known by the name of the MIDDLE ACADEMY. Plato, in his fondness for intellectual IDEAS, those creatures of his own imagination, had

always given a much greater degree of credit to their testimony than to that of the objects which compose the material world; believing that the mind was less likely to be imposed upon than the external senses. And with so much zeal was this feeling or prejudice followed up by Arcesilas, that he soon began to doubt, and advised his scholars to doubt also, of the reality of every *thing* they saw about them; and at length terminated his doubts in questioning the competency of reason itself to decide upon any evidence the external senses might produce, though he admitted an external world of some kind or other. And upon being reminded, by one of his scholars, who had a wish to please him, that the only thing which Socrates declared he was certain of was his own *ignorance*, he immediately replied, that Socrates had no right to say even that—for that no man could be certain of any thing. It was against this unhappy madman, though in other respects, like Pyrrho, excellent and accomplished scholar, that Lucretius directed those forcible verses in favour of the truth and testimony of the senses, as the only genuine means of acquiring knowledge, which have been so often referred to, and so warmly commended in the controversy of the present day:

> Who holds that nought is known, denies he knows
> E'en this, thus owning that he nothing knows.
> With such I ne'er could reason, who, with face
> Retorted, treads the ground just trod before.

Yet grant e'en this he knows; since nought exists
Of truth in things, whence learns he what to know,
Or what not know? What things can give him first
The notion crude of what is false or true?
What prove aught doubtful, or of doubt devoid?
Search, and this earliest notion thou wilt find
Of truth and falsehood, from the senses drawn,
Nor aught can e'er refute them; for what once,
By truths oppos'd, their falsehood can detect,
Must claim a trust far ampler than themselves.
Yet what, than these, an ampler trust can claim?
Can reason, born, forsooth, of erring sense,
Impeach those senses whence alone it springs?
And which, if false, itself can ne'er be true.
Can sight correct the ears? Can ears the touch?
Or touch the tongue's fine flavour? or, o'er all
Can smell triumphant rise? Absurd the thought!
For every sense a separate function boasts,
A power prescrib'd; and hence, or soft, or hard,
Or hot, or cold, to its appropriate sense
Alone appeals. The gaudy train of hues,
With their light shades, appropriate thus, alike
Perceive we; tastes appropriate powers possess;
Appropriate, sounds and odours; and hence, too,
One sense another ne'er can contravene,
Nor e'en correct itself; since, every hour,
In every act, each claims an equal faith.
E'en though the mind no real cause could urge
Why what is square when present, when remote
Cylindric seems, 'twere dangerous less to adopt
A cause unsound, than rashly yield at once
All that we grasp of truth and surety most;
Rend all reliance, and root up, forlorn,
The first firm principles of life and health.
For not alone fails reason, life itself
Ends instant, if the senses thou distrust,
And dare some dangerous precipice, or aught
Against warn'd equal, spurning what is safe.
Hence all against the senses urg'd is vain;
Mere idle rant, and hollow pomp of words.

As, in a building, if the first lines err,
If aught impede the plummet, or the rule
From its just angles deviate but a hair,
The total edifice must rise untrue,
Recumbent, curv'd, o'erhanging, void of grace,
Tumbling or tumbled from this first defect, —
So must all reason prove unsound, deduc'd
From things created, if the senses err. *

It is not to be supposed that mankind could consent to be inoculated with this disease to any great extent, or for any considerable period of time: and hence the chief hypotheses that were countenanced at Rome, and till the decline of the Roman empire, were those of Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. During the dark ages, Aristotle seems to have held an undivided sovereignty; and, though his competitors came in for a share of power upon the revival of literature, he still held possession of the majority of the schools, till, in the middle of the seventeenth century, Des Cartes introduced a new hypothesis, which served as a foundation for most of the systems or speculations which have appeared since.

With Aristotle and Epicurus Des Cartes contended that the mind perceives external objects by images or resemblances presented to it: these images he called, after Plato, *ideas;* though he neither acceded to the meaning of this term as

* Denique, nihil sciri si quis putat, id quoque nescit
An sciri possit, &c. — Lib. iv. 471.

The passage is too long for quotation, and the reader may easily turn to it at his leisure.

given by Plato, nor allowed with Aristotle or Epicurus that they proceed from the objects themselves, and are transmitted to the mind through the channel of the senses; so that the precise signification he attached to this term is not clear. With Epicurus he threw away the doctrine of an intellectual world; but contended, in order to supply its place, that the mind has a large stock of ideas of its own, implanted by the hand of nature, and not derived from the world around us: ideas, therefore, that are strictly innate, and may be found on being searched for, though otherwise not necessarily present to the mind's contemplation. Among these the principal are, the idea of thought, or consciousness, of God, and of matter; all which may be fully depended upon as so many established truths: and hence, upon his hypothesis, all real knowledge flows from an internal source, or, in other words, from the mind itself. These ideas can never deceive us, though the senses may do so in their report concerning external objects; and consequently such ideas are chiefly to be trusted to and reasoned from even in questions that relate to the senses.

In analysing the idea of THOUGHT, the mind, according to Aristotle, discovers it to be a power that has neither extension, figure, local motion, nor any other property commonly ascribed to body. In analysing the idea of GOD, the mind finds presented to it a being necessarily and eternally existing, supremely intelligent, power-

ful, and perfect, the fountain of all goodness and truth, and the creator of the universe. In analysing the idea of MATTER, the mind perceives it to be a substance possessing no other property than extent: — or, in other words, as having nothing else belonging to it than length, breadth, and thickness; that space, possessing equally this property, is a part of matter, and consequently that matter is universal, and there is no vacuum. From these, and other innate ideas, compared and combined with the ideas of sensation, or those furnished to the mind by the senses, flows, on the hypothesis of Des Cartes, the whole fund of human understanding, or all the knowledge that mankind are or can be possessed of.

There are two fundamental errors, and errors, moreover, of an opposite character, that accompany, or rather introduce, this hypothesis, and to which, popular as it was at one time, it has at length completely fallen a sacrifice: these are the attempting to prove what ought to be taken for granted, and the taking for granted what ought to be proved.

The philosophy of Des Cartes sets off with supposing that every man is more or less under the influence of prejudice, and consequently that he cannot know the real truth of any thing till he has thoroughly sifted it. It follows necessarily, as a second position, that every man ought, at least once in his life, to doubt of every thing, in order to sift it; not, however, like the sceptics of Greece, that, by such examination, he

may be confirmed in doubt, but that, by obtaining proofs, he may have a settled conviction.

Full fraught with these preliminary principles, our philosopher opens his career of knowledge, and while he himself continues as grave as the noble knight of La Mancha, his journey commences almost as ludicrously. His first doubt is whether he himself is alive or in being, and his next, whether any body is alive or in being about him. He soon satisfies himself, however, upon the first point, by luckily finding out that he thinks, and therefore, says he gravely, I must be alive: *Cogito, ergo sum.* "I think, and therefore I am." And he almost as soon satisfies himself upon the second, by feeling with his hands about him, and finding out that he can run them against a something or a somebody else, against a man or a post. He then returns home to himself once more, overjoyed with this demonstration of his fingers; and commences a second voyage of discovery by doubting whether he knows any thing besides his own existence, and that of a something beyond him. And he now ascertains, to his inexpressible satisfaction, that the soil of his own mind is sown with indigenous ideas precisely like that of thought or consciousness. These he digs up one after another, in order to examine them. One of the first that turns up is that of a God: one of the next is an idea that informs him that the outside of himself, or rather of his mind, is matter; and combining the whole he has thus far acquired

with other information obtained from the same sources, he finds that the people whom he has before discovered by means of his hands and eyes call this matter a body, and that the said people have bodies of the same kind, and also the same kind of knowledge as himself, although not to the same extent or demonstration; and for this obvious reason, because they have not equally doubted and examined.

It is difficult to be grave upon such a subject. What would be thought or said of any individual in the present audience, who should rise up and openly tell us that he had been long troubled with doubts whether he really existed or not; that his friends had told him he did, and he was inclined to believe so; but that as this belief might be a mere prejudice, he was at length determined to try the fact by asking himself this plain question, — "Do I think?" Is there a person before me but would exclaim, almost instinctively, "Ah! poor creature, he had better ask himself another plain question, — whether he is in his sober senses?"

If, however, we attempt to examine seriously the mode which M. Des Cartes thus proposes of following up his own principles, it is impossible not to be astonished at his departure from them at the first outset. Instead of doubting of every thing and proving every thing, the very first position before him he takes for granted: "I think; therefore I am." Of these two positions, he makes the first the proof of the second, but

what is the proof of the first? If it be necessary to prove that HE IS, the very ground-work of his system renders it equally necessary to prove that HE THINKS. But this he does not attempt to do: in direct contradiction to his fundamental principles he here commits a *petitio principii*, and takes it for granted. I do not find fault with him for taking it for granted; but then he might as well have saved himself the trouble of manufacturing an imperfect syllogism, and have taken it for granted also that he was alive or that he existed, for the last fact must have been just as obvious to himself as the first, and somewhat more so to the world at large.

There is another logical error in this memorable enthymeme, or syllogism without a head, which ought not to pass without notice; I mean that the proof does not run parallel with the predicate, and consequently does not answer its purpose. The subject predicated is that the philosopher exists or is alive, and to prove this he affirms gratuitously that he thinks. "I think; and therefore I am." Now, in respect to the extent or parallelism of the proof, he might just as well have said "I itch," or "I eat; and therefore I am." I will not dispute that in all probability he thought more than he itched, or partook of food: but let us take which proof we will, it could only be a proof so long as he itched, or was eating; and consequently, whenever he ceased from either of these conditions, upon his own argument, he would have no

proof whatever of being alive. Now, that he must often have ceased from itching, or eating, there is no difficulty in admitting; but then he may also at times have ceased from thinking, not only in various morbid states of the brain, but whenever he slept without dreaming. And hence, the utmost that any such argument could decide in his favour, let us take which kind of proof we will, would be that he could alternately prove himself to be alive and alternately not alive; that it was obvious to himself that he existed for and during the time that he thought, itched, or ate, but that he had no proof of existence as soon as these were over.

But I have said, that M. Des Cartes' philosophy consists not only in demanding proofs where no proofs are necessary, and where the truisms are so clear as to render it ludicrous to ask for them; but in taking for granted propositions that evidently demand proof. And I now allude to his whole doctrine of innate ideas—of axioms or principles planted in the mind by the hand of nature herself, and which are evidently intended to supply the place of the intelligible world of Plato and Aristotle.

Of these I have only produced a small sample, and it is not necessary to bring more to market. Let us state his innate idea of a God. It is, I admit, a very reverential, correct, and perfect one, and does him credit as a theologist: but I am not at present debating with him as a theologist, but as a logician. It is in truth owing

to its very perfection that I object to it; for there is strong ground to suspect, notwithstanding all his care to the contrary, that he has obtained it from induction, rather than from impulse; from an open creed, than from a latent principle. If such an idea be innate to him, there can be no question that it must be also innate to every one else. Now, it so happens that the ideas of other men, in different parts of the world, wander from his own idea as far as the north pole from the south. There are some barbarians, we are told, so benighted as to have no idea of a god at all. Such, as Mr. Marsden, His Majesty's principal chaplain in New South Wales, informs us, are the very barbarous aboriginal tribes of that vast settlement. "They have no knowledge," says he, "of any religion, false or true." There are others, whose idea of a god has only been formed in the midst of gloom and terror: and who hence, with miserable ignorance, represent him, in their wooden idols, under the ugliest and most hideous character their gross imagination can suggest. Atheism, in the strictest sense of the term, is at this moment, and has been for nearly a thousand years at least, the established belief of the majority, or rather, of the whole Burman empire; the fundamental doctrine of whose priesthood consists in a denial that there is any such power as an eternal independent essence in the universe; and that at this moment there is any God whatever; Gaudama, their last Boodh, or deity, having, by his meritorious deeds, long since reached

the supreme good of *Nigbar*, or annihilation; which is the only ultimate reward in reserve for the virtuous among mankind*; while the ideas of

* The most authentic account of the tenets of Boodhism which have of late years been communicated to the world, are those furnished by Mr. Judson, an American missionary, who for the last ten or twelve years has been stationary at Rangoon or Ava, has acquired an accurate knowledge of th Burman and Pali, or vulgar and sacred tongue, and has translated the whole of the New Testament into the former. His very interesting account of the mission of himself and his colleagues, as well as of the national creed of this extraordinary people, is to be found in his correspondence with the American Baptist Missionary Board, as also in "an Account of the American Baptist Mission to the Burman Empire, in a Series of Letters addressed to a Gentleman in London, by A. H. Judson, 8vo. Lond. 1823." The whole universe, according to the principles of Boodhism, is governed by fate, which has no more essential existence than chance. A Boodh, or god, is occasionally produced, and appears on earth, the last of whom was Gaudama. But gods and men must equally follow the law or order of fate; they must die, and they must suffer in a future state according to the sins they have committed on earth; and, when this penance has been completed, they reach alike the supreme good of Nigbar, or utter annihilation. Gaudama, their last deity, many hundred years ago reached this state of final beatitude, and another deity is soon expected to make his appearance. An eternal self-existent being is, in the opinion of the Boodhists, an utter impossibility, and they hear of such a doctrine with horror. When Mr. Judson had obtained an audience of the Burman emperor in his palace at Ava, to solicit protection and toleration, his petition was first read, and then a little tract, containing the chief doctrines of Christianity, printed in the Burman tongue, put into the Emperor's hands. "He held the tract," says Mr. Judson, "long enough to read the two first sentences, which

the wisest philosophers of Greece appear to have fallen far short of the bright exemplar of M. Des Cartes.

That Des Cartes himself was possessed of this idea at the time he wrote, no man can have any doubt; but what proof have we that he possessed it INNATELY? and that he found it among the ORIGINAL FURNITURE OF HIS MIND?

In like manner, he tells us, that his knowledge of MATTER is derived from the same unerring source; that its idea exists within him, and that this idea represents it to be an extended substance, without any other quality, and embracing space as a part of itself. Now, if such an idea appertained naturally to him, it must, in like manner, appertain naturally to every one. Let me, then, ask the audience I have the honour of addressing, whether the same notion has ever presented itself, as it necessarily ought to have done, to the minds of every one or of any one before me? and whether they seriously believe that SPACE is a part of MATTER? So far from it, that I much question whether even the meaning of the position is universally understood: while, with respect to those by whom it is understood, I have a shrewd suspicion it is not assented to; and that they would even

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assert that there is one eternal God, who is independent of the incidents of mortality; and that, beside him, there is no god; and then, with an air of indifference, perhaps of disdain, he dashed it down to the ground. Our fate was decided." — Id. p. 231.

apprehend some trick had been played upon them if they should find it in their minds. The good father Malebranche, as excellent a Cartesian as ever lived, and who possessed withal quite mysticism enough to have succeeded Plato, upon his death, and turned Xenocrates out of the chair, suspected that tricks like these are perpetually played upon us. For he openly tells us, in his *Recherche de la Vérité*, that ever since the fall Satan has been making such sad work with our senses, both external and internal, that we can only rectify ourselves by a vigorous determination to doubt of every thing, after the tried and approved Cartesian recipe: and if a man, says he, has only learned to doubt, let him not imagine that he has made an inconsiderable progress. And, for this purpose, he recommends retirement from the world, a solitary cell, and a long course of penitence and water gruel: after which our innate ideas, he tells us, will rise up before us at a glance: our senses, which were at first as honest faculties as one could desire to be acquainted with, till debauched in their adventure with original sin, will no longer be able to cheat us, we shall see into the whole process of transubstantiation, and though we behold nothing in matter, we shall behold all things in God.

It may, perhaps, be conceived that I treat the subject before us somewhat too flippantly or too cavalierly. It is not, however, the subject before us that I thus treat, but the hypothesis; and in truth it is the only mode in which I feel myself able to

treat it at all; for I could as soon be serious over the 'Loves of the Plants,' or 'The Battle of the Frogs.' And I must here venture to extend the remark a little further, and to add, that there is but one hypothesis amidst all those that yet remain to be examined, that I shall be able to treat in any other manner; for, excepting in this one, there is not a whit of superiority that I can discover in any of them; and the one I refer to, though I admit its imperfections in various points, is that of our own enlightened countryman, Mr. Locke. I may, perhaps, be laughed at in my turn, and certainly should be so if I were as far over the Tweed as over the Thames, and be told that I am at least half a century behind the times. Yet, by your permission, I shall dare the laugh, and endeavour, at least, to put merriment against merriment; and shall leave it to yourselves to determine, after a full and impartial hearing, who has the best claim to be pleasant. So that the study of metaphysics may not, perhaps, appear quite so gloomy and repugnant as the writings of some philosophers would represent it. If it have its gravity, it may also be found to have its gaiety as well; and to prove that there is no science in which it better becomes us to adopt the maxim of the poet, and to

> Laugh where we may, be serious where we c
> But vindicate the ways of God to man.

LECTURE IV.

The same Subject continued.

In our preceding study we commenced a general survey of the chief opinions and hypotheses that have been urged in different periods upon the important subject of Human Understanding; and, opening our career with the Greek schools, we closed it with that of Des Cartes.

Des Cartes, who was born in 1596, was for nearly a century the Aristotle of his age; and although from his very outset he was opposed by his contemporaries and literary friends Gassendi and Hobbes, he obtained a complete triumph, and steadily supported his ascendant, till the physical philosophy of Newton, and the metaphysical of Locke, threw an eclipse over his glory, from which he has now no chance of ever recovering.

Nothing, however, can prove more effectually the influence which fashion operates upon philosophy as well as upon dress, than a glance at the very opposite characters by whom the Cartesian system was at one and the same time principally professed and defended — Malebranche and Spinosa, Leibnitz and Bayle. It would, perhaps, be impossible, were we to range

through the whole scope of philosophical or even of literary biography, to collect a more motley and heterogeneous group; the four elements of hot, cold, moist, and dry, can not possibly present a stronger contrast; a mystical Catholic, a Jewish materialist, a speculative but steady Lutheran, and an universal sceptic.

It was only, however, for want of a simpler and more rational system, that Des Cartes continued so long and so extensively to govern the metaphysical taste of the day. That system was at length given to the world by Mr. Locke, and the "PRINCIPIA PHILOSOPHIÆ" fell prostrate before the "ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING."

This imperishable work made its first appearance in 1689: it may, perhaps, be somewhat too long; it may occasionally embrace subjects which are not necessarily connected with it; its terms may not always be precise, nor its opinions in every instance correct; but it discovers intrinsic and most convincing evidence that the man who wrote it must have had a head peculiarly clear and a heart peculiarly sound. It is strictly original in its matter, highly important in its subject, luminous and forcible in its argument, perspicuous in its style, and comprehensive in its scope. It steers equally clear of all former systems: we have nothing of the mystical archetypes of Plato, the incorporeal phantoms of Aristotle, or the material species of Epicurus; we are equally without the intelligible world of

the Greek schools, and the innate ideas of Des Cartes. Passing by all which, from actual experience and observation it delineates the features, and describes the operations of the human mind, with a degree of precision and minuteness which have never been exhibited either before or since.* "Nothing," says Dr. Beattie, and I readily avail myself of the acknowledgment of a honest and enlightened antagonist, "was further from the intention of Locke than to encourage verbal controversy, or advance doctrines favourable to scepticism. To do good to mankind by enforcing virtue, illustrating truth, and vindicating liberty, was his sincere purpose. His writings are to be reckoned among the few books that have been productive of real utility to mankind." †

To take this work as a text-book, of which, however, it is well worthy, would require a long life instead of a short lecture: and I shall, hence, beg leave to submit to you only a very brief summary of the more important part of its system and of the more prominent opinions it inculcates, especially in respect to the powers and process of the mind in acquiring knowledge. The work consists of four divisions, the first of which, however, is merely introductory, and intended to clear the ground of that multitude of strong and deep-rooted weeds at which we have already glanced, and which, under the

* Stud. of Med. Vol. iii. p. 19. 2d edit.

† Essay on Truth, Part ii. ch. ii. § 2.

scholastic name of *præcognita*, innate ideas, maxims, and dictates, or innate speculative and practical principles, prevented the growth of a better harvest; and, to a certain extent, superseded the necessity of reason, education, and revelation, of national institutions and Bible societies; by teaching that a true and correct notion of God, of self or consciousness, of virtue and vice, and consequently of religious and moral duties, is imprinted by nature on the mind of every man; and that we cannot transgress the law thus originally implanted within us without exposing ourselves to the lash of our own consciences. Discarding for ever all this jargon of the schools, the Essay before us proceeds in its three remaining parts to treat of IDEAS, which, in the popular, and not the scholastic, sense of the term, are the elements of knowledge; of WORDS, which are the signs of ideas, and consequently the circulating medium of knowledge; and of KNOWLEDGE itself, which is the subject proposed and the great end to be acquired.

The whole of the preceding rubbish, then, being in this manner cleared away, the elaborate author proceeds to represent to us the body and mind as equally at birth a *tabula rasa*, or unwritten sheet of paper: as consisting equally of a blank or vacuity of impressions, but as equally capable of acquiring impressions by the operation of external objects, and equally and most skilfully endowed with distinct powers or faculties for this purpose; those of the body being

being the external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; and those of the mind the internal senses of perception, reason, judgment, imagination, and memory. *

It is possible that a few slight impressions may be produced a short time antecedently to birth; and it is certain that various instinctive tendencies, which, however, have no connection with the mind, are more perfect, because more needful, at the period of birth than ever afterwards; and we have also frequent proofs of an hereditary or accidental predisposition towards particular subjects. But the fundamental doctrine before us is by no means affected by such collateral circumstances; to the correctness of which our most eminent logicians of later times have given their entire suffrage. Thus Bishop Butler, and it is not necessary to go farther than this eminent casuist: — "In these respects," meaning those before us, "mankind is left by nature an unformed, unfinished creature, utterly deficient and unqualified before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that mature state of life which was the end of his creation, considering him as related only to this world. The faculty of reason is the candle of the Lord within us; though it can afford no light

* An abstract of this view of Mr. Locke's system, abbreviated for the occasion, the Author found himself called upon to introduce into his Study of Medicine. — Vol. iv. p. 50—55. 2d edit. 1825.

where it does not shine, nor judge where it has no principles to judge upon." *

External objects first impress or operate upon the outward senses, and these senses, by means hitherto unexplained, and, perhaps, altogether inexplicable, immediately impress or operate upon the mind, or excite in it perceptions or ideas of the presence and qualities of such objects; the word idea being employed in the system before us, not, as we have already hinted at, in any of the significations of the schools, but in its broad and popular meaning, as importing "whatever a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind †;" whatever was formerly intended by the terms archetype, phantasm, species, thought, notion, conception, or whatever else it may be, which we can be employed about in thinking. ‡ And to these effects, without puzzling himself with the inquiry how external objects operate upon the senses, or the senses upon the mind, Mr. Locke gave the name of *ideas of* SENSATION, in allusion to the source from which they are derived.

But the mind, as we have already observed, has various powers or faculties as well as the body; and they are quite as active and lively in their respective functions. In consequence of which the ideas of external objects are not only perceived, but retained, thought of, compared,

* Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, Part i. ch. v. Part ii. Conclusion.

† Locke, Book i. ch. i. § 3. ‡ Ib. § 8.

compounded, abstracted, doubted, believed, desired; and hence another fountain, and of a very capacious flow, from which we also derive ideas, namely, a reflex act or perception of the mind's own operations; whence the ideas derived from this fountain are denominated *ideas of* REFLEXION.

The ideas, then, derived from these two sources, and which have sometimes been called OBJECTIVE and SUBJECTIVE *, constitute all our experience, and consequently all our knowledge. Whatever stock of information a man may be possest of, however richly he may be stored with taste, learning, or science, if he turn his attention inwards and diligently examine his own thoughts, he will find that he has not a single idea in his mind but what has been derived from the one or the other of these two channels. But let not this important observation be forgotten by any one; that the ideas the mind

* "On appelle, dans la philosophie Allemande, idées *subjectives* celles que naissent de la nature de notre intelligence et de ses facultés, et idées *objectives* toutes celles que sont excitées par les sensations."—Mad. de Staël Holstein, de l'Allemagne, tom. iii. p. 76.

Mad. de Staël, however, has fallen into the common error of the French philosophers, from whom she appears to have generally informed herself of the principles of Locke's system, in supposing that he derived all ideas from sensation. "A l'époque où parut *la Critique de la Raison pure*, il n'existoit que deux systémes sur l'entendement humain parmi les penseurs; l'une, celui de Locke, *attribuait toutes nos idées à nos sensations*; l'autre, celui de Descartes et de Leibnitz, s'attachoit à démontrer la spiritualité et l'activité de l'âme, de libre arbitre, enfin toute la doctrine idéaliste."—Id. p. 70.

possesses will be fewer or more numerous, simpler or more diversified, clear or confused, according to the number of the objects or subjects presented to it, and the extent of its reflection and examination. Thus, a clock or a landscape may be for ever before our eyes, but unless we direct our attention to them, and study their different parts, although we cannot be deceived in their being a clock or a landscape, we can have but a very confused idea of their character and composition. The ideas presented to the mind, from which of these two sources soever derived, or in other words, whether objective or subjective, are of two kinds, SIMPLE and COMPLEX.

SIMPLE IDEAS consist of such as are limited to a single notion or perception; as those of unity, darkness, light, sound, hardness, sweetness, simple pain or uneasiness. And in the reception of these the mind is passive, for it can neither make them to itself, nor can it, in any instance, have any idea which does not wholly consist of them; or, in other words, it cannot contemplate any one of them otherwise than in its totality. Thus, on looking at this single sheet of paper, I have the idea of unity; and though I may divide the single sheet of paper into twenty parts, I cannot divide the idea of unity into twenty parts; for the idea of unity will and must as wholly accompany every part as it accompanies the collective sheet. And the same remark will apply to all the rest.

Complex ideas are formed out of various simple ideas associated together, or contemplated derivatively. And to this class belong the ideas of an army, a battle, a triangle, gratitude, veneration, gold, silver, an apple, an orange: in the formation of all which it must be obvious that the mind is active, for it is the activity of the mind alone that produces the complexity out of such ideas as are simple. And that the ideas I have now referred to are complex must be plain to every one; for every one must be sensible that the mind cannot form to itself the idea of an orange without uniting into one aggregate the simple ideas of roundness, yellowness, juiciness, and sweetness. In like manner, in contemplating the idea of gold, there must necessarily be present to the mind, and in a complex or aggregate form, the ideas of great weight, solidity, yellowness, lustre; and if the idea be very accurate, great malleability and fusibility.

Complex ideas are formed out of simple ideas by many operations of the mind; the principal of which, however, are some combination of them, some abstraction, or some comparison. Let us take a view of each of these: —

And, first, of complex ideas of combination. Unity, as I have already observed, is a simple idea; and it is one of the most common simple ideas that can be presented to the mind, for every object without, and every idea within, tend equally to excite it. And, as being a simple idea, the mind, as I have also remarked, is pas-

sive on its presentation; it can neither form such an idea to itself, nor contemplate it otherwise than in its totality: but it can combine the ideas of as many units as its pleases, and hence produce the complex idea of a hundred, a thousand, or a hundred thousand. So beauty is a complex idea, for the mind, in forming it, combines a variety of separate ideas into one common aggregate. Thus Dryden, in delineating the beautiful Victoria, in his "Love Triumphant:"

> Her eyes, her lips, her cheeks, her shape, her features,
> Seem to be drawn by Love's own hand; by Love
> Himself in love.

In like manner the mind can produce complex ideas by an opposite process, and that is, by ABSTRACTION, or separation. Thus chalk, snow, and milk, though agreeing, perhaps, in no other respect, coincide in the same colour; and the mind, contemplating this agreement, may abstract or separate it from the other properties of these three objects, and form the idea which is indicated by the term *whiteness;* and having thus acquired a new idea by the process of abstraction, it may afterwards apply it as a character to a variety of other objects: and hence particular ideas become general or universal.

Other complex ideas are produced by COMPARISON. Thus, if the mind take one idea, as that of a foot, as a determinate measure, and place it by the side of another idea, as the idea of a table, the result will be a formation of the

complex idea of length, breadth, and thickness. Or if we vary the primary ideas, we may obtain as a result, the secondary ideas of coarseness and fineness.

And hence complex ideas must be almost infinitely more numerous than simple ideas, which are their elements or materials, as words must be always far more numerous than letters. I have instanced only a few of their principal kinds; but even each of these kinds is applicable to a variety of subjects, of which Mr. Locke mentions the three following:

I. Ideas of Substances; or such as we have uniformly found connected in the same thing, and without which, therefore, such thing cannot be contemplated. To this head belong the complex ideas of a man, a horse, a river, a mountain.

II. Ideas of Modes; or such as may be considered as representative of the mere affections, or properties of substance; of which the idea of number may once more be offered as an example: the ideas of expansion or extension and duration belong to the same stock; and in like manner those of power, time, space, and infinity, which are all modes, properties, or affections of substance; or secondary ideas derived from or excited by the primary idea of substance of some kind or other.

III. Ideas of Relations; which are by far the most extensive, if not the most important, branch of subjects from which our complex

ideas are derived; for there is nothing whatever, whether simple idea, substance, mode, relation, or even the name of any of them, which is not capable of an almost infinite number of bearings in reference or relation to other things. It is from this source, therefore, that we derive a very large proportion of our thoughts and words. As examples under it, I may mention all those ideas that relate to or are even imported by the terms father, brother, son, master, magistrate, younger, older, cause and effect, right and wrong, and consequently all moral relations.

It must hence appear obvious that many of our ideas have a NATURAL CORRESPONDENCE, congruity, and connexion with each other. And as many, perhaps, on the contrary, a NATURAL REPUGNANCY, incongruity, and disconnexion. Thus if I were to speak of a cold fire, I should put together ideas that are naturally disconnected and incongruous, and should consequently make an absurd proposition, or, to adopt common language, talk nonsense. I should be guilty of the same blunder if I were to speak of a square billiard-ball, or a soft reposing rock. But a warm fire, on the contrary, a white, or even a black billiard-ball, and a hard, rugged rock, are congruous ideas, and consequently consistent with good sense. Now it is the direct office of that discursive faculty of the mind which we call reason, to trace out these natural coincidences or disjunctions, and to connect or separate them

by proper relations. For it is a just perception of the natural connexion and congruity, or of the natural repugnancy and incongruity of our ideas, that constitutes all real knowledge. The wise man is he who has industriously laid in and carefully assorted an extensive stock of ideas; as the stupid or ignorant man is he who, from natural hebetude, or having had but few opportunities, has collected and arranged but a small number. The man who discovers the natural relations of his ideas quickly is a man of sagacity; and, in popular language, is said, and correctly so, to possess a quick, sharp intellect. The man, on the contrary, who discovers these relations slowly, we call dull or heavy. If he rapidly discover and put together relations that lie remote, and perhaps touch only in a few points, but those points striking and pleasant, he is a man of wit, genius, or brilliant fancy; of agreeable allusion and metaphor. If he connect ideas of fancy with ideas of reality, and mistake the one for the other, however numerous his ideas may be, and whatever their order of succession, he is a madman: he reasons from false principles; and, as we say in popular language, and with perfect correctness, is out of his judgment.

Finally, our ideas are very apt to ASSOCIATE or run together in trains; and upon this peculiar and happy disposition of the mind we lay our chief dependence in sowing the important seeds of education. It often happens, however, that some of our ideas have been associated erro-

neously, and even in a state of early life, before education has commenced: and hence, from the difficulty of separating them, most of the sympathies and antipathies, the whims and prejudices that occasionally haunt us to the latest period of old age. Peter the Great, having been terrified by a fall into a sheet of water when an infant, could never till he became a man, go over a bridge without shuddering; and even at last had no small difficulty in breaking the connection of the ideas that were thus early and powerfully associated. Avarice did not by any kind of predisposition belong to the miser Elwes, for in his youth he was of gay manners, and a spendthrift; but he caught the vice by living with his uncle: uninterrupted habit, the strong power of association, gave strength to its influence, and what was originally his abhorrence became at length his idol.

Such, then, is the manner in which the mind, at first a sheet of white paper, without characters of any kind, becomes furnished with that vast store of ideas, the materials of wisdom and knowledge, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety. The whole is derived from experience —THE EXPERIENCE OF SENSATION OR REFLECTION; from the observations of the mind employed either about external sensible objects, or the internal operations of itself, perceived and reflected upon by its own faculties.

But man is a social as well as a rational being; he is dependent for the supply of his wants upon his fellow man; and his happiness is made to consist in this dependence. The ideas he possesses he feels a desire of communicating, and those possessed by others he feels an equal desire of diving into. But ideas in themselves are incommunicable: he requires here, as in the case of sensible objects, a circulating medium by which their value may be expressed. And what he requires is freely granted to him: it consists in the high faculty of speech; in reducing ideas to articulate sounds or words, the aggregate of which constitutes language. And hence the great and valuable systematic work to which I have now chiefly directed your attention, proceeds from a general analysis of our ideas to a general analysis of their vocal representatives: a subject which every one must perceive to be of the utmost importance in the progress of human understanding. Important, however, as it is, it is a subject rather collateral than direct. We have briefly glanced at it already *, and may perhaps return to it hereafter, but I shall postpone it for the present, that we may hasten with due speed to the goal before us. Allow me, however, before we quit it, to observe that words bear precisely the same relation to ideas that ideas do to objects; for as ideas are the mere signs of objects, so words are the mere signs of

* Vol. II. Ser. II. Lect. VIII. IX. X.

ideas; and hence that every rule which applies to the variety, precision, and arrangement of our ideas, applies with equal force to the variety, precision, and arrangement of our words; and that without a clear and determinate meaning to the latter, we can no more have a clear and determinate apprehension of the former than we can have of a person's features by a confused or unlike picture. And hence the importance of attending to our vocabulary; of minutely measuring and weighing the terms we make use of, so as to adjust them exactly to the measure and weight of our ideas, must be obvious at the first glance; as it must be also that the more exact and copious a language is found, the more clear and comprehensive must be the general knowledge of the nation to which it belongs.

But ideas and words, though the materials of which knowledge is constructed, and without which it cannot among mankind be constructed at all, are no more knowledge itself than the bricks and mortar of a house are the house itself. Both, as I have indeed hinted at already, must be collected in sufficient abundance, compared with each other, duly assorted, arranged and united together, before the proper building can be produced; and we have yet, therefore, to contemplate the most important part of the subject before us, and that to which the preceding parts are subservient — the general nature of knowledge, its kinds, degrees and reality.

KNOWLEDGE may be defined the PERCEPTION OF TRUTH, or in the language of Aristole, THE SCIENCE OF TRUTH: and consequently he who acquires knowledge, perceives or acquires truth. But what is truth? This is a question which has been asked for ages: the particular answer, however, must necessarily depend upon the particular subject to which it refers. We are now considering *general truth*, which may be defined the connexion and agreement, or repugnancy and disagreement, of our ideas.

This definition requires some attention; but when it is thoroughly comprehended, it will be found to apply to truths of every kind, in the arts, physics, and morals, as well as in metaphysics; for the law of adjustment, of connexion and disconnexion, of congruity and incongruity it refers to, is an universal law or constitution of nature, and hence must hold equally every where. Thus in a building, where the different parts of which it consists perfectly agree, the lines accurately correspond, and the dependencies fit and are proportioned to each other; every part is TRUE to every part, and the whole is TRUE to itself.

So in working a mathematical problem, or determining a fact from circumstantial evidence, every separate link or idea that constitutes a part of the general chain, must have its proper connexion or agreement with the link or idea that lies next to it, as well above as below: for it is these connexions or agreements between

one idea, and another that constitute the proofs, and a failure in any one destroys our knowledge upon the subject; or, in other words, prevents us from perceiving its truth.

It sometimes happens that we are able to discover at once this agreement or disagreement, this connexion or repugnancy, in the ideas that are presented to us; and in such case our knowledge is instantaneous, and constitutes what we call INTUITION or INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. But it happens far more generally that the agreement or disagreement is by no means obvious; and we are obliged, as in the case of circumstantial evidence, to look out for some intermediate idea, which the schools denominate a *medius terminus*, by which the separate ideas may be united. To make this research is the peculiar province of the discursive faculty of reason; and hence the information thus obtained is called RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE.

Let us take a brief view of both these. When I affirm that white is not black; or, which is a proposition of the same kind, that white is white, and black is black, I affirm what I know intuitively. The colours of white and of black have excited ideas in my mind, which, whenever they occur, must be identic and true to themselves; for it is not possible for me to have any other idea of white than white, or of black than black: the agreement in this case is the AGREEMENT OF IDENTITY, the agreement of either idea with itself; and hence the man who asks me to

prove that white is white, or that white is not black, or red, or yellow, asks me to prove what I neither can prove nor want to prove. I do not want to prove it, for I know it with certain knowledge, or, in other words, it is SELF-EVIDENT. And I cannot prove it for this reason; that every proof consists in placing between two ideas that we want to unite together by an agreement which we do not perceive, an idea whose agreement with both of them is more obvious. But what idea can I place by the side of the idea of white, of black, of red, or of yellow, that can agree more fully with either of these ideas, than such ideas agree with themselves? Every one must see that there is no such idea to be had; and consequently that I can neither offer a proof nor want one. And the very attempt to obtain such a proof would be an absurdity: for could it possibly be acquired, it would not add to my knowledge, which is perfect and certain already, and depends upon the constant agreement of the idea with itself, — the agreement of identity.

Nothing has been productive of more mischief in the science of metaphysics than this absurd restlessness in seeking after proofs in cases of intuition, where no proofs are to be had, and the knowledge is certain without them. M. Des Cartes' hypothesis, as I had occasion to notice in our last lecture, commences with an instance of this very absurdity, and it has proved the ruin of it; and the same attempt in various

other hypotheses of later date that we shall yet have to touch upon, and particularly those of Bishop Berkeley and Mr. Hume, has equally proved the ruin of these. When I affirm that *I am*, I affirm that of which I have an intuitive knowledge: and when I affirm that *I think*, I only make a proposition of the same kind. The connection between the two ideas *I am*, and the two ideas *I think*, is a connexion of co-existence or absolute necessity. It is not possible to separate them, and they want no third or intervening idea to unite them; for if it were possible for me to doubt whether I thought, or whether I existed, the very doubt itself would answer the purpose of a proof in either case. Now one of the chief absurdities of M. Des Cartes' argument, *I think, therefore I am*, consists in his putting two propositions equally self-evident and intuitive, by the side of each other, and making the first the proof of the second. For being equally intuitive, the second must be just as good a proof of the first as the first is of the second; since the mind can no more put together the two ideas *I am* without *thinking*, than it can put together the two ideas *I think*, without *being*. But nothing is gained by their being put together in the way of proof or demonstration, for I have no more evidence of my existence by calling up the ideas, *I think*, than I had before this proposition was conceived. And hence the attempt not only fails, but could lead to no use if it could stand its ground.

Our knowledge of personal identity is derived from the same source. It is INTUITIVE. This is a subject which has excited a great dael of learned controversy, — and called forth many a different proof, or attempt at proof, from the different disputants who have engaged in it. Mr. Locke himself, with a singular deviation from the principles of his own system, has fallen into a common error, and offered as a proof the idea of consciousness. No proof, however, or attempt at proof, is more imperfect; for the identity often continues when the consciousness is interrupted, as in sleep without dreaming, in apoplexy, catalepsy, drowning, and various other cases: and hence if identity were dependent on consciousness, the same man in a dead sleep and out of it would be two or more different persons. The truth is, that our knowledge of identity is intuitive; the two ideas *I am*, and the two ideas *I was*, a combination of which constitutes the more complex idea of personal identity, are ideas of necessary connexion from the first moment the connexion can be formed: and hence they produce certain knowledge, and can have no proof; since there can be no intermediate idea capable of possessing a closer connexion with either proposition, and consequently fitted to enter between them. "Here then," to adopt the language of Bishop Butler, whose reasoning upon this subject, bears a close resemblance to the present, "we can go no further. For it is ridi-

culous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions whose truth we can no otherwise prove than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves.*

I may now advance a step further, and observe that in all cases in which the agreement or disagreement of two or more ideas can be immediately perceived and compared together, our knowledge is of a like kind, and consequently approaches to intuitive; although to other persons such ideas may be very remote, and require a long chain of intermediate ideas to connect or separate them, or prove their agreement or repugnancy. Thus I know intuitively, or without going through the process, that the arc of a circle is less than the entire circle; that a circle itself is a line equidistant in every part of it from its centre; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; that the square of four is sixteen. No man, however, can perhaps have any kind of knowledge at first sight upon any of these subjects; he cannot put the extreme ideas together in such a manner as to perceive their agreement or disagreement, and he is not acquainted with the

* Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed. Of Personal Identity, forming Diss. I.

intermediate ideas which are to compare them, and prove their relation. If he could perceive that relation at first sight, he would at first sight have intuitive knowledge upon the subject; and some persons have a much more comprehensive power of this kind than others; for they can perceive and compare the relations of ideas both more readily and more extensively. Euler was a striking example of this endowment, in regard to the science of abstract quantities: Jedediah Buxton appears to have obtained a similar degree of intuitive knowledge in regard to the science of numbers; and we seem in our own day to have another instance of the same kind in the very extraordinary young calculator from America, not more than eight years old.*

I have already stated, that when we cannot immediately perceive the agreement or disagreement of two or more ideas, which we are desirous of bringing into comparison, we are obliged to seek out for some intervening idea whose agreement or disagreement with them is obvious to us; and I have also stated, that as this general search is the immediate office of the faculty of reason, the knowledge thus obtained is called RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE. In many cases we are so fortunate as to hit upon intervening ideas

* See "Some account of Zerah Colburn, an American child, who possesses some very remarkable powers of solving questions in arithmetic, by computation, without writing, or any visible contrivance." — Nicholson's Journal of Nat. Phil. vol. xxxiv. p. 5.

whose connexion with the one, the other, or both, as in a chain of perfect evidence, is clear and distinct; and in such case, whether the reasoning consist of a single step or of many, as soon as the mind is able to perceive the connexion or repugnancy, the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in question, the degree of rational knowledge hereby obtained becomes equal or nearly so to INTUITION, and is called DEMONSTRATION. If the proofs or intervening ideas do not quite amount to this, we have necessarily an inferior degree of rational knowledge, and we distinguish it by the name of BELIEF, ASSENT, or OPINION; and according to the nature of the proofs or intermediate ideas, as decided by the faculty of the judgment, the opinion is rendered INDUBITABLE, PROBABLE, CONJECTURAL, or SUSPICIOUS.

It is upon this comparison of two ideas, by means of a mediate idea expressed or understood, that most of our moral information or common knowledge would be found to depend, if we were to analyze it. Thus, on going into the street and hearing a man whom I am acquainted with, asking which is the way to London Bridge, I may perhaps observe to a by-stander, "That man ought to know the way." The by-stander immediately compares the two ideas of going to London Bridge, and the man's right to know the way, but can find no connexion or agreement between them, and consequently is ignorant of what I mean. He applies to me,

therefore, for the intermediate idea by the question "Why so?" and I give it to him by answering, "Because he has repeatedly been the same road before:" and although he does not put the three ideas into the measured form of the schools, which is called a syllogism, every one as regularly passes through his mind, and gives him the same satisfactory information as if they were to assume such order; in which case they would perhaps run as follows:

> Every man who goes repeatedly the same road should know his way:
> This man has been repeatedly the same road:
> Therefore this man should know his way.

It would be absurd to introduce this part of logical analysis into common discourse: but it is of high use in the closet, as teaching us precision, by compelling us to measure the force and value of every idea and word of which a proposition consists. We are indebted to Aristotle for its invention: and though it was at one time carried to an absurd excess, it has of late years been far too generally discontinued.

The connective or intermediate idea is not always expressed either in speaking or writing; and hence is not always obvious to the hearer or reader, though it is, or ought to be, so to the framer of the argument. Let me exercise the ingenuity of the audience before me by throwing out as a trial, the following well-known sentiment of Mr. Pope:

> Who governs freemen should himself be free.

Here are two distinct propositions; and Dr. Johnson, not immediately perceiving their agreement, nor immediately hitting upon any intervening idea or proposition by which they might be united, declared the whole to be a riddle, and that the poet might just as well have written,

Who drives fat oxen should himself be fat.

Had Johnson, however, lived in our own day, and turned his attention to the Continent, it would have been a riddle to him no longer; for he would have called to mind, as I doubt not every one before me has done already, the mischief that has happened to many a free people on the Continent, from the unfortunate want of freedom in the sovereign who is placed over them, and his being under the detestable control of one of the worst, and, unluckily, one of the most universal, tyrants the world has ever witnessed. * He would have been, as every one before me must be, at once prepared to have connected the two ideas of *free men*, — and the propriety of their being governed by *a free sovereign*, by means of a third or intervening idea to this effect, that otherwise the people themselves might run no small risk of having their freedom destroyed by foreign force; the whole of which might assume the following appearance if reduced to the form of a syllogism :

* Napoleon Bonaparte. This lecture was delivered in 1814.

Who governs free-men should be able to maintain their freedom:
But he who is not free himself is not able to maintain their freedom:

Therefore,

Who governs freemen should himself be free.

PROPER OR REAL KNOWLEDGE, then, is of two kinds or degrees, INTUITION and DEMONSTRATION; below which, all the information we possess is imperfect knowledge or OPINION. Mr. Locke, nevertheless, out of courtesy to the Cartesian hypothesis, rather than from any other cause, makes proper or real knowledge to consist of three degrees, placing sensible knowledge, or that obtained by an exercise of the external senses, below the two degrees of intuition and demonstration, though above the authority of opinion. In most instances, however, the ideas we obtain from the senses are as clear and as identic as those obtained from any other source: and in all such cases the knowledge they produce is self-evident or intuitive. And although, at times, the idea excited by a single sense may not be perfectly clear, yet, as we usually correct it, or destroy the doubt which accompanies it by having recourse to another sense, which furnishes us with the proof or intermediate idea, the knowledge obtained, even in these cases, though not amounting to intuition, is of the nature of demonstration: whence all sensible knowledge (the organs of sense being in them-

selves perfect, and the objects fully within their scope,) falls, if I mistake not, under the one or the other of these two divisions.

DEMONSTRATIVE KNOWLEDGE, where the intervening proofs or ideas perform their part perfectly, approaches, as I have already observed, to the certainty of intuition. But it has generally been held that this kind of demonstration can only take place in the science of mathematics, or, in other words, in ideas of number, extension, and figure. I coincide, however, completely with Mr. Locke, in believing that the knowledge afforded by physics may not unfrequently be as certain. I have already stated that the knowledge we possess of our own existence is INTUITIVE. Our knowledge of the existence of a God is, on the contrary, DEMONSTRATIVE. Examine, then, the proofs of this latter knowledge, and see whether it be less certain. Am I asked where proofs to this effect are to be found? On every side they press upon us in clusters. — I cannot, indeed, follow them up at the present moment, for it would require a folio volume instead of the close of a single lecture; and I merely throw out the hint that you may pursue it at home. But this I may venture to say, that whatever cluster we take, it will develope to us a certain proof, and, in its separate value, fall but little short of the force of self-evidence. If I ascend into heaven he is there; in peerless splendour, in ineffable

majesty; diffusing, from an inexhaustible fountain, the mighty tide of light, and life, and love, from world to world, and from system to system. If I descend into the grave he is there also; still actively and manifestly employed in the same benevolent pursuit: still, though in a different manner, promoting the calm but unceasing career of vitality and happiness; harmoniously leading on the silent circle of decomposition and re-organization; fructifying the cold and gloomy regions of the tomb; rendering death itself the mysterious source of reproduction and new existence; and thus literally making the "dry bones live," and the "dead sing praises" to his name. If I examine the world without me, or the world within me, I trace him equally to a demonstration: — I feel, — nay, more than *feel*, — I *know* him to be eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, the creator of all things, and therefore God. I discover him, not by the vain maxims of tradition, or the visionary conceit of innate principles, but by the faculty with which he has expressly endowed me to search for him, — by my reason. There may, perhaps, be some persons, as well learned as unlearned, who have never brought together these proofs of his existence, and are therefore ignorant of him; as there certainly are others, who have never brought together the proofs that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and are therefore ignorant of geome-

try: but both facts have a like truth and a like foundation: both flow from and return to the same fountain: for God is the author of every truth, — for God is truth itself.

LECTURE V.

ON ANCIENT AND MODERN SCEPTICS.

From a system that is simple, intelligible, and satisfactory, adapted to the condition of man, and pregnant with useful instruction, we have now to turn our attention to a variety of hypotheses, that are scarcely in any instance worthy of the name of systems, and which it is difficult to describe otherwise than by reversing the terms we have just employed, and characterising them as complicated, unintelligible, unsatisfactory; as not adapted to the condition of man, and barren of useful instruction.

It is a distinguishing and praiseworthy feature in the Essay on Human Understanding, that it confines itself to the subject of human understanding alone, and that in delineating the operations of the mind, it neither enters into the question of the substance of mind, or the substance of matter; neither amuses us with speculations how external objects communicate with the senses, or the senses with the mental organ. It builds altogether upon the sure foundation of the simple fact, that the senses are influenced, and that they influence the mind; and as, in

the former case, it calls the cause of this influence external objects, so in the latter case it calls the effects it produces internal ideas. Of the nature of these objects it says little, but of their substantive existence; of the nature of these ideas it says little, but of their truth or exact correspondence with the objects that excite them; its general view of the subject being reducible to the two following propositions: —

First, that as objects are perceivable at a distance, and bodies cannot act where they are not, it is evident that something must proceed from them to produce impulse upon the senses, and that the motion hereby excited must be thence continued by the nerves, or connecting chain, to the brain or seat of sensation, so as to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them.*

And; secondly, that the ideas thus produced, so far from being images or pictures of the objects they represent, have no kind of resemblance to them, except so far as relates to their real qualities of solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest and number. †

Thus far, and thus far only, does the author of the Essay on Human Understanding indulge in a digression into physical science; and even for this he feels it necessary to offer an apology to his reader: "I hope," says he, "I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy, it being necessary in our present enquiry."‡

* Essay on Hum. Underst. Book ii. ch. viii. § 12.
† Ibid. § 15. ‡ Ibid. § 22.

For myself I am glad he did not proceed farther, and should have been still more satisfied if he had not proceeded even so far; for the subject proves itself, even in his hands, to be inexplicable; and if he be here found to evince some degree of obscurity, it is only, perhaps, because it is not possible to avoid it. Of the PRIMARY or real qualities of bodies, as he denominates them, we know but little; and it is probable, that Mr. Locke has enumerated one or two under this head that do not properly belong to the list. And although it is not difficult to determine his meaning where he asserts that their ideas resemble them, as being drawn from patterns existing in the bodies themselves, the sense of the passage has been very generally mistaken, and opinions have hence been ascribed to him which are contrary to the whole tenour of his system. In consequence of being real representatives of real qualities, they resemble them in respect to REALITY. And this, I think, seems to be what Mr. Locke intended to express upon this subject; though he does not discover his usual clearness as to what he designed to convey by the term RESEMBLANCE. This view, however, will be still more obvious by comparing the seventh, ninth, and twenty-third sections of the eighth chapter of his second book, in which he asserts, that the SECONDARY qualities of bodies, as they are usually called, and which he contrasts with the PRIMARY before us, have *no real* existence in their respective bodies, and are nothing more than powers instead of qualities.

And hence, while the ideas of the PRIMARY qualities of bodies are real representatives of real qualities, and to this extent RESEMBLE them, the ideas of their SECONDARY qualities are only real representatives of ostensible or imaginary qualities, in regard at least to the subjects to which they appear to belong, and consequently have NO RESEMBLANCE to them whatever.

What, however, Locke thus modestly glanced at, others, with all the confidence of the Greek philosophers, have boldly plunged into; and the consequence has been that they have met with the very same success as the Greek philosophers, and revived the very same errors: — some having been bewildered into a disbelief of the soul, others into a disbelief of the body, and others, again, still more whimsically, into a disbelief of both soul and body at the same time; contending not only that there is no such thing as a world about them, but no such thing as themselves, except at the very moment they start either this or any other idea of equal brilliance.

We have already seen, that the ideas of the mind have no resemblance whatever to the external objects by which they are produced; unless in the case of the primary qualities of bodies, in which, as just observed, the term resemblance may be applied in a figurative sense, the only sense, as I shall show more fully hereafter, in which it was ever employed by Mr. Locke.

This is a fact so clear as to be admitted by almost every school of philosophy. "Between an

external object and an idea or thought of the mind," observes Dr. Beattie, "there is not, there cannot possibly be, any resemblance."* So, in continuation, "a grain of sand and the globe of the earth; a burning coal, and a lump of ice; a drop of ink and a sheet of white paper, resemble each other in being extended, solid, figured, coloured, and divisible; but a thought or idea has no extension, solidity, figure, colour, or divisibility: so that no two external objects can be so unlike, as an external object, and (what philosophers call) the idea of it." To the same effect Dr. Potterfield: "How body acts upon mind, or mind upon body, I know not; but this I am very certain of, that nothing can act or be acted upon where it is not; and therefore our mind can never perceive any thing but its own modifications, and the various states of the sensorium to which it is present. So that it is not the external sun and moon which are in the heavens that our mind perceives, but only their image or representation impressed on the sensorium. How the soul of a seeing man sees those images, or how it receives those ideas from such agitations in the sensorium, I know not. But I am sure it can never perceive the external bodies themselves, to which it is not present."

Now allowing this fact, it follows of inevitable necessity, that the mind does not of itself perceive an external world; even any thing resem-

* On Truth, part ii. ch. ii. p. 165.

bling an external world; and we must take both its existence and the nature of its existence upon the evidence of our external senses. Such an authority may perhaps seem tolerably sufficient to most of my audience; and I trust I shall be able to prove, before we conclude, that the external senses are as honest and as competent witnesses as any court of judicature can reasonably desire. But it has somehow or other happened, as we have already seen, that there have been a few wise and grave men, and of great learning, talents, and moral excellence, in different periods of the world, who have had a strange suspicion of their competency; and have hunted up facts and arguments to prove that their evidence is not worth a straw; that, in some cases, they have shown themselves egregious fools, and in others arrant cheats; that the testimony of one sense often opposes the testimony of another sense; that what appears smooth to the eye appears rough to the touch; that we cannot always distinguish a green from a blue colour; and that we sometimes feel great awe and solemnity beneath a deep and growing sound, which we at first take to be a clap of thunder, but afterwards find to be nothing more than the rumbling of a filthy cart; that we mistake a phantasm, or phantasmagoria, for a figure of flesh and blood; and occasionally see things just as clearly in our dreams as when we are awake, though all the world with which we have then any concern is a world of mere ideas — a world of our own mak-

ing, and altogether independent of the senses; and, consequently, that it is possible the poet may speak somewhat more literally than he intended, when he tells us

> We are such stuff
> As dreams are made on, and our little life
> Is rounded with a sleep.*

This sort of reasoning, however, has not been confined to modern times; it was, as I have already observed, the very argument of Arcecilas, and the sceptics of the MIDDLE ACADEMY, as it was called; who, in consequence, contended that there is no truth or solidity in any thing: no such thing as certainty, or real knowledge; and that all genuine philosophy or wisdom consists in doubting. From a cause somewhat similar, Pyrrho, as I have likewise remarked, seems to have carried his scepticism to a still further extravagance, though a very excellent man and enlightened philosopher in other respects: for he is said to have so far disbelieved the real existence of every thing before him that precipices were nothing; the points of swords and arrows were nothing; the wheel of a carriage that threatened to go over his own neck was nothing. Insomuch that his friends, who were not quite so far gone in philosophy, thought it right to protect him against the effects of his own principles, and either accompanied

* Tempest.

him themselves or set a keeper over him under the milder name of a disciple. It was in vain that Plato pretended that the mind is loaded with intellectual archetypes, or the incorporeal ideas, of all external objects; Aristotle that it perceives by immaterial phantasms; and Epicurus by real species or effigies thrown forth from the objects themselves: Pyrrho denied the whole of this jargon, and contended that if it could even be proved that the senses uniformly give a true account of things, as far as their respective faculties extend, still we obtain no more real knowledge of matter, of the substance that is said to constitute the external world, than we do of the perceptions that constitute our dreams. If, said he, you affirm that matter consists of particles that are infinitely divisible, you ascribe the attribute of infinity to every particle; and hence make a finite grain of sand consist of millions of infinite atoms; and such is the train of argument of the atomic philosophers. While, on the contrary, if you contend, with the atomists, that matter has its ultimate atoms or primordial particles, beyond which it is not possible to divide and subdivide it, show me some of these particles, and let those senses you appeal to become the judges.

Such was the state of things under the Greek philosophers: the existence of an external world and its connection with the mind was supported, and supported alone, by fine-spun hypotheses, that were perpetually proving their own fallacy;

and was denied or doubted of by sceptics who were perpetually proving the absurdity of their own doubts.

Des Cartes, as we have already observed, thought, in his day, it was high time to remove all doubt whatsoever, and to come to a proof upon every thing; and he zealously set to work to this effect. In the ardour of his own mind he had the fullest conviction of a triumph; and like a liberal antagonist he conceded to his adversaries all they could desire. He allowed a doubt upon every thing for the very purpose of removing it by direct proofs. He began, therefore, as we have already seen, by doubting of his own existence: and, as we have also seen, he made sad work of it in the proofs he attempted to offer.

Having satisfied himself, however, upon this point, he next proceeded to prove the existence of the world around him; and, candidly following up the first principle he had laid down for the regulation of his conduct, he was determined to doubt of the evidence of the senses, excepting so far as they could bring proof of their correctness. But what proof had the senses to offer? The very notion of a proof, as I took leave to observe in our last lecture, consists in our obtaining a fact or an idea possessing a closer agreement or connection with the thing to be proved than the fact or idea that the mind first perceives or is able to lay hold of. But what ideas can more closely agree or be more closely

connected with an external world than the ideas produced by the senses, by which alone the mind perceives such world to exist? These are ideas of identity, of self-agreement; and consequently ideas, which, like that of consciousness, it is neither possible to doubt of or to prove. They form, for the most part, a branch of intuitive knowledge, and we are compelled to believe whether we will or not.

I say *for the most part*, for I am now speaking of the common effect of external objects upon the senses, and upon the mental organ. I am ready to admit that, under particular circumstances, the ideas they excite may not be perfectly clear: we may be at too great a distance from the object, or the sense of sight, smell, taste, or touch, may be morbidly or accidentally obtuse; but in all these cases a sound mind is just as conscious of having ideas that are not clear, as it is, under other circumstances, of having distinct ideas. There is no imposition whatever: the mind equally knows that it has certain knowledge in the latter instance, and that it has uncertain knowledge in the former. I mean if it will exert itself to know by the exercise of its own activity; for otherwise it may as well mistake in ideas that originate from itself as in those that originate from the senses. And in the case of its being conscious of an imperfect or indistinct idea, excited by one of the senses, what is the step it pursues? That which it uniformly pursues in every other case of imperfect know-

ledge: it calls in the aid of an intermediate idea by the exercise of another sense that is more closely connected or more clearly agrees with the idea that raises the question, and the faculty of the judgment determines, as in every other case. And here the knowledge, as I have already hinted at on a former occasion, loses indeed its intuitive character, and assumes, for the most part, the demonstrative.

It was impossible, therefore, for Des Cartes to obtain any proofs whatever; and it being the very preamble of his system that his doubts should remain unless he could remove them by proofs, the only device that seemed to afford him a loop-hole to escape from his dilemma, was an appeal to the veracity of the Creator. God, he asserted, has imprinted on the mind innate ideas of himself and of an external world; and though the senses offer no demonstration of such a world, it is completely furnished to us by these internal ideas: the senses, indeed, may deceive, but God can be no deceiver. And hence what *appears* to exist around us does exist.

The existence of an external world, therefore, in the Cartesian philosophy is doubtful, so far as depends upon the senses; for the testimony they offer is in itself doubtful. And hence it is not upon the evidence of our eyes and our hands, and our taste, smell, and hearing, that we are to believe that there is any body or any thing without us, but on the truth of those innate ideas of a something without us which are supposed

to be imprinted on the mind, in connection with the veracity of the Creator who has imprinted them.

But here another stumbling-block occurred to the progress of our philosophical castle-builder; and that was, the difficulty of determining, in regard to the number and extent of these innate ideas. His friends Gassendi and Hobbes openly denied that there were any such ideas whatever, and put him upon his proofs, by which the whole system would be to be commenced again from its foundation; while Malebranche, one of the most zealous of all the disciples of Des Cartes, at the same time that he contended for the general doctrine of innate ideas, confessed that he had some doubts whether they extended to the existence of the world without us, or to any thing but a knowledge of God and of our own being.

Although, in his opinion, M. Des Cartes has proved the existence of body by the strongest arguments that reason alone can furnish, and arguments which he seems to suppose unexceptionable; yet he does not admit that they amount to a full demonstration of the existence of matter. In philosophy, says he, we ought to maintain our liberty as long as we can, *and to believe nothing but what evidence compels us to believe.* To be fully convinced of the existence of bodies it is necessary that we have it demonstrated to us, not only that there is a God, and that he is no deceiver, but also that God has assured us that he has actually created such bodies; and this,

continues Malebranche, "I do not find proved in the works of M. Des Cartes. The faith obliges us to believe that bodies exist, but as to the evidence of this truth, it certainly is not complete; and it is also certain that we are not invincibly determined to believe that any thing exists but God and our own mind. It is true that we have an EXTREME PROPENSITY to believe that we are surrounded with corporeal beings: so far I agree with M. Des Cartes: but this propensity, natural as it is, does not force our belief by evidence; it only inclines us to believe by impression. Now we ought not to be determined in our judgments by any thing but light and evidence: if we suffer ourselves to be guided by the sensible impression, we shall be almost always mistaken." *

Thus stood the question when the very learned and excellent Bishop of Cloyne, Dr. George Berkeley, entered upon its investigation. For Locke, as we have already seen, boldly overleaped the Cartesian toll-gate of doubting, and was content to take the knowledge of our own existence upon the authority of intuition, that of a God upon the authority of demonstration, and that of external objects upon the authority of our senses. Berkeley had minutely studied the rival systems of Des Cartes and Locke. With the latter he agreed, that there is no such thing as innate ideas, and with the former, that

* Recherche de la Vérité, tom. iii. pp. 30. 39.

the creed of a philosopher should be founded upon proof. But Locke had not proved the existence of an external world: he had only sent us to our senses, and had left the question between ourselves and the evidence they offer; and though this is an evidence which Locke had assented to, Bishop Berkeley conceives it is an evidence that every man ought to examine and sift for himself. Upon this point, then, he deserted Locke for his rival, and commenced a chace for proofs:

> He would not, with a peremptory tone,
> Assert the nose upon his face his own;

and looked around him for demonstrative evidence whether there be any thing in nature besides the Creator and a created mind. And the well-known result of the chace was that he could discover nothing else: he could discover neither a material world nor matter of any kind; neither corporeal objects nor corporeal senses, with which to feel about for objects; he could not even discover his own head and ears, his own hands, feet, or voice, as substantive existences; and the whole that he could discover was proofs to demonstrate not only that these things have no substantive existence, but that it is impossible they could have any such existence; or in other words, that it is impossible that there can be any such thing as matter under any modification whatever, cognizable by mental faculties.

Let us, however, attend to the limitation that *external* objects can have no *substantive* or *material* existence, for otherwise we shall give a caricature-view of this hypothesis, (which it by no means stands in need of,) and ascribe to it doctrines and mischievous results which, if it be candidly examined, will not be found chargeable to it. Dr. Beattie, from not adverting to this limitation, appears, in his humorous description of the Bishop of Cloyne's principles, to have been mistaken upon several points; and it is but justice to the memory of a most excellent and exemplary prelate, as well as enlightened philosopher, to correct the errors into which his equally excellent and enlightened opponent has fallen. When Berkeley asserts that he can prove that there is nothing in existence but a Creator and created mind, and that matter, and, consequently, material objects and material organs have not, and cannot have a being, he does not mean, as Dr. Beattie has represented him to mean, that he himself, or his own mind, is the only created being in the universe *; nor that external objects and external qualities do not and cannot exist independent of, and distinct from, created mind. He allows as unequivocally as Dr. Beattie himself the existence of fellow-minds or fellow-beings, possessing appropriate senses, as also the existence of external and real objects, and of external and real qualities,

* Beattie on Truth, 8vo. p. 159.

by which such senses are really and definitely influenced; contending alone that none of these objects or qualities are material, or any thing more than effects of the immediate agency of an ever-present Deity, "who," to adopt his own words, "knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules as he himself has ordained, and are termed by us the laws of nature. — When," says he, "in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is, therefore, some other will or spirit that produces them. The question between the materialists and me is not whether things have a real existence out of the mind of *this* or *that* person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by (in) God and exterior to all minds? I assert as well as they, that since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without in a being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be spirit: they matter, or I know not what third nature." *

* Princip. of Hum. Knowledge.

According to Dr. Beattie, Berkeley taught "that external objects (that is, the things which we take for external objects) are nothing but ideas in our minds; and that independent of us and our faculties, the earth, the sun, and the starry heavens, have no existence at all; that a lighted candle has not one of those qualities which it appears to have; that it is not white, nor luminous, nor round, nor divisible, nor extended; but that for any thing we know, or can ever know, to the contrary, it may be an Egyptian pyramid, the King of Prussia, a mad dog, the island of Madagascar, Saturn's ring, one of the Pleiades, or nothing at all."

Now all this shows a fruitful fund of pleasantry, but in the present case it is pleasantry somewhat misapplied. It would indeed be a woeful state of things if such were the confusion or anomaly of our ideas, that we could never distinguish one object from another, and were for ever mistaking the King of Prussia for an Egyptian pyramid, a lighted candle for a mad dog, and the island of Madagascar for the Pleiades or Saturn's ring. But it would be a state of things no more chargeable to Dr. Berkeley's than to Dr. Beattie's view of nature; since the former supposes as perfect a reality in external objects, that they have as perfect an independence of the mind that perceives them, the possession of as permanent and definite qualities, and as regular a catenation of causes and effects, as the latter. Or, in other words, it supposes that all things exist as they

appear to exist, and must necessarily produce such effects as we find them produce, but that they do not exist corporeally; that they have no substrate and can have no substrate of matter, nor any other being than that given them by the immediate agency of the Deity; or, in still fewer words, that all things exist and are only seen to exist in God: a representation of nature, which, however erroneous, is by no means necessarily connected with those mischievous and fatal consequences which Dr. Beattie ascribed to it, and which, if fairly founded, must have been sufficient not only to have deterred Bishop Berkeley from starting it at first, but those very excellent prelates and acute reasoners, Bishop Sherlock and Bishop Smallwood, from becoming converts to it afterwards.

The hypothesis, however, after taking away all undue colouring, and regarding it as merely assuming the non-existence of matter and a material world, is still abundantly absurd in a philosophical point of view. Yet so fully had Berkeley persuaded himself of its truth, that he had the firmest conviction that if the world be, as it is said to be, composed of men, women, and children of a corporeal and material make, with ground beneath our feet and a sky over our heads, every body must in his heart believe as he believed, namely, that there are no such women nor children, no such ground, sky, or any thing else but mind and mental perception. Nevertheless, whichsoever creed be true, he con-

tended that it could make no difference in the regulation of our moral conduct; which he endeavours to prove by the following notable strain of argument: "That nothing gives us interest in the material world except the feelings, pleasant or painful, which accompany our perceptions; that these perceptions are the same whether we believe the material world to exist or not to exist; consequently, that our pleasant or painful feelings are also the same; and therefore that our conduct, which depends on our feelings and perceptions, must be the same whether we believe or disbelieve the existence of matter."

The more we reflect upon the native vigour and acuteness of Bishop Berkeley's mind, as well as upon his extensive information and learning, the more we must feel astonished that he could for one moment be serious in the profession of so wild and chimerical a creed. And to those who are not acquainted with the subject it may perhaps appear impossible for the utmost stretch of human ingenuity to push such a revery any farther.

To the possession of such ingenuity, however, the celebrated author of the "Treatise on Human Nature" is fairly and fully entitled. This notable performance, though published anonymously, is well known to be the production of Mr. Hume; and though, in the Essays to which his name appears, he makes some scruple of acknowledging it, and hints at its containing a few

points which he subsequently thought erroneous, he maintains, in his avowed volumes, the same principles and the consequences of those principles so generally, that it is difficult to understand what errors he would wish the world to suppose he had ever retracted.

In mounting into the sublime regions of metaphysical absurdity, Bishop Berkeley furnished him with the ladder; but as I have already hinted, Hume ascended it higher, and, consequently, in his own opinion, had a more correct and extensive view of the airy scene before him.

If, said he, there be nothing in nature but mind and the perceptions of mind, — perceptions diversified, indeed, by being sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker, and which may hence be properly distinguished by the names of impressions and ideas, — how do we know that we possess a mind any more than that we possess a body, which no reasonable man or philosopher can possibly think of contending for? How do we know that there is any thing more than impressions and ideas? This is the utmost we can know; and even this we cannot know to a certainty: for nobody but fools will pretend certainly to know or to believe any thing. These ideas and impressions follow each other, and are therefore conjoined, but we have no proof that there is any necessary connection between them. They are "a bundle of perceptions that succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a

perpetual flux *;" and hence I myself of to-day am no more the I myself of yesterday or to-morrow, than I am Nebuchadnezzar or Cleopatra.

Now all this nonsense in Bishop Berkeley, even had His Lordship gone so far, which, however, he did not do, we could laugh at; for his mind was of too excellent a cast to mean mischief. But it is impossible to make the same allowance to Mr. Hume, since the doctrines he attempts to build upon this nonsense effectually prevent us from doing so.

If the mind of every man become every moment a different being, all punishment for crime must be absurd; for you can never hit the culprit, who is every moment slipping through your fingers, and may as well hang the sheriff as the thief. No philosopher, it seems, can even dream of believing in an external world, and yet (putting by the trash of innate ideas) what other arguments have we, continues the same school, if school it may be called, for the existence and attributes of a Supreme Being. You may talk of power, but it is a word without a meaning: we can form no idea of power, nor of any being endued with any power, much less of a being endued with infinite power. And we can never have reason to believe that any object or quality of an object exists of which we cannot form an idea. It is, indeed, unreasonable to believe

* Treat. of Human Nat. vol. i. p. 438, &c.

God to be infinitely wise and good while there is any evil or disorder in the universe; nor have we any sound reason to believe that the world, whatever it may be, proceeds from him, or from any cause whatever. We can never fairly denominate any thing a cause till we have repeatedly seen it produce like effects; but the universe is an effect quite singular and unparalleled; and hence it is impossible for us to know any thing of its cause; it is impossible for us to know that there is any universe whatever; any creature or any Creator; or any thing in existence but impressions and ideas. *

* Mr. Hume seems to have been only a speculative advocate of his own doctrines: the Bishop of Cloyne, like the Greek sceptics to whom we have formerly adverted, were real believers. And it is not a little singular that the fundamental atheism on which the doctrines of Boodhism are founded, as professed throughout the Burman empire, has given rise, even in the present day, to a sect of philosophical sceptics of the very same kind; of which Mr. Judson, the intelligent American missionary, to whom I have already alluded, (Ser. III. Lect. III.) gives us, in his Journal, the following notable example: "May 20. 1821. Encountered another new character, one Moung Long, from the neighbourhood of Shway-doung, a disciple of the great Tong-dwan teacher, the acknowledged head of all the semi-atheists in the country. Like the rest of the sect, Moung Long is, in reality, a complete sceptic, scarcely believing his own existence. They say he is always quarrelling with his wife on some metaphysical point. For instance, if she says, "The rice is ready," he will reply, "Rice! What is rice? Is it matter or spirit? Is it an idea, or is it a non-entity?" Perhaps she will say, "It is matter!" and he will

It is not my intention to enter into these arguments, nor is it necessary. For though there had been ten times more force or more folly in them than there is, we have already traced the Babel-building to its foundation, and know that it rests upon emptiness.

Scotland has the disgrace of having given birth to this hydra of absurdity and malignity: she has also the honour of having produced the Hercules by whom it has been strangled. She has, indeed, amply atoned: for she has produced a Hercules in almost every one of her universities. True to the high charge reposed in them, the public guardians of her morals have started forth from Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, armed in celestial panoply, and equally masters of their weapons. Neither argument nor raillery have been spared on the occasion; and instead of invidiously enquiring whether Reid, Beattie, or Stewart be chiefly entitled to the honours of the victory, let us vote them our thanks in the aggregate. The only regret (and it is incident to human affairs that in almost every victory there should be a regret) is that in pulling down one hypothesis they should have thought it requisite to build up another, and to

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reply, "Well, wife, and what is matter? Are you sure there is any such thing in existence, or are you merely subject to a delusion of the senses?" — Account of the American Baptist Mission to the Burman Empire, &c. by A. H. Judson, p. 304. 8vo. Lond. 1823.

give a proof of their own weakness in the midst of their own triumph. But this is a subject which must be reserved for our next lecture. I cannot, however, consent to quit our present connexion with Mr. Hume without adverting to Dr. Beattie's very witty, and I may say, for the most part, logical pleasantry upon the leading principle of Mr. Hume's hypothesis, that our impressions and ideas of things only differ in degrees of strength; the idea being an exact copy of the impression, but only accompanied with a weaker perception. Upon this proposition Dr. Beatie remarks as follows *: "When I sit by the fire, I have an impression of heat, and I can form an idea of heat when I am shivering with cold; in the one case I have a stronger perception of heat, in the other a weaker. Is there any warmth in this idea of heat? There must, according to this doctrine; only the warmth of the idea is not quite so strong as that of the impression. For this author repeats it again and again, that 'an idea is by its nature weaker and fainter than an impression, but is in every other respect' (not only similar but) 'the same.' † Nay, he goes further, and says, that 'whatever is true of the one must be acknowledged concerning the other ‡;' and he is so confident of the truth of this maxim, that he makes it one of the pillars of his philosophy.

* Beattie on Truth, part ii. ch. ii.

† Treatise of Human Nature, vol. i. p. 131.

‡ Ibid. p. 41.

To those who may be inclined to admit this maxim on his authority, I would propose a few plain questions. Do you feel any, even the least, warmth, in the idea of a bonfire, a burning mountain, or the general conflagration? Do you feel more real cold in Virgil's Scythian winter than in Milton's description of the flames of hell? Do you acknowledge that to be true of the idea of eating, which is certainly true of the impression of it, that it alleviates hunger, fills the belly, and contributes to the support of human life? If you answer these questions in the negative, you deny one of the fundamental principles of this philosophy. We have, it is true, a livelier perception of a friend when we see him, than when we think of him in his absence. But this is not all: every person of a sound mind knows, that in the one case we believe, and are certain, that the object exists, and is present with us; in the other we believe, and are certain, that the object is not present: which, however, they must deny, who maintain, that an idea differs from an impression only in being weaker, and in no other respect whatsoever.

"That every idea should be a copy and resemblance of the impression whence it is derived; —that, for example, the idea of red should be a red idea; the idea of a roaring lion a roaring idea; the idea of an ass, a hairy, long-eared, sluggish idea, patient of labour, and much addicted to thistles; that the idea of extension

should be extended, and that of solidity solid; — that a thought of the mind should be endued with all, or any, of the qualities of matter, — is, in my judgment, inconceivable and impossible. Yet our author takes it for granted; and it is another of his fundamental maxims. Such is the credulity of scepticism!"

It is a singular coincidence, that while the substantive existence of an external world was thus hotly attacked by metaphysics, the science of physics should have proved just as adverse to it: thus reviving, as we have already seen, the very same double assault to which it had been exposed at Athens, shortly after the establishment of the Academy. This latter controversy commenced and hinged upon what are the real qualities of matter. Heat, cold, colours, smell, taste, and sounds, had been pretty generally banished from the list about the middle of the seventeenth century. Locke contended, after Sir Isaac Newton, for solidity, extension, mobility, and figure: but it was soon found that there is a great difficulty in granting it solidity: that the particles of bodies never come into actual contact, or influence each other by the means of objective pressure; that however apparently solid the mass to which they belong, such mass may be reduced to a smaller bulk by cold, as it may be increased in bulk by heat; that we can hence form no conception of perfect solidity, and every fact in nature appears to disprove its existence. The minutest corpuscle we can pick

out is capable of a minuter division, and the parts into which it divides possessing the common nature of the corpuscle which has produced them, must necessarily be capable of a still farther division; and as such divisions can have no assignable limit, matter must necessarily and essentially be divisible to infinity. For these and similar reasons M. Boscovich contended that there is no such thing as solidity in matter; nor any thing more than simple, unextended, indivisible points, possessing the powers of attraction and repulsion, yet producing extension by their combination. *

Upon the self-contradiction of this hypothesis I have found it necessary to comment on a former occasion †; and shall now, therefore, only further observe that it just as completely sweeps the whole of matter away with a physical broom, as the systems of Berkeley and Hume do with a metaphysical; for, by leaving us nothing but inextended points, possessing mere powers without a substrate, it leaves nothing at all, — a world indeed, but a world "without form, and void;" with darkness, not only upon the face of the deep, but there and every where else.

"That nothing," says Dr: Reid "can act immediately where it is not, I think must be ad-

* Theoria Philosophiæ Naturalis, Vien. 1758.

† Vol. I. Series I. Lect. III. See also Dr. Wollaston's paper "On the finite extent of the Atmosphere," Phil. Trans. 1822. p. 89.

mitted; for I think, with Sir Isaac Newton, that power without substance is inconceivable." Lord Kames, however, in his Elements of Criticism, though a strong advocate for the common-sense system, expresses his doubts of the doctrine contained in this passage.

To complete the folly of the age, and fix the laugh of the simple against the wise, while Berkeley, Hume, and Boscovich were thus, in their different ways, dissipating the world of matter, in favour of the world of mind, another set of philosophers started up,—

—— impios
Titanas, immanemque turmam, *
An impious, earth-born, fierce, Titanic race, —

and put to flight the world of mind in favour of the world of matter. Hobbes, who was a contemporary, and friend of Des Cartes, courageously led the van, and did ample justice, and somewhat more than ample justice, to the senses, by contending that we have no other knowledge than what they supply us with, and what they themselves derive from the world before them; that the mind is nothing more than the general result of their action; and that with them it begins, and with them it ceases.

To Hobbes succeeded Spinosa, who was born in the very same year with Locke, and who carried forward the crusade of matter against

* Hor. lib. iii. 4.

mind, to so illimitable a career, that he made the world, the human senses, the human soul, and the Deity himself, matter and nothing else: all one common material being; no part of which can or ever could exist otherwise than as it is, and consequently every part of which is equally the creature and the Creator.

In the midst of these indiscriminate assaults, appeared Hartley; whose learning, benevolence, and piety, entitle his memory to be held in veneration by every good man. He strenuously contended for the existence of mind and matter as distinct principles; and conceived it was in his power to settle the general controversy, by showing what Locke had failed to do, or rather what he had too much modesty to attempt; the direct means by which the external senses, and consequently the external world, operates upon the mind. And hence arose the well known and at one time highly popular hypothesis of the association of ideas. It was conceived by Dr. Hartley that the nervous fibrils, which form the medium of communication between the external senses and the brain or sensory, are solid and elastic capillaments; that on every impression of objects upon the senses the nervous chord, immediately connected with the sense, vibrates through its whole length, and communicates the vibration to the substance of the brain, and particularly to its central region, which is the seat of sensation, leaving upon every communication a mark or vestige of itself; which produces a sensation, and excites its corre-

spondent perception or idea. The more frequently these vibrations are renewed, or the more vigorously they are impressed, the stronger will be the vestiges or ideas they induce; and as, in every instance, they occasion vibratiuncles, or miniature vibrations, through the substance of the brain itself, a foundation is hereby laid for a series of slighter vestiges, sensations, and ideas after the primary vibrations have ceased to act. And hence originate the faculties of memory and imagination. And as any order of vibrations, by being associated together a certain number of times, obtain a habit of mutual influence, any single sensation or single idea belonging to such order acquires a power of calling the whole train into action, either synchronously or successively, whenever called into action itself.

Now according to this system the brain of man is a direct sensitive violin, consisting of musical strings, whose tones go off in thirds, fifths, and eighths, as regularly as in a common fiddle, through the whole extent of its diapason; and the orator who understands his art, may be said, without a figure, to play skilfully upon the brains of his auditors. The hypothesis, however, is ingenious and elegant, and has furnished us with a variety of detached hints of great value; but it labours under the following fatal objections. First, the nervous fibres have little or no elasticity belonging to them, less so perhaps than any other animal fibres whatever; and next, while it

supposes a soul distinct from the brain, it leaves it no office to perform: for the medullary vibrations are not merely causes of sensations, ideas, and associations, but in fact the sources of reason, belief, imagination, mental passion, and all other intellectual operations whatever.

Admitting, therefore, the full extent of this hypothesis, still it gives us no information about the nature of the mind and its proper functions; and leaves us just as ignorant as ever of the power by which it perceives the qualities of external objects. The difficulty was felt by many of the advocates for the associate system, especially by Priestley and Darwin; and it was no sooner felt than it was courageously attacked, and in their opinion completely overcome. Nothing was clearer to them than that Dr. Hartley had overloaded his system with machinery: that no such thing as a mind was wanting distinct from the brain or sensory itself: that ideas, to adopt the language of Darwin, are the actual contractions, motions, or configurations of the fibres which constitute the immediate organ of sense, and consequently material things*: or, to adopt the language of Priestley, that ideas are just as divisible as the archetypes or external objects that produce them; and, consequently, like other parts of the material frame, may be dissected, dried, pickled, and packed up, like herrings, for home-consumption or exportation, according as the

* Zoon. vol. i. p. 11. edit. 3.

foreign or domestic market may have the largest demand for them. And consequently, also, that the brain or sensory, or the train of material ideas that issue from it, is the soul itself; not a fine-spun flimsy immaterial soul or principle of thought, like that of Berkeley or even of Hume, existing unconnectedly in the vast solitude of universal space, but a solid, substantial, alderman-like soul, a real spirit of animation, fond of good cheer and good company; that enters into all the pursuits of the body while alive, and partakes of one common fate in its dissolution.

If there be too much crassitude in this modification of materialism, as has generally been supposed, even by materialists themselves, there is at least something tangible in it: something that we can grasp and cope with, and fix and understand; which is more, I fear, than can be said of those subtler and more complicated modifications of the same substrate, which have somewhat more lately been brought forward in France to supply its place, and which represent the human fabric as a duad, or even a triad of unities, instead of a mixed or simple unity; as a combination * of a corruptible life within a corruptible life two or three deep, each possessing its own separate faculties or manifestations, but covered with a common outside.

This remark more especially applies to the philosophers of the French school; and particu-

* Stud. of Med. vol. iv. p. 41—45. edit. 2.

larly to the system of Dumas*, as modified by Bichat; under which more finished form man is declared to consist of a pair of lives, each distinct and co-existent, under the names of an organic and an animal life; with two distinct assortments of sensibilities, an unconscious and a conscious. Each of these lives is limited to a separate set of organs, runs its race in parallel steps with the other; commencing coetaneously and perishing at the same moment.† This work appeared at the close of the past century; was read and admired by most physiologists; credited by many; and became the popular production of the day. Within ten or twelve years, however, it ran its course, and was as generally either rejected or forgotten even in France; and M. Richerand first, and M. Magendie since, have thought themselves called upon to modify Bichat, in order to render him more palatable, as Bichat had already modified Dumas. Under the last series of remodelling, which is that of M. Magendie, we have certainly an improvement, though the machinery is quite as complex. Instead of two distinct lives M. Magendie presents us with two distinct sets or systems of action or relation, each of which has its separate and peculiar functions, a system of nutritive action or relation, and a system of vital. To which is added, by way of appendix, another system, comprising the

* Principes de Physiologie, tom. iv. 8vo. Par. 1800—3.

† Recherches sur la Vie et la Mort, &c.

functions of generation.* Here, however, the brain is not only the seat but the organized substance of the mental powers: so that, we are expressly told, a man must be as he is made in his brain, and that education, and even logic itself, is of no use to him. 'There are,' says M. Magendie, 'justly celebrated persons who have thought differently; but they have hereby fallen into grave errors.' A Deity however is allowed to exist, because, adds the writer, it is comfortable to think that he exists, and on this account the physiologist cannot doubt of his being. 'L'intelligence de l'homme,' says he, 'se compose de phénoménes tellement différens de tout ce que présente d'ailleurs la nature, qu'on les rapporte à un être particuliere qu'on regarde comme une emanation de la Divinité. Il est trop *consolant de croire à cet être*, pour que le physiologiste métte en doute son existence; mais la séverité de language ou de logique que comporte maintenant la physiologie exige que l'on traite de l'intelligence humaine comme si elle était le résultat de l'action d'un organe. En *s'écartant* de cette marche, des hommes justement célèbres sont tombés dans des *graves erreurs;* en la suivant, on a, d'ailleurs, le grand avantage de conserver la même méthode d'étude, et de rendre trés faciles des choses qui sont envisagées généralement comme presqu' au-dessus de l'esprit

* Précis Elementaire de Physiologie, tom. ii. 8vo. Paris, 1816, 1817.

humain.' — 'Il existe une science dont le but est d'apprendre à raisonner justement: c'est *la logique:* mais le jugement erroné ou l'esprit faux (for judgment, genius, and imagination, and therefore false reasoning, all depend on organization,) tiennent à l'organization. Il est impossible de se changer à cet egard; nous restons, tels que *la nature* nous à faits.'*.

Dr. Spurzheim has generally been considered, from the concurrent tenour of his doctrines, as belonging to the class of materialists; but this is to mistake his own positive assertion upon the subject, or to conclude in opposition to it. He speaks, indeed, upon this topic with a singular hesitation and reserve, more so, perhaps, than upon any other point whatever; but as far as he chooses to express himself on so abstruse a subject, he regards the soul as a distinct being from the body, and at least intimates that it *may be* nearer akin to the Deity. Man is with him also possessed of two lives, an AUTOMATIC and an ANIMAL: the first produced by organization alone, and destitute of consciousness; the second possessed of consciousness dependent on the soul, and merely manifesting itself by organization. 'We do not,' says he, 'attempt' to explain how the body and soul are joined together and exercise a mutual influence. We do not examine what the soul can do without the body. Souls, so far as we know, may be united to bodies at

* Précis Elementaire, &c. ut supra, passim.

the moment of conception or afterwards; they may be different in all individuals, or of the same kind in every one; they may be emanations from God, or something essentially different.'* The mind of this celebrated craniologist seems to be wonderfully sceptical and bewildered upon the subject, and studiously avoids the important question of the capacity of the soul for an independent and future existence; but with the above declaration he cannot well be arranged in the class of materialists.

The hypothesis which has lately been started by Mr. Lawrence † is altogether of a different kind, and though undoubtedly much simpler than any of the preceding, does not seem to be built on a more stable foundation. According to his view of the subject, organized differs from inorganized matter merely by the addition of certain PROPERTIES which are called vital, as sensibility and irritability. Masses of matter endowed with these new PROPERTIES become organs and systems of organs, constitute an animal frame, and execute distinct sets of PURPOSES or FUNCTIONS; for functions and purposes carried into execution are here synonymous. 'Life is the assemblage of ALL the functions (or purposes), and the general result of their exercise.'‡

* Physiognomical System, &c. p. 253. 8vo. Lond. 1815.

† Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, &c. 8vo. 1816.

‡ Ibid. p. 120.

Life, therefore, upon this hypothesis, instead of being a two-fold or three-fold reality, running in a combined stream, or in parallel lines, has no reality whatever. It has no ESSE or independent existence. It is a mere assemblage of PURPOSES, and accidental or temporary PROPERTIES: a series of phænomena*, as Mr. Lawrence has himself correctly expressed it; — a name without a thing. "We know not," says he, "the nature of the link that unites these phænomena, though we are sensible that a connexion must exist; and this conviction is sufficient to induce us to give it a NAME, which the VULGAR regard as the sign of a particular principle; though in fact that name can only indicate the ASSEMBLAGE OF THE PHÆNOMENA which have occasioned its formation."†

The human frame is, hence, a barrel-organ, possessing a systematic arrangement of parts, played upon by peculiar powers, and executing particular pieces or purposes; and life is the music produced by the general assemblage or result of the harmonious action. So long as either the vital or the mechanical instrument is duly wound up by a regular supply of food or of the wince, so long the music will continue: but both are worn out by their own action; and when the machine will no longer work, the life has the same close as the music; and in the language of

* Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, &c. p. 122.

† Ibid.

Cornelius Gallus, as quoted and appropriated by Leo X.,

—— redit in nihilum, quod fuit ante nihil.

There is, however, nothing new either in this hypothesis or in the present explanation of it. It was first started in the days of Aristotle by Aristoxenus, a pupil of his, who was admirably skilled in music, and by profession a physician. It was propounded to the world under the name of the system of HARMONY, either from the author's fondness for music, or from his comparing the human frame to a musical instrument, and his regarding life as the result of all its parts acting in accordance, and producing a general and harmonious effect. *

We have already had occasion to notice this hypothesis in a former lecture, and the triumphant objections with which it was met by the Stoics as well as by the Epicureans †; as also that it has at times been revived since, and especially by M. Lusac, who extended it to even a wider range: while the same objections remain unanswered to the present hour, and seem to be altogether unanswerable.

There is, moreover, the same looseness in the term PHÆNOMENA, employed by Mr. Lawrence, and the French writers just adverted to, as we have remarked in many of the opposers of Mr. Locke, who seem to be afraid of fettering them-

* Stud. of Med. ut supra.

† Series I. Lect. IX. on the Principle of Life.

selves with definite terms or definite ideas. This looseness may be convenient in many cases, but it always betrays weakness or imprecision. In the mouth of the Platonists and Peripatetics of ancient Greece, we distinctly know that the term phænomena denoted the archetypes of the one, or the phantasms of the other. We understand it with equal clearness as made use of, though in very different senses, by Leibnitz in reference to his system of PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY, and by Professor Robson, in reference to that of Boscovich. But when M. Magendie, or Mr. Lawrence, tells us that "human intelligence," which is the phrase of the former, in the passage just quoted, or "life," which is that of the latter, is a COMPOSITION or ASSEMBLAGE of PHÆNOMENA, — a "RESULT OF THE ACTION of an organ," — we have no distinct notion whatever put before us. The "purposes," or "properties," or "functions," or whatever it is they intend under the name of PHÆNOMENA, certainly do not seem to be strictly material in themselves, though we are told they are, in some way or other, the product of a material organ: but whether they be the phantasms of the Greek schools, the visions of Malebranche or Berkeley, the mathematical points of Boscovich, the APPARITIONS or APPEARANCES of the Common-Sense hypothesis, — whether they be a name or a thing, any thing or nothing, the writers themselves have given us no clue to determine, and perhaps have hardly determined for themselves.

We have thus travelled over a wide extent of ground, but have not yet quite reached our journey's end. It still remains to us to examine the popular hypothesis of the present day, put forth from the north, under the captivating title of the System of Common Sense; produced undoubtedly from the best motives, and offered as an universal and infallible specific for all the wounds and weaknesses we may have incurred in our encounters with the preceding combatants.

The consideration of this shall form the subject of our ensuing lecture; and I shall afterwards, by your permission, follow up the whole by submitting a few general observations on the entire subject, and endeavour to collect for your use, from the wide and tangled wilderness in which we have been beating, the few flowers and the little fruit that may be honestly worth the trouble of preservation.

LECTURE VI.

ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF COMMON SENSE.

It must be obvious, I think, to every one who has attentively watched the origin and progress of those extraordinary and chimerical opinions through which we have lately been wading, and which have been dressed up by philosophers of the rarest endowments and deepest learning, into a show of systems and theories, that the grand cause of their absurdities is attributable to the imperfect knowledge we possess respecting the nature and qualities of matter, and the nature and qualities of those perceptions which material objects produce in the mind, through the medium of the external senses.

These perceptions, however accounted for, and whatever they have been supposed to consist in, have in most ancient, and in all modern schools been equally denominated ideas; and hence ideas have sometimes implied modifications, so to speak, of pure intelligence, which was the opinion of Plato and of Berkeley; of immaterial apparitions or phantasms, which was that of Aristotle, and in a certain sense may perhaps be said to have been that of Hume; of real species or material images, which was that of

Epicurus, of Sir Kenelm Digby*, and many other schoolmen of the middle of the seventeenth century; of mere notional resemblances, which was that of Des Cartes; and of whatever it was the ultimate intention of any of these scholastic terms to signify, whether phantasm, notion, or species; whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, or the mind can be employed about when thinking, which was that of Locke, and is the fair import of the word in popular speech.

It is possible, morever, that this indiscriminate use of the same term to express different apprehensions, and particularly in modern times, has contributed to many of the errors which are peculiarly chargeable to the metaphysical writers of modern times. But this opinion has been carried much farther by Dr. Reid, who has persuaded himself that the word *idea* has been the rock on which all the metaphysical systematizers, from the time of Aristotle to his own era, have shipwrecked themselves; and hence, having determined to oppose the absurdities of his own countryman Mr. Hume, by the introduction of a new hypothesis, he thought the better way would be to clear the ground on every side, by an equal excommunication of this mischievous term, and of every system into which it had ever found an

* He was warmly opposed by Alexander Ross, of Hudibrastic memory, who was a staunch Aristotelian, and, consequently, denied the materiality of ideas. See Ross's argument in Professor Stewart's Essays, vol. i. p. 556. 4to.

entrance; whence all the authors of such systems, whatever may have been their views or principles in other respects, he has lumped together by the common name of *Idealists*.

The motive of Dr. Reid was pure and praiseworthy: he entered the arena with great and splendid talents; and soon found himself powerfully abetted by his friends Dr. Adam Smith, Dr. Beattie, Lord Kames, Dr. Campbell, and Mr. Dugald Stewart: but it must be obvious to every one, that in the execution of his motive he has carried his resentment to a strange and somewhat ludicrous extreme. *Idea* is a word sufficiently harmless in itself, and even his own friends have not chosen to follow him in his Quixotic warfare against it; and have consequently continued to use it, in spite of his outlawry and proscription: while to arrange under the same banner every one who has employed this term, and to impute the same dangerous tendency to every hypothesis in which it is to be met with, is to make the wearing of a blue or a chocolate coat a sure sign of treason, and to assert that every man who is found thus habited deserves hanging.

Mr. Locke distinctly tells us, that he uses the term idea in its popular sense, and only in its popular sense. But he uses it, and that is enough: —the mischief is in the word itself. It has, however, been attempted to be proved that he has not always known the sense in which he did use it; and that he has sometimes employed it

in a popular and sometimes in a scholastic import, as denoting that certain ideas are not mere notional perceptions, but material images or copies of the objects which they indicate, by which means he has given a strong handle to such materialists, or favourers of materialism, as Hartley, Priestley, and Darwin: while, by his striking away from bodies all their secondary qualities, as taste, smell, sound, and colour, he has given a similar handle to such immaterialists as Berkeley and Hume.

Now it is not often that a theory is accused of leaning north and south at the same time; and whenever it can be so accused, the charge is perhaps the highest compliment that can be paid to it, as proving its uprightness and freedom from bias. But it was absolutely necessary for the success of the new hypothesis that the Essay on Human Understanding should be demonstrated to be radically erroneous, and particularly to have some connexion in the way of causation with what may be called the physical speculations of the day, whether of materialism or of immaterialism: since so long as this remained firm, so long as the system maintained its ground, the immortal edifice proposed to be erected — *monumentum ære perennius* — could find no place for a foundation; and on this account, and so far as I can learn, on this account alone, the name of Locke has been placed among "the most celebrated promoters of

modern scepticism*;" though it is admitted, that nothing was farther from his intention.

It is hence requisite, before we enter upon a survey of this new hypothesis, to enquire how far the objections which were offered against Mr. Locke's theory are founded in fact. I have already mentioned two of the more prominent, and I shall have occasion to mention two others immediately.

We are told, in the first place, that Mr. Locke has not used the term idea in all instances in one and the same signification; and that while it sometimes imports something separate from body, it sometimes imports a modification of body itself.

But this is egregiously to mistake his meaning, and to charge him with a confusion of conception which only belongs to the person who can thus interpret him. Des Cartes, after most of the Greek philosophers, had asserted, that our ideas are in some way or other exact images of the objects presented to the senses: Mr. Locke, in opposition to this assertion, contended that so far from being exact images they have not the smallest resemblance to them in any respect, with the exception of those ideas that represent the real or primary qualities of bodies, or such as belong to bodies intrinsically; and which, in his own day, were supposed to consist of figure,

* Beattie on Truth: compare part ii. ch. ii. § 1 2. with the opening of part ii. ch. ii. § 2.

extension, solidity, motion, or rest, and number. These qualities being REAL in the bodies in which they appear, the ideas which REALLY represent them are, in his opinion, entitled to be called RESEMBLANCES of them; while the ideas of the secondary qualities of bodies, or those which are not real but merely ostensible, or which, in other words, do not intrinsically belong to the bodies in which they appear, as colour, sound, taste, and smell, are not entitled to be called resemblances of them. Now what does such observation upon these two sets of qualities amount to? Plainly and unequivocally to this, and nothing more; that as the first set of ideas are real representatives of real qualities, and the latter real representatives of ostensible qualities, there is in the former case a resemblance of reality, though there is no other resemblance, and in the latter case, no resemblance of reality, and consequently no resemblance whatever. The resemblance is in respect to the reality of the qualities perceived: it is simply a resemblance of reality: here it begins and here it ends. But the adverse commentators before us contend that it neither begins nor ends here; and that the word resemblance must necessarily import an actual and material resemblance, — a corporeal copy or image; and that consequently the class of ideas referred to must necessarily be material and corporeal things. So that it is not allowable to any man to say, that truth resembles a rock, unless he means, and is

prepared to prove, that truth is a hard, stony mass of matter jutting into the sea, and fatal to ships that dash against it.

But many of Mr. Locke's own followers are said to have understood him in this sense. Not, however, in regard to this distinction: though I am ready to admit that many of those who have pretended to be his followers have misunderstood him upon the subject of ideas generally, and have affirmed, in direct opposition to his own words that, in the Essay on Human Understanding, all our ideas of sensation are supposed to be sensible representations or pictures of the objects apprehended by the senses. This observation particularly applies to Locke's French commentators and followers, Condillac, Turgot, Helvetius, Diderot, D'Alembert, Condorcet, Destutt-Tracy, and Degerando: concerning whom Professor Stewart has made the following just remark; that while "these ingenious men have laid hold eagerly of this common principle of reasoning, and have vied with each other in extolling Locke for the sagacity which he has displayed in unfolding it, hardly two of them can be named who have understood it precisely in the sense annexed to it by the author. What is still more remarkable, the praise of Locke has been loudest from those who seem to have taken the least pains to ascertain the import of his conclusions."*

* Essays, vol. i. p. 102.

The term OBJECT Mr. Locke has occasionally used in an equally figurative sense. Thus book ii. ch. i. sect. 24.: "In time," says he, "the mind comes to reflect on *its own operations* about the ideas got by sensation; and thereby stores itself with *a new set of ideas*, which I call *ideas of reflection*. These are the *impressions* that are made on our senses by OUTWARD OBJECTS that are extrinsical to the mind, and *its own operations* proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself; which when reflected on by itself, becoming also OBJECTS of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the originals of all knowledge."

No words can more clearly prove that Locke regarded ideas of sensation as *impressions* made by external objects, and not as objects themselves; and ideas of reflection as *operations* of the mind, and no more objects, literally so considered, than in the preceding case. And hence, when, towards the close of the above passage, he applies the term objects to these operations, he can only in fairness be supposed to do it in a figurative sense: in which sense, indeed, he applies the same term to ideas of all kinds in another place, where he explains an idea to be "whatsoever is the OBJECT of the understanding when a man thinks." And yet he has been accused, by the School of Common Sense, of using the term literally; and it is "to Dr. Reid," says Mr. Stewart, "that we owe the important remark that all these notions (images, phan-

tasms, &c.) are wholly hypothetical*;" and that we have no ground for supposing that in any operation of the mind there exists in it an *object distinct* from the mind itself.

With respect to the division of the qualities of bodies just adverted to, though derived from the views of Sir Isaac Newton, I am ready to admit that it is loose, and in some respects perhaps erroneous. Nor is this to be wondered at; for I have already had frequent occasions to observe that it is a subject upon which we are totally ignorant; and that we are rather obliged to suppose, than are capable of proving the existence of even the least controverted primary qualities of bodies, as extension, solidity, and figure, in order to avoid falling into the absurdity of disbelieving a material substrate. But the supporters of the new hypothesis have no reason to triumph upon this point, since it is a general doctrine of their creed that all the qualities of matter are equally primary or real; in the interpretation of which, however, the sentiments of Mr. Stewart are wider from those of Dr. Reid than Dr. Reid's are from Mr. Locke's.

Nor are they altogether clear from the very same charge here advanced against Mr. Locke: "Professor Stewart in his Elements says, 'Dr. Reid has justly distinguished the quality of colour from what he calls the *appearance* of

* Elem. ch. iii. § ii. Fearne's Essay, p. 23.

colour, which last can only exist in a mind.' And Dr. Reid himself says, 'The name of colour belongs indeed to the cause only, and not to the effect.'" Here, then, we have it unequivocally from Dr. Reid, that colour is a quality in an external body, — and the sensation occasioned by it in the mind is *only* the *appearance* of that external quality!! — Would any one suppose that such doctrine could come from the illustrious defender of non-resemblances? — from the founder of the school which ridicules Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, for supposing that our ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of those qualities? — "What is the *appearance* of any thing but a *resemblance* of it? An *appearance* of any thing means the highest degree of resemblance; or that precise resemblance of it which makes it *seem to be* the thing itself." * *Appearance*, in Dr. Reid's sense of the term, is precisely assimilated to the *phantasm* of Aristotle.

In reality, neither of these objections against Mr. Locke's theory seem to have weighed very heavy with Dr. Beattie; whose chief ground of controversy is drawn from another source; from Locke's having opposed the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas and principles: or, in other words, from his having opposed M. Des Cartes's gratuitous assertion that infallible notions of a God,

* Fearne's Essay on Consciousnesss, ch. xii. p. 247. 2d edit.

of matter, of consciousness, of moral right, together with other notions of a like kind, are implanted in the mind, and may be found there by any man who will search for them; thus superseding the necessity for discipline and education, and putting savages upon a level with theologians and moral philosophers. To confute this absurdity of M. Des Cartes is the direct object of the first book of the Essay on Human Understanding; "and it is this first book," says Dr. Beattie, "which, with submission, I think the worst and most dangerous." * Here again, however, it is altogether unnecessary for me to offer a vindication, for it has been already offered by one of the most able supporters of the new system, Mr. Dugald Stewart himself; who thus observes, as though in direct contradiction to his friend Dr. Beattie; "the hypothesis of innate ideas thus interpreted (by Des Cartes and Malebranche) scarcely seems to have ever merited a serious refutation. In England, for many years past, it has sunk into complete oblivion, excepting as a monument of the follies of the learned." †

We have thus far noticed three objections advanced against Mr. Locke's system by the three warmest champions for the new hypothesis. And it is a curious fact, that they are almost advanced singly; for upon these three points the three combatants are very little more in harmony with

* Beattie on Truth, part ii. ch. ii. sect. i. § 2.

† Essays, vol. i. p. 117.

themselves than they are with the Goliah against whom they have entered the lists. There is a fourth objection, however, and it would be the chief and most direct, if it could be well supported, on which the metaphysicians of the north seem to be unanimous. The Essay on Human Undertanding resolves all the ideas we possess, or can possibly possess, into the two classes of those obtained by sensation, or the exercise of our external senses, and those obtained by reflection, or the operations of the mind on itself; and it defies its readers to point out a single idea which is not reducible to the one or the other of these general heads. The supporters of the northern hypothesis have specially accepted this challenge, and have attempted to point out a variety of ideas, or CONCEPTIONS, as Dr. Reid prefers calling them, which are in the mind of every man, and which are neither the result of sensation or reflection; and they have peculiarly fixed upon those of extension, figure, and motion. And hence this argument is regarded as decisive, and is proposed, both by Dr. Reid and Professor Stewart, "as an experimentum crucis, by which the ideal system must stand or fall." *

Now, strictly speaking, this invincible argument, as it is called, is no argument whatever. It is a mere question of opinion, whether the above-named ideas, together with those of time,

* Reid's Inquiry, &c. p. 137. Stewart's Essays, vol. i. p. 549.

space, immensity, and eternity, which belong to the same class, can be obtained either by means of the external senses or the operation of the mind upon its own powers, or whether they cannot. And, for myself, I completely concur in believing with Mr. Locke that they can: though I am ready to leave this part of the subject, as I am the whole question between us, to Mr. Stewart's own case of the boy born blind and deaf, as communicated to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in the course of last year*; who, it is admitted, is possessed of perfect soundness of mind; but who, at that time in his seventeenth year, was, as we are expressly told, without any idea of a being superior to himself; of any religious feelings; and who did not appear to have possessed any moral feelings upon the sudden death of an indulgent father, notwithstanding the utmost pains that had been taken to give him instruction. If this boy shall be found to possess as clear an idea of figure and motion as those who have the free use of their eyes, I will readily allow Mr. Locke's system to be unfounded. That he must have some idea follows necessarily from this system; because he appears to have a very fine touch, and has also, or at least had till very

"* Some Account of a Boy born Blind and Deaf. By Dugald Stewart, Esq. F.R.S. Ed. 4to. Edin. 1812." With which compare, relating to the same individual, "History of James Mitchel, a Boy born Blind and Deaf, &c. By James Wardrop, F.R.S." Ed. 4to. 1813.

lately, some small glimmering of light and colours.*

But, upon the northern hypothesis, he ought not only to have *some idea* of these qualities of bodies, but A MOST TRUE AND CORRECT IDEA, probably more so, instead of less so, than that of other persons; since he is said to obtain it from a faculty which is not supposed to be injured, and since the want of one sense is usually found to strengthen the remainder.

With respect to the idea of extension, indeed, which, by some philosophers, is thought to be the most difficult of the whole, it appears to me that it is capable of being obtained with at least as much perspicuity as that of most other qualities of bodies, and more so than ideas of many of them; for we have in this instance the power of touch to correct that of sight, or *vice versâ;* while in a multitude of other instances we are compelled to trust to one sense alone. Extension, in its general signification, is a complex idea, resulting from a combination of the more simple ideas of length, breadth, and thickness; and hence evidently imports a continuity of the parts of whatever subject the idea is applied to; whether it be a solid substance, as a billiard ball, or the unsolid space which measures the distance between one billiard ball and another; the idea of *measure* being, indeed, the most obvious idea we can form of it. In both which cases we determine the relative

* See Edin. Rev. No. xl. p. 468.

proportions of the length, breadth, and thickness by the eye, by the touch, or by both: and acquire, so far as I can see to the contrary, notwithstanding all that has been said upon the subject, as clear an idea as we do of substance. It is first obtained, I grant, from the sight or touch of what is solid alone; and it is afterwards made use of in a more abstract form, as a measure of what is unsolid; whence the mind is able to apply it not only to the subject of pure space, but to a contemplation of circles, triangles, polygons, or any other geometrical figure, even though such figures be not present to the senses, and exist alone in its own conceptions.

Extension, by the Cartesian school, was only applied to solid substance, or body; but then they supposed the universe to consist of nothing but solid substance, or body, and that there is no such thing as vacuum, or pure space. Among the Newtonians, who admit space, extension is applied as generally to this latter as to the former; but in order to avoid the confusion to which the application of this term to things so totally opposite as matter and space has produced in common discourse, Mr. Locke advises to appropriate the term *extension* to body, and *expansion* to space; using both these terms, however, as perfect synonyms, and as equally importing the simple idea of *measure;* which, as I have just observed, is the most obvious and explanatory idea that can be offered upon this subject.

Widely different, however, is the opinion of the metaphysical school of North Britain; and hence, in order to account for these abstruse ideas, to which they affirm that neither our senses nor our reason can give rise, as also in order to compel our belief that the external world exists in every respect precisely AS IT APPEARS TO EXIST, and that external bodies possess in themselves all the qualities, both primary and secondary, which THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS, and thus, with one wide sweep, to clear the ground as well of the errors of Des Cartes, Newton, and Locke, as of those of Berkeley and Hume; Dr. Reid, who, at one time, had been a follower of Berkeley, and, as he himself tells us, "had embraced the whole of his system*," steps forth with his new theory, the more important doctrines of which may be comprised under the four following heads:—

I. There exist in the mind of man various ideas or conceptions, both physical and metaphysical, which we have never derived either from sensation or reflection.

II. There must therefore exist, somewhere or other in the animal frame, a third percipient principle, from which alone such ideas can have been derived.

III. From this additional principle there is no appeal: it is higher in its knowledge, and surer

* See Dugald Stewart's Essays, note E. p. 548., and compare with ch. i. pp. 62, 63.

in its decision, than either the senses or the reason; it compels our assent in a variety of cases, in which we should otherwise be left in the most distressing doubt; and gives us an assurance, not only that there is an external world around us, but that the primary and secondary qualities of bodies exist equally and uniformly in the bodies themselves, or, in other words, that every thing actually is as it appears to be.

IV. This mandatory or superior principle is COMMON SENSE OR INSTINCT.

And in order to insure himself success in the establishment of the doctrines contained in this outline, Dr. Reid, with a warmer devotion than falls to the lot of metaphysicians in general, and in some degree breathing of poetic inspiration, opens his Inquiry with the following animated prayer: "Admired philosophy! daughter of light! parent of wisdom and knowledge! if thou art she! surely thou hast not yet arisen upon the human mind, nor blessed us with more of thy rays than are sufficient to shed a darkness visible upon the human faculties, and to disturb that repose and security which happier mortals enjoy, who never approached thine altar, nor felt thine influence! But if, indeed, thou hast not power to dispel those clouds and phantoms which thou hast discovered or created, withdraw this penurious and malignant ray: I despise philosophy, and renounce its guidance: let my soul dwell with common sense."

How far this petition was attended to, and the prostrate suppliant was enabled to obtain his object, we shall now proceed to examine.

It is not necessary again to enquire whether the abstruse ideas of extension, figure, and motion, time and space, together with various others of the same kind, can or cannot be derived from mental reflection or external sensation. I have already touched upon the subject, and must refer such of my audience as are desirous of entering into it more deeply to the writings of Locke and Tucker on the one side, and of Reid and Stewart on the other. I shall only observe, in addition, that Mr. Stewart himself admits, with that liberality which peculiarly characterises his pen, that the ideas or notions of extension and figure, which he somewhat quaintly denominates "the *mathematical affections* of matter," presuppose the exercise of our external senses.* But this being admitted, they ought, if not derived from their immediate action, to be fundamentally dependent upon them.

Let us step forward at once to an investigation of the newly discovered and sublime principle itself, by which all these profundities are to be fathomed, and all the aberrations of sense and reason to be corrected.

Many of my hearers will perhaps smile at the idea that this high and mighty principle is nothing more than *common sense;* but, in truth, the

* Essays, vol. i. p. 95.

founder and supporters of the northern system seem to have been woefully at a loss, not only what name to give it, but what nature to bestow upon it; and have hence variously, and at times most cloudily and incongruously, described it, and loaded it with as many names and titles as belong to a Spanish grandee or a Persian prime minister.

"If," says Dr. Reid, "there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in *the common concerns* of life, without being able to give a reason for them, these are what *we* call the principles of COMMON SENSE." *

Upon this passage I shall only, for the present, remark, that the new percipient faculty, which it is the object of the Scottish theory to discover to us, is one, as we have just been told, that is capable of extending its survey far beyond "the *common concerns* of life," and of forming ideas of the *mathematical affections* of matter; and consequently that if the principles of common sense be limited, as they seem to be here, and in my judgment correctly so, to "the common concerns of life," they can never answer the purpose to which this faculty aspires, and for which it is started in the present hypothesis; which demands not only a common sense, but a moral and a mathematical sense; and all essentially

* Inquiry, p. 52.

distinct from and totally independent of corporeal sensation and mental intelligence.

It is much to be regretted, however, and forms an insuperable objection to the whole hypothesis, that its founders have never been able to agree among themselves upon the nature of their new principle.

"The power or faculty," says Dr. Reid, "by which we acquire these conceptions, (those of extension, motion, and the other attributes of matter,) must be something different from any power of the human mind that hath been explained, since it is neither *sensation* nor *reflexion*."*

This is loosely written; for it seems to intimate that there may be conceptions or ideas in the mind derived from or dependent on itself, which are not conceptions or ideas of reflexion: while the phrase ideas of reflexion, as employed in Locke's system, embraces ideas of every kind of which the mind is or can be conscious, and which issue from any powers of its own.

Dugald Stewart gives the same doctrine more correctly as follows, and as a paraphrase upon this very passage: "That we have notions of external qualities which have no resemblance to our *sensations*, or to any thing of which *the mind* is conscious, is therefore a fact of which every man's experience affords the completest evidence, and to which it is not possible to oppose a single

* Reid, ch. v. sect. vii.

objection, but its incompatibility with the common philosophical theories concerning the origin of our knowledge." *

But the question still returns, from what source then are these insensible, unintellectual notions derived? Where is the seat, and what is the meaning of that COMMON SENSE which is to solve every difficulty? As these philosophers make a boast of their *experimentum crucis*, this is an *experimentum crucis* in return to them; nor does there seem to be an individual through the whole school that is able to work out a solution, or to offer any definite idea upon the subject.

I have already observed upon the looseness of Reid, who, in the passage just quoted, seems still to have a slight inclination to regard his principle of COMMON SENSE as a power of the MIND, and of course as seated in the mental organ; though a power that has not hitherto been explained. In the following passage he seems to regard it as a power of the external senses, and hence as seated in these senses themselves.

"The account which this system (Hume's) gives of our judgment and belief concerning things, is as far from the truth as the account it gives of our notions or simple apprehensions. It represents our SENSES as having no other office but that of furnishing the mind with notions or simple apprehensions of things; and makes our judgment and belief concerning those things to

* Essays, vol. i. p. 549.

be acquired by comparing our notions together, and perceiving their agreements or disagreements. We have shown, on the contrary, that EVERY OPERATION OF THE SENSES, in its very nature, implies JUDGMENT or BELIEF as well as simple apprehension." *

Yet, in a third passage, he tells us still more openly, that common sense belongs neither to the mind nor to the corporeal senses, but is "A PART OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH HATH NEVER BEEN EXPLAINED!" †

Dr. Beattie, on the contrary, who assigns to the phrase Common Sense a much more scholastic import than Dr. Reid appears to have intended, expressly asserts that Common Sense, as he understands it, signifies "that POWER OF THE MIND which perceives truth or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous and INSTINCTIVE IMPULSE ‡; or, as he says on another occasion, "it is INSTINCT and not REASON." § While Mr. Stewart, still more decisively, declares it to be the COMMON REASON of mankind ‖; in express contradiction, however, to Dr. Reid, who as positively declares the principles of Common Sense to consist of those principles which we are under a necessity of

* Inquiry, ch. vii. p. 480.
† Ibid. ch. v. lect. iii. p. 115. edit. 1785.
‡ On Truth, part i. ch. i. p. 11.
§ Id. part ii. ch. i.
‖ Essay ii. p. 60.

taking for granted, without being able TO GIVE A REASON FOR THEM."*

Now, whether this third principle reside in the senses or in the mind, so long as it resides in either of them, and constitutes a part of either of them, the argument which they call their *experimentum crucis* falls instantly to the ground; for the ideas to which it gives rise must be sensitive or mental ideas, or, in other words, ideas of sensation or of reflexion.

Dr. Beattie's expression of *instinctive impulse* resulting from a power of the *mind*, is still more objectionable; for instinct is not a power of the mind, but a power meant to supply the place of a mind where no mind is present, or in energy: and always acting most strikingly where there is least intelligence, as in the lowest ranks of animals; and perhaps still more obviously in plants. This is to confound endowments instead of to discriminate them. Nor is there less confusion in Dr. Reid's account of the matter; which is, "that every operation of the senses implies JUDGMENT and BELIEF, as well as simple apprehension:" for this is to transfer the mind itself from the brain to the senses, as well as to make a like transfer of the principle of common sense to the same organs: it is to produce a chaos in the constitution of man, by jumbling every faculty into an interference with every faculty. And yet upon this very doctrine he stakes the whole truth

* Inquiry, p. 52.

or falsehood of his theory; and Mr. Stewart abets him in the same appeal. *

It is amusing, indeed, to run over the names, titles, or distinctive marks assigned to their newly-discovered principle by the leaders of the Common Sense school. For we have not only common sense, instinct †, instinctive prescience ‡, and *instinctive propensity* §; but dictates of *nature* ‖, *dictates of internal sensation* ¶, simple *notions, and ultimate laws* **, judgment and belief furnished by the senses ††, inductive principle ‡‡, constitution of human nature §§, common understanding ‖‖, moral sense ¶¶, *moral principle* ***, suggestions †††, and, finally, inspiration: thus

* Stewart's Essays, vol. i. p. 548.

† Beattie, part i. ch. ii. p. 28. stereotype edit. Stewart's Essays, vol. i. pp. 66. 87, 88. 589.

‡ Reid's Inquiry, ch. vi. lect. xxiv. p. 441.

§ Beattie on Truth, part i. ch. iii. lect. vii. p. 63.

‖ Ibid. part i. ch. ii. pp. 28. 32.

¶ Ibid. p. 31.

** Stewart's Essays, vol. i. essay iii. p. 123.

†† Reid's Inquiry, ch. vii. p. 481.

‡‡ Ibid. ch. vi. lect. xxiv. p. 442.

§§ Stewart, essay i. ch. i. p. 7. Reid, p. 391. Principles of the Constitution, Beattie, part i. ch. ii. p. 29. Original Principles of the Constitution, Reid, Inq. ch. vi. lect. xxiv. pp. 428. 441.

‖‖ Reid, ch. vi. lect. xx. p. 380.

¶¶ Stewart, essay i. ch. iv. p. 44.; a phrase of Shaftesbury, and adopted from him by Hutcheson.

*** Beattie, part i. ch. ii. 29.

††† Ibid. essay ii. ch. ii. p. 96. Reid, ch. vi. lect. ii. p. 157.

putting this imaginary power, if not in the place of a Bible, upon an equality with it.

The "original and natural judgments" of this faculty, says Dr. Reid, are the INSPIRATION OF THE ALMIGHTY: "they serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are a part of our constitution: and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up the common sense of mankind, and what is manifestly contrary to any of those first principles is what we call absurd." *

* Reid, ch. vii. p. 482.

In treating of the subject of instinct, I had occasion to notice that Dr. Hancock, in a recent work of much moral excellence, has taken the same generalized view of those various powers, and has directly resolved the whole into an immediate and continual flow of divine inspiration through the agency of the Holy Spirit; so that the lowest animal, in its instincts, and the most gifted saint, in his special illumination, are supplied from one and the same intellectual fountain. And hence, in Dr. Hancock's view, this is a power or energy which not only serves "to direct us in the COMMON affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark," but to enlighten us in the sublime mysteries of spiritual truth. "In the same manner as the Divine Being has scattered the seeds of plants and vegetables in the body of the earth, so he has implanted a portion of his own incorruptible seed, or of that which in Scripture language is called 'the seed of the kingdom,' in the soul of every individual of the human race." Essay on Instinct, p. 459. And hence, though Dr. Hancock is obliged to "admit that there are no innate ideas, according to the strict meaning of the term, and no formally inscribed truths like established propositions to be discovered in early life, —

Now, what is to be collected from all this pompous heraldry of high-sounding names, so totally inconsistent with the precision of an exact

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yet it is fair to presume that the rudiments or *inherent propensities* leading to mental and corporeal perfection, are still essentially in existence. Hence, because we cannot discover in the infant mind the manifest signs of an original innate truth or conception that there is a God, and the simple propositions relative to moral and religious duty, we are not to conclude that it has no *tendency* to develope these notions." — Ibid. p. 314, 315.

We have here a clear example of the difficulty of keeping an hypothesis within due limits that has no fixt principles to be built upon. So far, however, as these writers appeal to Scripture in support of their doctrine of a moral sense, or instinctive love of virtue, *propensity* to moral right, internal light or innate idea of God, they seem to be opposed by every page to which they refer. For whatever man may become by a gradual cultivation of his mental powers, or by immediate irradiation from heaven, we are expressly told, what, indeed, we have sufficient proofs of if we look around us, and especially into savage tribes, that by nature his "heart is desperately wicked;" that shortly after the fall, God beheld that "the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually;" that "in the flesh dwelleth no good thing;" that men by nature are under "the dominion of sin," — whose power is so great as to constitute as it were a "LAW in the members," — and a law so active and hostile to every *good principle*, as to be for ever "warring against the law of the mind" when enlightened by a divine revelation, and even gifted, as St. Paul was, when he wrote this of himself, as well as of others, with the power of the Holy Spirit. And it is hence St. Paul tells us farther, that mankind, in their natural state, instead of being children of light, with innate tendencies or propensities to good, have a

science; and which certainly would not have been allowed had this school been able to settle among themselves, or to communicate to the public, a clear idea of the seat, nature, or attributes of the new, and as I trust to prove, imaginary faculty it thus ventures to introduce; and which, after all, is only intended to supply the place of the innate ideas of M. Des Cartes, as these innate ideas were designed to supply

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heart at "enmity against God;" and "are children of wrath." Whilst, instead of referring us to any kind of præcognita, inbred notions, or instinctive suggestions, in proof of the existence and attributes of a deity, St. Paul, like Locke, sends us to the works of nature and of providence; to the world *without* instead of to the world *within* us; and to the exercise of our own senses in relation to them: "for the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, ARE CLEARLY SEEN, being understood by THE THINGS THAT ARE MADE, even his ETERNAL POWER and GODHEAD." And these proofs are so manifest, and the duties they enjoin so easily deducible, as to form a law of nature, "a law unto themselves," in the minds of those who attend to them, and have no revealed law, — a *conscience* of what is right and wrong; so as to leave the whole world, as he farther adds, "without excuse," for not acquiring this knowledge, and this natural law. It is to the same BOOK OF NATURE, and for the same purpose, that the Psalmist leads himself in Ps. viii. 3. "When I consider the heavens, the work of thy hands: the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained;" and to which he leads every one else, in Ps. xix. 1—3. And to what but the same divine yet external proof does our Saviour lead us in Matt. vi. 28. "CONSIDER the lilies of the field, how they grow," &c. as well as in numerous other places? — external objects generally forming a text to the divine comment of him who "spake as never *man spake*."

the place of the intelligible world of the Greek schools?

"It is hardly possible for us," says Dr. Beattie, "to explain these *dictates of our nature* according to *common sense* and common experience, in such language as shall be liable to no exception. The misfortune is, that many of the words we must use, though extremely well understood, are either too simple or too complex in their meaning to admit a logical definition." * But the plain fact is, that they have not come to any definite meaning amongst themselves. † Let us then just give a glance at the

* Ibid. Part i. ch. ii. 32.

† The phrases KOINAI ΔΟΞΑΙ or common sentiments, of Aristotle, Premières Vérités or Primary Truths of Buffier, or even Innate Ideas of Des Cartes, whatever be the truth or fallacy of the doctrines they impart, are far less exceptionable than that of Common Sense, as being far less capable of being misunderstood. Attempts have been made to support this phrase by a reference to its employment by other writers, and even in the Latin tongue; and poets as well as metaphysicians have been brought forward with their suffrages. But all this is to no purpose, unless it could be proved that such writers had used it in the same meaning as the chief supporters of the present hypothesis, and that this meaning was one and indivisible. Mr. Stewart has felt himself particularly called upon to admit the loose and unsettled character of Dr. Beattie's language, and especially in one of his accounts of Common Sense, which he declares "is liable to censure in almost every line." Elem. ch. i. lect. iii. p. 83.: while Dr. Reid, on the very same subject, has been far more roughly handled both by the English translator of Buffier, and by Sir James Stewart, ibid. p. 88.

"One unluckly consequence," observes Mr. Stewart, "has unquestionably resulted from the coincidence of so

two leading terms, for it is hardly worth while to follow up the whole of them. These are *common sense* and *instinct*: both of which seem by Dr. Reid, and in various places by Dr. Beattie and Mr. Dugald Stewart, to be used in their popular import. Can any man for a moment, who has the slightest knowledge of physiology and philology, seriously admit that common sense and instinct are the same thing? or rather ought to be confounded under the same term? Do these writers believe so themselves, whenever they form any clear and precise idea of these faculties in their own minds? "Common sense," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, is "the common

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many writers connected with this northern part of the island, in adopting, about the same period, the same phrase, as a sort of philosophical watch-word: — that, although their views differ widely in various respects, they have in general been classed together as partisans of a new sect, and as mutually responsible for the doctrines of each other. It is easy to perceive the use likely to be made of this accident by an uncandid antagonist." — Ibid. p. 89.

I have endeavoured as much as possible to avoid being open to any such charge, by confining my remarks to a few alone of the pillars of the school before us; and by selecting alone those who, from personal friendship and confidential acquaintance with each other's thoughts, are universally regarded as being both the most accordant and ablest defendants of their hypothesis. And if, among writers so closely united, discrepancies of doctrine or opinion should be frequent and flagrant, the only deduction that can be drawn from so unhappy a fact is, that the hypothesis cannot be made to hold true to itself, and is faulty in its first principles.

reason of mankind * :" and every man of common sense will, I suppose, accede to this definition. But common sense, says Dr. Reid, as though in direct opposition to Mr. Stewart, is not reason: for it is that principle which compels us "to take things for granted, *without* being able to give *a reason* for them." † "Common sense," says Dr. Beattie, "is an instinctive impulse. Common sense is not reason, but instinct. It is instinct, and not reason, that determines me to believe my touch; it is instinct, and not reason, that determines me to believe that visible sensations, when consistent with tangible, are not fallacious: and it is either instinct or reasoning founded on experience (that is, on the evidence of sense) that determines me to believe the man's stature a permanent and not a changeable thing." ‡

Now, the first thing that cannot fail to strike us, on comparing these passages together, is the contradictory definitions they contain; the singular confusion which runs through the whole of them in respect to the three ideas of reason, common sense, and instinct; and the acknowledged difficulty the writers feel of drawing a line between the first and the two last of these principles, upon which, however, the whole system of the new philosophy hinges. Surely "if reasoning, founded on experience," which is the very language of Mr. Locke as well as of

* Essay ii. p. 60.
† Inquiry, ch. ii. lect. vi.
‡ Essay on Truth, part ii. ch. i. p. 95.

Dr. Beattie, be sufficient to determine us, and is probably the principle actually appealed to in one case of external sensation, it may well be sufficient, and be thought the principle actually appealed to in all others.

The next remark that must, I think, occur to every one, is the absurdity of clothing instinct with moral and intellectual powers, with belief and judgment: for we are, in other places, told that this instinct of common sense possesses sentiment and moral sense. Now, all these import the existence of a mind; they import more, for they import mental feeling. And the consequence is, that we must either employ the term instinct without a determinate idea, and in opposite significations at different times, or we must allow to reptiles, and ought to allow to plants, the possession of belief, judgment, and mental feeling, as well as to mankind; for the existence of instinct is still clearer and more powerful in the first two than in the last. I know there is no attendant upon these lectures who finds any necessity for this confusion of ideas: and who does not apprehend perspicuously, from the definitions I have ventured to lay down, and have so frequently had occasion to repeat, the natural distinction between the principles here adverted to. But let a man, if it be possible for him, believe that common sense and instinct are the same thing, can he still farther believe that this is the faculty, call it by which of the two names you please, that is to be an infallible guide in physical and metaphy-

sical, in sensible and intellectual, in moral and theological perplexities; where the finest perception falls short, and the most penetrating mind is overwhelmed? Is it this which is to teach us the *mathematical affections of matter;* and to direct us in our duty towards God, our neighbours, and ourselves? I again refer to Mr. Stewart's own description of the boy, born nearly blind, and wholly deaf, to which I have referred already.

If this high and domineering power be instinct, then let us turn, with due reverence, to those quarters where instinct exists in its fullest perfection; let us pay due homage to the brutal and the vegetable tribes. Let us return to the pretty prattle of the nursery, and learn industry from the ant, and geometry from the bee, and constancy from the dove, and innocence from the snow-drop, and blushing modesty from the rose. Let us hail all these, not indeed as our equals, but as our superiors; as more richly endowed with that "inspiration of the Almighty," which is designed to correct the errors of sense and intelligence, and to soar to sublimities to which these can never attain.

But let us part with the term INSTINCT, and confine ourselves to that of COMMON SENSE. Why is this idea set up as a distinct principle from reason? as a principle often opposed to it, and always superior to it? Common sense is plain sense: the common judgment of mankind upon subjects of common comprehension, sometimes

given intuitively, and sometimes by the exercise of reason, both of which, as I have already shown, are alike mental processes. And Mr. Stewart has hence, as lately noticed, freely denominated it in one place, though in my mind most incongruously with respect to his own system "the common reason of mankind." Its proper limit is the common concerns of life, and while it confines itself to these it is nearly infallible; for the common constitution of our nature must, in most cases, lead us to one common result. When the legislature of our own country, (in which this principle exists with peculiar force,) appeals to the general voice of the people, it appeals to their common sense. But in doing this, does it appeal to their instinct, or to any other faculty than their common reason; that discursive power, which, by being better exercised here than among other nations, has enriched them with sounder and more general information upon the subject in question?

Common sense, however, must be confined to common subjects. Like the ostrich, it is quick and powerful on the surface, but its wings are not plumed for flight, and it plays a ridiculous part whenever it attempts to soar. When Copernicus, with a trembling hand, first suggested that the sun stands fixed in his place, and all the heavenly bodies move round him, common sense, assuming the philosopher, to which character it has no pretensions, opposed him, and science fell a sacrifice to its conceit. With the same foolish vanity it denied, till laughed out of

its folly by circumnavigation, the existence of antipodes; or that the surface of the earth, which appears to be a plane, could be spherical, and that men and women of our own shape and make could exist on its reverse side, with their feet opposed to our own. When the Dutch ambassador told the king of Siam, who had never seen or heard of such a thing as frost, that the water in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so hard, that men might walk, and bullocks be roasted upon it, his well-known answer was delivered upon the principles of common sense. He spoke from what he had seen, and from what every one had seen around him, and he relied upon the common appearances of nature. "Hitherto," said he, "I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I looked upon you as an honest man; but now I am sure you are a liar." Yet this is the faculty held up in the system before us as a sure and infallible judge, whose office it is to correct the errors of reason, and to prove to us that every thing exists precisely AS IT APPEARS TO EXIST.*

* Dr. Beattie has adopted this precise line of reasoning under the influence of his Common Sense principles: and points out, by analogy, that the opinion of the Siamese monarch was founded upon a basis which nothing could shake, or ought to shake; for the only appeal that any opposing evidence could make to him must have been through the medium of his reason, which is a less infallible judge than common sense, and hence less worthy of attention. "Common sense," says he, "tells me that the ground on which I stand is hard, material, and solid. — Now, if my common

How much clearer, and to the purpose, is the explanation of this subject given by the excellent bishop Butler, and how perfectly in unison with the language of Mr. Locke! "That which renders beings," says he, "capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature and moral faculties of perception and action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But additional to this we have A CAPACITY OF REFLECTING upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought; and ON OUR DOING THIS, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill-desert. — It is manifest that a great part of common language and of common behaviour over the world is formed upon the supposition of SUCH A MORAL FACULTY; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding or a perception of the heart, or which seems

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sense be mistaken, who shall ascertain and correct the mistake? Our reason, it is said. Are then the inferences of reason, in this instance, clearer and more decisive than the dictates of common sense? By no means. I still trust to my common sense as before, and I feel that I must do so. But supposing the inferences of the one faculty as clear and decisive as the dictates of the other; yet who shall assure me that my reason is less liable to mistake than my common sense? — In a word, no doctrine ought to be believed as true that EXCEEDS BELIEF AND CONTRADICTS A FIRST PRINCIPLE." — On Truth, part i. ch. i.

the truth, as including both."* Here we have laid down a firm and impregnable basis: it is the capacity of reflexion: an arrival at the intrinsic nature of natural and moral good, and natural and moral evil, through the operation of our own reason: — that faculty of reason, which the same distinguished writer, instead of despising or undervaluing, expressly calls in another place, after Solomon, "the candle of the Lord;" but which he adds, "can afford no light where it does not shine, nor judge where it has no principles to judge upon."†

With this remark I feel that I might safely drop this part of the argument: but as I have referred Mr. Stewart to his own description of the blind and deaf boy, in refutation of his view of the powers and duties of the external senses, I will, in like manner, refer Dr. Reid to Dr. Reid himself in refutation of the doctrine immediately before us, that every thing exists precisely as it appears to exist. In page 173. of his chapter on the quality of colours, he tells us, that the *colour* of the body is in the *body* itself — a scarlet rose being as much a scarlet in the dark as in the day; but that the *apparition* or *appearance* of the colour is in the *eye* or the *mind*. But when he tells us this, does he not tell us in as plain terms as can be used, that the *object* and its apparition or *appearance* are in a state of separation

* Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed: Dissert. ii. of the Nature of Virtue.

† Ibid. part ii. Conclusion.

from each other? that they are two distinct things, and exist in two distinct places? and consequently that, instead of every thing BEING as IT SEEMS TO BE, nothing has a being either *as* it seems to be, or *where* it seems to be? Nay, does he not, in spite of himself, adopt the very doctrine of Aristotle and Des Cartes, both of whom held the same tenet? the former, indeed, calling this separate apparition a *phantasm*, which is a mere change of the Latin term apparition into a Greek word.*

But where, let me again ask, is the residence, and what is the nature of this many-titled faculty, which is neither sense nor mind; and is thus capable of discerning what neither sense nor mind can comprehend? Every other principle or faculty has its peculiar seat, and we

* "The scarlet-rose which is before me is still a scarlet-rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at midnight when no eye saw it. The *colour remains* when the *appearance ceases*: it remains the same when the appearance changes. To a person in the jaundice it has still another appearance: but he is easily convinced that the change is *in his eye*, and not in the colour of the object. When a coloured body is presented, there is a certain APPARITION *to the eye* or *to the mind*, which we have called *the appearance of colour*. Mr. Locke calls it an idea, and, indeed, it may be called so with the greatest propriety. Hence the appearance is, in the imagination, so closely united with the quality called a scarlet colour, that they are apt to be mistaken for one and the same thing, although they are in reality so different and so unlike, that one is an idea *in* the mind, the other is a quality of body." — Inquiry, &c. ch. vi. lect. iv. pp. 172, 173. 175. edit. 4. Lond. 1785.

know how to track it to its form. Instinct is the operation of the power of organized life by the exercise of certain natural laws, directing it to the perfection of the individual; and wherever organized life is to be found there is instinct. Irritation exists in the muscular fibre; sensation in nervous cords; intelligence in the gland of the brain: for there is its seat, whatever may be its essence. But where is the seat, and what is the nature of this new principle? Is it capable of a separate existence? Does it expire with the body? Or does it accompany and still direct the soul after death? These are important questions; what is the answer to them? Or is there any other to be found than that of Dr. Reid already noticed? "Common sense is a part of human nature which hath never been explained."*

And what, after all, is it designed to teach us? What is the number and the precise character of those primary maxims, or instinctive notions, or natural dictates, or inspired truths, or whatsoever else they may be called, which form the sum of its communication? How are we to know what is a genuine and infallible first principle from what has the mere semblance of one and is spurious? Are the founders of the system agreed upon this subject among themselves? If so, they are far more fortunate than the Cartesians upon the first principles, the κοιναὶ

* Inquiry, ch. v. sect. iii. p. 115.

ἔννοιαι of their own school. If they be not, their foundation slips from them in a moment, and all is wild and visionary; and every one may find a first principle in what his own fancy may suggest, or his own inclination lead him to. Yet we have no proof that any such convention has ever been settled; nor has any individual been bold enough to furnish a catalogue from the repository of his own endowment.

In few words, the whole of this hypothesis is nothing more than an attempt to revive the Cartesian scheme, so far as relates to, perhaps, the most obnoxious part of it, the doctrine of innate ideas, but to revive it under another name. Beattie and Stewart have in fact indirectly admitted as much, though neither of them have chosen to avow the design openly. The worst and most dangerous part of Mr. Locke's system, in the opinion of Dr. Beattie, is his first book — that very book in which this doctrine meets with its death-blow. While Mr. Stewart, notwithstanding the contempt with which he professes to treat this fanciful tenet of innate ideas, asserts almost immediately afterwards, that his chief objection to it consists in its name, and the absurdities that have been connected with it *; and adds, that "*perhaps he might even venture to say,*" if separated from these, it would agree in substance with the conclusion he had been attempting to establish.†

* Essay iii. p. 120.

† "Perhaps I might even venture to say that, were the ambiguous and obnoxious epithet *innate* laid aside, and all the

It was my intention to have pursued this hypothesis in another direction, and to have pointed out its decisive tendency to an encouragement of mental indolence and immorality; a tendency, however, altogether unperceived by the uncorrupt and honourable minds of its justly eminent leaders. But our time has already expired, and I must leave it to yourselves to calculate at home, what must be the necessary result of a theory, provided it could ever be seriously embraced upon an extensive scale, that teaches, on the one hand, that intelligence is subordinate to instinct, and that our truest knowledge is that which is afforded by the *dictates of nature*, without trouble or exertion; and on the other, that our *moral sense* is identical with our *instinctive propensities*; and that the *constitution of our nature* is an infallible guide, and can never lead us amiss. This mischievous, but unquestionably unforeseen tendency of the theory of common sense, I must leave you to follow up at your leisure; but I cannot quit this subject without once more adverting to the total failure of this theory, in ac-

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absurdities discarded which are connected either with the Platonic, with the Scholastic, or with the Cartesian hypothesis, concerning the nature of *ideas*, this last theory ("the antiquated theory of innate ideas," as he has just above called it, and to which he here refers,) would agree in substance with the conclusion which I have been attempting to establish by an induction of facts." — Phil. Essay iii. p. 120. 4to. 1810.

complishing the chief point for which it was devised,—I mean that of engaging us to believe, in opposition to the philosophical vagaries of the Bishop of Cloyne and Mr. Hume, as well as of the earlier idealists, not only that the external world has a substantive existence, but that it substantively exists in every respect as it APPEARS to exist. I have already observed, that while Dr. Berkeley was contending metaphysically that we have no proof of a material world, because we have no proof of any thing but the existence of our own minds and ideas, M. Boscovich was contending physically, that we have no proof that matter contains any of the qualities which it APPEARS to contain; that whatever the OSTENSIBLE FORMS of bodies may present to us, it has in itself no such properties as they *seem* to exhibit; that the whole visible creation is nothing more than a collection of indivisible, unextended atoms, or mere mathematical points, whose only attributes are certain powers of attraction and repulsion, and consequently that every thing we behold is A MERE PHÆNOMENON, — AN APPARITION, and nothing more.

Now, meaning to oppose this doctrine, and every doctrine of a similar import, could it be supposed possible, if the fact did not stare us in the face from his own writings, that Dr. Reid would after all avow and contend, not indeed for the same, but for a parallel tenet, and support it almost in the same terms? Could it be supposed

that he would tell us, as we have already seen he has told us, that every object has its APPARITION; that the object is one thing and its APPARITION another; that the object is IN ONE PLACE and its apparition IN ANOTHER; and that neither the mind nor the eye behold the object itself, but only its APPARITION, or APPEARANCE, its PHANTASM or PHÆNOMENON?

But I have to draw still more largely upon your astonishment; for it yet remains for me to inform you, that Mr. Dugald Stewart, who may be regarded as the key-stone of Dr. Reid's system, and the chief aim of whose writings has been to proscribe the hypothesis of Berkeley, has himself fallen, not unintentionally, as Dr. Reid seems to have done, but openly and avowedly, into a modification of Boscovich's hypothesis; and has even brought forward its more prominent principles "as necessary," I I adopt his own terms, "to complete Dr. Reid's speculations." * He labours, indeed, to prove, that the two hypotheses, of Berkeley and Boscovich, have no resemblance or connexion with each other; and I am ready to admit, that in some respects there is a difference, since Boscovich allows us a visionary material world, a world of apparitions, or orderly phænomena, in the language of Leibnitz *phenomenes bien réglés*, while Berkeley allows us no material world whatever; though he, too, has his world of phæno-

* Essay ii. ch. ii. p. 80., and compare with ch. i. pp. 62, 63.

mena : but I must contend that they are, to all intents and purposes, alike in their opposition to that tenet, which it is the leading feature of Reid's theory to establish, — I mean that we have an internal principle, that proves to us that the world around us is not a vain SHOW but a solid REALITY, and that every thing actually is as it appears to be. So that the theory before us, even in the hands of its founder and principal supporter, has strikingly failed in the object for which it was devised; and, for all the purposes in question, the former might just as well have continued in the profession of Bishop Berkeley's principles, as have deserted them, and set up a new scheme for himself.

Under these circumstances I must leave it to the enlightened audience before me, to choose out of these different hypotheses as they may think best. For myself I freely confess, that I have no ambition to soar into the higher rank and the infallible knowledge of an instinctive creature, and shall modestly content myself with the humbler character of a rational and intelligent being, still steadily steering by the lowly but sober lamps of a Bacon, a Newton, a Locke, a Butler, a Price, and a Paley, instead of being captivated by the beautiful and brilliant, but vacillating and illusive, coruscations of these northern lights.

LECTURE VII.

ON HUMAN HAPPINESS.

It has required, I apprehend, but a very slight attention to the course of study we have lately been following up, to be convinced of the truth of the remark with which we opened the series, —I mean, that the subject it proposed to discuss is, of all subjects whatever that relate to human entity, the most difficult and intractable. And absurd and visionary as have been many of the opinions which it has brought before us, let us, in conclusion, check all undue levity, by recollecting that they are the absurdities and visions of the first philosophers and sages of their respective periods; of the wisest, and, with a few exceptions, of the best of mankind; to whom, in most other respects, we ought to bow with implicit homage, and who have only foundered from too daring a spirit of adventure, and amidst rocks and shoals which laugh at the experience of the pilot.

For myself, I freely confess to you, that my own hopes of success are but very humble. I have done my best, however, to render the subject intelligible; and if in the progress of it I should also have betrayed dreams and absurdi-

ties, I have only to entreat that they may be visited with the candour which I have endeavoured to extend to others; fully aware that the ablest arguments I have been able to submit are not fitted, if I may adopt the eloquent words of Mr. Burke, "to abide the test of a captious controversy, but of a sober, and even forgiving examination; that they are not armed at all points for battle, but dressed to visit those who are willing to give a peaceful entrance to truth."

There is one point, however, and the most important point we have contemplated, in which all the different schools seem to be agreed,—I mean, that of moral distinctions. Whatever may be the roads the different travellers have lighted upon, whether short or circuitous, smooth or entangled, they all at last find themselves, in this respect, arrive at the same central spot; and coincide in prescribing the same rules of duty, enjoining the same conduct, and, with a few exceptions, delivering the same determinations. No philosopher in the world has ever dreamed of confounding virtue with vice, or of writing a treatise on the benefit of committing crimes. Let us search where we will, we shall find that there is a something in human nature, when once emerged from the barbarism of savage life, that leads the learned and the unlearned to approve the one and to condemn the other, even where their own conduct is involved in the condemnation.

And what is this something in human nature that conducts to so general a conclusion? A

set or system of innate ideas and first principles, replies one class of philosophers; a moral instinct or impulse of common sense, replies another class; the intrinsic loveliness and beauty of virtue itself, replies a third; because the attributes of virtue are useful and agreeable either to ourselves or to others, replies a fourth; because it conducts to human happiness, replies a fifth; and because it is the will of God, replies a sixth.

But while all thus agree in the conclusion, the question that leads to it still returns upon us: What proof have we of the existence of such innate ideas or instinctive impulse? of the intrinsic beauty of virtue? that it is useful to us, productive of our happiness, or that it is the will of God it should be cultivated? or rather, what proof have we that the original position is true, and that there is a something in human nature in general which induces us to prefer virtue to vice?

The original position is true, but the reasons urged in support of it are neither equally true nor equally adequate, even where they are true.

It is not true that we have either innate ideas or moral instincts that impel us to a love of virtue; for in such cases the most savage tribes among mankind would be the most virtuous; their præcognita, or innate ideas, being but little disturbed by foreign ideas, acquired by education or extensive commerce with the world; and their moral instincts as little disturbed by foreign habits acquired from the same causes.

There has often arisen in the mind an unaccountable whim, of supposing that a savage life, or state of nature, is the best and purest mode of human existence; and novellists, poets, and sometimes even philosophers, have equally ranted upon the paucity of its wants, the simplicity of its pursuits, the solidity of its pleasures, and the strength and constancy of its attachments. It is here, we have been told, that the human soul developes its proper energies, and displays itself in all its native benevolence and dignity: here all things belong equally to every one; the only law is the will of the individual, the only feeling a sublime, unselfish philanthropy. This whim became epidemic in France about the beginning of the French Revolution, and was, in fact, the monster mania that led to it. And the contagion, not long afterwards began to show itself among many individuals of our own country, who, in the height of their phrenzy, laboured earnestly to promote the same kind of trials amongst ourselves that our neighbours were actually exhibiting. The history is fresh in the mind of every one, and it is not necessary to pursue it. It is sufficient to observe, that it led in a short time to consequences so mischievous as to work their own cure; and to afford another living proof of the fact I endeavoured pointedly to establish in a late lecture, that barbarism, vice, and misery are, by an immutable law of nature, the inseparable associates of each other.* Throw your eyes

* Vol. II. Ser. II. Lect. XIII.

to whatever part of the globe or to whatever history of mankind you please, and you will find it so without an exception. Other animals have instincts that control their appetites, and lead them insensibly to the perfection of their respective kinds; that inculcate constancy where constancy is necessary, and compel them to provide for and take the charge of their young. Man has no such instincts whatever: he has reason, indeed, a more ennobling and efficient faculty, but it must be called forth, for it is a dormant principle in savage life. And hence, destitute of the one, and uninfluenced by the other, he is the perpetual slave of his ungoverned and ungovernable passions, and is the only animal in the world that has been known to kill or abandon its own offspring in a state of destitute and helpless infancy; and to murder its own kind for the purpose of feasting upon it: a fact too well established to be doubted of; and which, instead of being confined to a single climate or a single people, has apparently been common to all countries, when under the influence of gross barbarism; which still exists among various tribes in Africa, South America, and Australia, and particularly among the islands of the South Sea, and which, according to the concurrent testimony of the best Greek and Roman writers, as Herodotus, Pliny, Strabo, and Pomponius Mela, was formerly to be traced among the Scythians, Tartars, and Massagetæ of Asia, and the Lestrigons of Europe. Strabo, indeed, ascribes the same

practice even to the Irish in his day, and Cælius Rhodriginus to their neighbours of Scotland; while Thevenot asserts that, when he was in India in 1665, human flesh was publicly sold in the market at Debca, about forty leagues from Baroche.

Consentaneous to this view of the subject are the following remarks of one of the most intelligent circumnavigators of the present day, M. Von Langsdorff, which he gives as the result of a personal and comprehensive survey of different climates and countries:—"There is no creature upon the earth, in any climate or zone, that bears such an enmity to its own species as man. Let us only," says he, "cast our eyes over the history of the globe, in the most barren wastes, and in the most fertile countries, in the smallest islands, or on the most extensive continents, among the most savage as well as the most cultivated nations, in short, in every part of the world, wherever man exists, and we shall find him seeking to destroy his own species: he is every where *by nature* harsh and cruel. The observations we made upon these newly discovered islands (the Polynesian), which never, to the best of our knowledge, had any intercourse with civilised nations, and whose inhabitants may be considered as children of nature, and as still in their original condition, afford remarkable examples in confirmation of these assertions.

"The sweet and tender feelings of affection and love, of friendship and attachment, even that

of parents towards their children, and of children towards their parents, I have, alas! very seldom found among a rude and uncivilised people. The African hordes not only bring their prisoners taken in battle but their own children to market. The same thing is done by the Kirgis, the Kalmucs, and many other inhabitants of the north-western coast of America; and here at Nakatiwa (one of the islands of the South Sea) a woman would very readily have given a child at her breast, which had been asked by us in jest, in exchange for a piece of iron."* And he might have added, that it was the exposure of British, or rather perhaps of Saxon children for slaves in the public market at Rome, as late as the close of the sixth century, expressly sold for this purpose, by their own parents at their own homes, that first induced that excellent prelate, Pope Gregory I., to plan a mission for the conversion of our barbarous forefathers to Christianity, from the horror he felt at their conduct, and the pity with which he beheld the little outcasts.

In the view of history, therefore, as well as in the language of Scripture, man, in a state of nature, is prone to evil, and his heart is desperately wicked: or as it is given most exquisitely in the poetical language of the Psalmist,

> "Behold the dark places of the earth
> Are full of the habitations of cruelty!"†

* Von Langsdorff's Voyages and Travels, ch. vii. p. 139.

† Psalm lxxiv. 20.

The sentiment, then, that exists in human nature in favour of virtue, or a virtuous conduct, though general, is not universal, and consequently cannot proceed from any original instincts or innate ideas. What, then, are the other causes to which it has been ascribed by moralists? The intrinsic loveliness of virtue itself. Because its attributes are generally useful and agreeable. Because it conducts to human happiness. Because it is the will of God.

Now all these answers, however diversified, may be resolved into two general ideas—human happiness and the will of God: for we can only regard that as lovely or an object of love which contributes to our happiness: and we can only regard that as useful or agreeable which conduces to the same end.

The subject, therefore, becomes considerably narrowed, and the only substantial replies that appear capable of being given to the question, What is the source of this general sentiment among mankind in favour of virtue? are, Because it is the path to happiness; or, Because it is the will of God.

But may not the subject be still farther narrowed, and both these replies be resolved into one identical proposition? may not human happiness and the will of God be the same thing? If so, we shall then only have to enquire farther, whether virtue be the real path to human happiness? for if it be, then, necessarily, he who pursues that path obeys the will of God.

Both questions are important: the first, however, may be settled in a few words. To discover the will of an intelligent agent, nothing more is necessary than to examine the general drift or tendency of his contrivance, so far as we are able to make it out. Taking it, then, for granted, that the world is the work of an intelligent agent, does it exhibit proof of having been devised for the general accommodation and happiness of man? for his general misery, — or for neither? It cannot have been devised for neither, because that would be to relinquish the very foundation of our present position, and to deny that the world exhibits contrivance, or has been formed by an intelligent agent? Is, then, the world, with its general furniture, is the frame of man itself calculated to promote man's happiness or his misery? It is impossible to answer this question more strongly than in the words of Archdeacon Paley: —

"Contrivance proves design, and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the designer. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances with which we are acquainted are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache: their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it; or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the *object* of it.

This is a distinction which well deserves to be attended to. In describing implements of husbandry, you would hardly say of the sickle that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though, from the construction of the instrument, and the manner of using it, this mischief often happens. But if you had occasion to describe instruments of torture or execution, this engine, you would say, is to extend the sinews; this to dislocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to scorch the soles of the feet. Here pain and misery are the very *objects* of the contrivance. Now, nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this is to irritate; this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys; this gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout. If by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is that it is useless. No one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment. Since, then, God has called forth his consummate wisdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been constituted with this design at first, so long as this constitution is upholden by him, we must in reason suppose the same design to continue." *

* Mor. and Pol. Phil. vol. i. ch. v.

A thousand other examples might be added, but it is unnecessary. The conclusion is clear, and it is most important: we obtain from the light of nature, or the exercise of our own reason, irresistible proofs of the divine benevolence, irresistible proofs that God has made man to make him happy: or, in other words, that human happiness is the will of God.

We are now, then, prepared to enter upon our last question: Is a course of virtue the path to happiness, for if it be it must necessarily be the will of God to walk in it? Or, having proved the terms to be co-ordinate, we may propose the question conversely, Is a course of virtue the will of God? For if it be, it must necessarily conduct to human happiness. Under either view of the question, the general proposition will be as follows: God has willed human happiness, and he has willed it to be obtained by a course of virtue. God, then, is the author, happiness the end, and virtue the means.

Let us take the question before us in its first view, Is human virtue the means of human happiness?

Had we time it might perhaps be expedient to enter into a definition of the terms; but we have not time, and I must refer therefore to the general understanding of mankind upon this subject: which I may do the more safely, because, though the terms virtue and happiness are strikingly comprehensive, there is no great difference of opinion either among the learned or

the unlearned concerning their general outlines or more prominent characteristics.

The question, then, ought to be argued in relation to the happiness both of the individual and of the community; or, in other words, to the happiness of man in his private and his social capacity.

Is the practice of virtue most contributory to a man's individual happiness? The libertine says No; and he seeks for it in his mistress, whom he changes as often as he changes his dress. The glutton says No; unless a good city-feast be virtue; for the soul of happiness with him consists in a haunch of venison and a brisk circulation of the bottle. The spendthrift says No: you may as well seek for happiness in a hay-stack: happiness, my dear Sir, you may depend upon it, consists in nothing else than a good stud, and a pack of hounds. The gamester, in like manner, says No; and he directs us to a pack of cards and a pair of dice. Even the miser joins in the general negative, and would fain persuade us that it resides in the meagre and miserable ghost that constitutes his own person, or the meagre and miserable pursuits to which his person is daily prostituted.

Now all these have, no doubt, their respective enjoyments; but do they constitute happiness in any fair sense of the term? are they permanent? I do not say through life, but for four-and-twenty hours together. Many of them, on the contrary, are of that violent kind that they

wear themselves out in an hour or two; and what is the state of the system before it recovers sufficient energy for a renewal? To say that it is as empty as an air-pump would be to give a better character of it than it deserves. It is not empty; it is still full; full of bitterness or insupportable languor, sickness at heart or sickness at the stomach. Even the miser, who, properly speaking, provides for a longer range of enjoyment than any of the rest of this precious group, is a victim while he is a worshipper, a sacrifice to anxiety while an idolater of Mammon.

We are at present, however, merely following them up through a single day; but life is a series of days: in its ordinary estimate, of three-score years and ten. And he who is a candidate for happiness must prepare himself, not for a single day, but for the entire term: he must save his strength, and proceed cautiously, for there is no race in which he may so soon run himself out of breath. His motto may perhaps be, "A short life and a merry one;" and this, in truth, is the motto, and not the motto only, but the brief history of most of those whom we have thus far considered. For consumption, dropsy, gout, or chagrin and suicide, make not unfrequently a woeful havoc in their ranks before they have cleared two-thirds of the pleasurable career they had proposed to themselves. Let them, then, have their motto if they will; but let them not boast that they have found out the specific for making life happy; for all that they have found

out is a specific for throwing both life and happiness away at the same time. They have had a few fitful bursts of enjoyment; but the price has been enormous, — a costly birthright for a mess of pottage. He only can fairly boast of happiness, place it in whatever way you please, who, on casting up the account, can honestly say that it has accompanied him through the long run.

There is another and a very different set of people, both in the higher and lower ranks of life, who also occasionally strive to persuade themselves that they are happy, and who are sometimes actually thought so by those around them: and these are the listless and idle, who loll and saunter life away as though it were a dream; and who, in truth, are more alive in their dreams than in their waking hours. Now happiness consists in activity: such is the constitution of our nature: it is a running stream, and not a stagnant pool. It shows itself under this form from the first moment it shows itself at all. Behold the happiness of the infant or of the school-boy: he is full of frolic; he cannot contain the current of self-delight: in the bold significancy of vulgar language, it runs out at his fingers' ends. Upon the whole, the listless and idle have less pretensions to happiness than the characters we have just surveyed, — the libertine, the gamester, and the spendthrift: for should you distil the aggregate of insignificant incidents that compose the whole tenour of the feeble life of the former, not

a drop, perhaps, of the essence of happiness would ascend in the alembic. They may be at perfect quiet if you please, and look fat and in good liking, but this is not happiness; for if so, capons and Cappadocian slaves would have a better title to it than themselves.

Let us now apply these observations to the question before us. No man can be happy without exercising the virtue of a cheerful industry or activity. No man can lay in his claim to happiness, I mean the happiness that shall last through the fair run of life, without chastity, without temperance, without sobriety, without economy, without self-command, and consequently without fortitude; and, let me add, without a liberal and forgiving spirit. The whole of this follows as the necessary result of our argument. The exercise of these virtues may perhaps cost a man something at the time, but the full scope and aggregate of his happiness depend upon the exercise. It is a tax upon the sum-total, that must be regularly paid to secure the rest. And it ought never to be forgotten that we are so much the creatures of habit that the more we are accustomed to the exercise, like an old garment, the easier it will sit upon us.

But these are private virtues, and only a few of them. Man has also, if he would be happy, to practise a still longer list of public virtues; and he cannot be happy without practising them. Or, in other words, (for I am now to consider him in a social capacity,) the happiness of the

community to which he belongs, and of which his own forms a constituent part, could not continue without his practising them.

He may steal, indeed, from his neighbour, and hereby increase his means of gratifying some predominant passion; but then his neighbour may also steal from him in return, and to a greater extent; and his happiness therefore (ever regarding it in the aggregate) is connected with his exercising the virtues of justice and honesty. He may break his promise, or lie to his neighbour, upon a point in which his own interest appears to be concerned; but then his neighbour may also return him the compliment, and in a way in which his interest may be still more deeply concerned; and his interest, therefore, or, which is the same thing, his happiness, obliges him to practise the virtue of veracity.

In Woodfall's edition of the Letters of Junius, there is a passage upon the subject before us, contained in one of his private letters, which has peculiarly struck me, considering the quarter it has proceeded from, and the manner of its communication. Whoever was the writer of these celebrated Letters, it will be readily admitted, that he had a most extensive acquaintance with men of all ranks and characters, particularly with the vicious and profligate; and that he had a most extraordinary facility of penetrating into the human heart. In the private letter I refer to, he unbosoms himself to his printer, for whom he appears to have had a

great esteem, and, amidst the regulations he gives him for his future conduct, makes the following forcible remark: "With a sound heart be assured you are better gifted, even for worldly happiness, than if you had been cursed with the abilities of a Mansfield. After long experience of the world, I affirm, before God, I never knew a rogue who was not unhappy." *

It is not necessary to pursue the catalogue. Man is by nature a social being: every one is purposely made dependent upon every other; and consequently the happiness or well-being of the whole and of every one, who constitutes an integral part of the whole, must be the same happiness. Yet as the happiness or well-being of the individual demands, in his private capacity, as we have already seen it does, a system of private abstinences or restraints, the happiness or well-being of society demands a more extensive system of public duties of the same kind. We must consent to relinquish a part of our liberty, a part of our property, a part of all our personal propensities and appetites, or the well-being of the society to which we belong, and consequently our own social well-being, could not continue. We may indeed take ourselves away from society, and live in the solitude of the forests; but our happiness is bound up in social life, and, whatever is the cost, it is consistent with the same happiness that we pay it.

* Letter, No. xliii.

Freethinkers are accustomed to sneer at the precepts of the Bible, which inculcate upon us the virtues of self-denial and mortification in the present life, in order to our making sure of a life of uninterrupted happiness hereafter. But if there be any degree of truth in the remarks now offered, they find themselves called upon to practise a similar restraint and denial even in the purchase of present enjoyment. And the analogy is so striking between the natural and the moral government of the Deity in this respect, that Bishop Butler has forcibly laid hold of the same argument, not only in vindication of the Gospel-precepts upon this point, but in illustration of the paramount importance of our attending to them, if we would be wise to our future and everlasting interest. "Thought," says he, "and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course of behaviour far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common decent and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the present world, and be received upon any tolerably good terms in it. Since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial and attention to secure our HIGHER INTEREST is removed. The constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us either to do or to suffer, as we chuse. And all

the various miseries of life which people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this; which miseries are, beforehand, just as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and left to be determined by it." *

It is from this common consent to put a restraint upon our personal feelings in the pursuit of relative pleasures, from this social impulse of our constitution with which we are so wisely and benevolently endowed, that every man belonging to the same state or community becomes a part of every man, and cannot, even if he would, be an indifferent spectator of the woe or the weal of his neighbour. And hence arises the sacred bond of sympathy or fellow-feeling;

And true self-love, and social, are the same.

While as the line is drawn still closer, and we associate together more frequently and more intimately, we become, from the great and powerful principle of habit, still more kindred parts of each other. And hence the origin of the higher public virtues of patriotism, generosity, gratitude, friendship, conjugal fidelity, parental love, and filial reverence; the exercise of all which in our relative situations of life, whether we contemplate it at the time, or whether we do not, is by our own constitution, or, which is the same thing, by the will of the great Creator, rendered essential to our individual happiness.

* Analysis of Religion, Natural and Revealed, part i. ch. iv.

Mr. Pope, from a hint furnished by Dr. Donne, finely compares this origin and spread of the different circles of private and public virtues from the salient point of self-love, or the desire of individual happiness in the breast, to the series of circles within circles excited on the bosom of a still and peaceful lake by the throw of a pebble; while all nature smiles around, and, from this very agitation, the face of the heavens is reflected with an additional degree of lustre.

" Self-love but serves the virtuous breast to wake,
As the smooth pebble stirs the peaceful lake.
The centre mov'd, a circle strait succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads.
Friend, parents, neighbour, first it will embrace,
Our country next, and next all human race.
Wide, and more wide, th' o'erflowing of the mind
Takes every creature in of every kind.
Earth smiles around, in boundless beauty dress'd;
And heav'n reflects its image in his breast."

We stand in need, then, of no præcognita or innate ideas, of no fanciful instinct whatever;—arguing as intelligent beings, and fairly exercising the discursive faculty of reason, we come to the clear conclusion that virtue is the path to human happiness. The case, indeed, is so manifest, that while many of the instincts we actually possess are often tempting us against such a conduct and such a conclusion, whenever reason is appealed to, we never fail to return to the same established dictum.

The Stoics, with a sort of romantic refinement, pretended to have fallen into a love of virtue for her own sake; and to *sustain* and to *abstain*, to *bear* and *forbear*, to be patient and continent, comprised the summary of their moral system. But while they were thus enraptured with the means, like every other society of mankind, they had the full advantage of the end. They may, indeed, have practised virtue for the love of virtue, but they also practised virtue, and reaped the benefit of their own happiness.

The Epicureans, on the contrary, regarded all these sublime pretensions as mere cant and affectation. They also enjoined and practised, and notwithstanding the false reproach that has attached to their name, enjoined and practised with more rigidity than even the Stoics, the laws and, restraints of moral virtue; yet boldly and unequivocally avowed that it was chiefly as a mean towards an end: that it was not so much from a love of virtue, as from a love of pleasure or happiness: and hence pleasure and happiness were in this school used as synonymous terms, as were also vice and folly, and wisdom and virtue; or, rather, wisdom was regarded as the first of all virtues, as being that which teaches us that a life of real pleasure or happiness is to be obtained alone by the exercise of the general cluster of virtues. In one of his letters to Menæceus, that has yet survived the ravage of time, Epicurus has a passage upon this subject peculiarly striking, and that cannot be too strongly impressed on our

memories. "Wisdom," says he, "is the chief blessing of philosophy, since she gives birth to all other virtues which unite in teaching us, that no man can live happily who does not live wisely, conscientiously, and justly; nor, on the other hand, can he live wisely, conscientiously, and justly, without living happily: for virtue is inseparable from a life of happiness, and a life of happiness is equally inseparable from virtue. Be these, then, and maxims like these, the subjects of thy meditation, by night and by day, both when alone and with the friend of thy bosom; and never, whether asleep or awake, shalt thou be opprest with anxiety, but live as a god among mankind."*

To the same effect Cassius, in an expostulatory letter to his friend Cicero, who had shown some inclination to join in the general calumny against the Epicureans: "Those whom we call lovers of pleasure are real lovers of goodness and justice: they are men who practise and cultivate every virtue; for no true pleasure can exist without a good and virtuous life."

So Lucretius, when describing the different tribes of the sons of vice, or offenders against the public law, characterises them by the common name of fools. "They are," says he, "perpetually smarting, even in secret, beneath a sense of their atrocious crimes, and that reward of their guilt, which they well know will sooner or later overtake them:

* Diog. Laert. x. 132. 135.

The scourge, the wheel, the block, the dungeon deep,
The base-born hangman, the TARPEIAN cliff,
Which, though the villain 'scape, his conscious soul
Still fears perpetual; torturing all his days,
And still foreboding heavier pangs at death.
Hence earth itself to FOOLS becomes a hell. *

It was from the elegant and ornate moralists of the East, that the philosophers of this school derived this figurative synonymy: from Arabia, Egypt, and India; in all which quarters we find it still more frequent and familiar. Solomon, whose early studies were derived from an Arabic source, is peculiarly addicted to this use of these terms. The very commencement of his book of Proverbs, or system of ethics, as the schools would denominate it, affords us a striking instance: —

"The fear of Jehovah is the beginning of knowledge:
For FOOLS despise wisdom and instruction."

So Vishnusarman, in his Hitopadesa to the same precise effect: "Many who read the Scriptures are *grossly ignorant;* but he who *acts well* is a truly LEARNED man." †

Whatever view, therefore, we take of this subject, in whatever way we exercise our reason

* Vérbera, carnufices, robur, pix, lamina, tædæ:
Qui tamen et si absunt, at mens, sibi conscia factis,
Præmetuens, adhibet stimulos, torretque flagellis
Nec videt interea, qui terminus esse malorum
Possit, quive sciet pœnarum denique finis;
Atque eadem metuit magis, hæc ne in morte gravescant.
Hinc Acherusia fit STULTORUM denique vita.
Lib. iii. 1030.

† Sir W. Jones, vi. p. 37.

upon it, we cannot fail to approve of virtue in preference to vice; for we cannot fail to regard virtue as the only sure road to happiness, and consequently as the path of wisdom, or the will of God. The case, indeed, is so clear, that it is seldom mankind in any part of the world are now-a-days at the trouble of debating the subject. There is no controversy — the result is taken for granted. And hence wherever education exists, or, in other words, wherever civilised life extends, we are chiefly taught it, not as a science, but as a rule of action; we imbibe it as a habit; and our first and finest feelings co-operate with our best reason in its favour. We form an abstract picture of it in our minds, and delineate it, under the correct and pleasing image of the fair, the needful, the sovereign good. We have already seen that, in proportion as society is ignorant, men are wicked; in proportion as it becomes wise, they grow virtuous. They acquire clearer ideas of right and wrong, which are obviously nothing more than virtue and vice, under an additional set of names, or in a state of activity. And were the rules and laws of right, virtue, or wisdom to be constantly adhered to, or, in other words, the will of the Deity to be fully complied with, there can be no question that mankind, even in the present state, would enjoy all the happiness their nature will allow of; and that a kind of paradise would once more visit the earth.

And why, then, is not the will of the Deity fully complied with? Why, since the consequence is so undoubted, and so beneficial, are not the rules of virtue constantly and universally adhered to?

This is a most important question, as well in itself as in its results.

The will of the Deity, or the entire rules of virtue, are not always adhered to, first, because, as collected from reason or the light of nature alone, they are not, through the whole range of this complicated subject, in all instances equally clear and perspicuous; and, secondly, because in a thousand instances in which there is no want of clearness or perspicuity, there is a want of sanction — of a compulsory and adequate force. The rules of virtue are general, and must necessarily be general; but the cases to which they apply are particular. The case is present and often impulsive, but the operation of the rule is remote, and it may not operate at all; and hence the pleasure of immediate gratification is perpetually unhinging this harmonious system, and plunging mankind into vice with their eyes open.

But civil laws, moreover, or the authority of the social compact in favour of virtue, are not only often inadequate in their force, but they must necessarily, in a thousand instances, be inadequate in their extent. It is impossible for man of himself to provide against every case of vice or criminality that may offend the public; for the keenest casuist can form no idea of many of

such cases till they are before him; and if he could, the whole world would not contain the statute-books that should be written upon the subject.

There are also duties which a man owes to himself as well as to his neighbour; or, in other words, human happiness, as we have already seen, depends almost as largely upon his exercise of private as of public virtues. But the eye of civil law cannot follow him into the performance of these duties, for it cannot follow him into his privacy: it cannot take cognisance of his personal faults or offences, nor often apply its sanction if it could do so. And hence, in most countries, this important part of morality is purposely left out of the civil code, as a hopeless and intractable subject. Yet even in the breach of public duties, specifically stated and provided for, it cannot always follow up the offender, and apply the punishment: for he may secrete himself among his own colleagues, and elude, or he may abandon his country, and defy the arm of justice.

There seems, then, to be a something still wanting. If the Deity have so benevolently willed the happiness of man, and made virtue the rule of that happiness, ought he not, upon the same principle of benevolence, to have declared his will more openly than by the mere, and, at times, doubtful, inferences of reason? in characters, indeed so plain, that he who runs may read? and ought he not also to have employed sanc-

tions so universal as to cover every case, and so weighty as to command every attention?

As a being of infinite benevolence, undoubtedly he ought. And what, in this character, he ought to have done, he has actually accomplished. He has declared his will by an express revelation, and has thus confirmed the voice of reason by a voice from heaven: he has made this revelation a written law, and has enforced it by the strongest sanctions to which the mind of man can be open: — not only by his best chance of happiness here, but by all his hopes and expectations of happiness hereafter. And he has hence completed the code of human obligations, by adding to the duties which we owe to our neighbour and to ourselves, a clear rescript of those we owe to our Maker. Nor is such revelation of recent date; for a state of retributive justice beyond the grave constituted, as we have already seen, the belief of mankind in the earliest ages of time; and amidst all the revolutions the world has witnessed, amidst the most savage barbarism, and the foulest idolatries, there never perhaps has been a country in which all traces of it have been entirely lost, or have even entirely ceased to operate.

At different periods, and in different manners, the Deity has renewed this divine communication according as his infinite wisdom has seen the world stand in need of it. New doctrines and discoveries, and doctrines and discoveries, too, of the highest importance, but which it is not my

province to touch upon in the present place, have in every instance accompanied such renewal, justificatory of the supernatural interposition. But the sanction has, in every instance, been the same; while, and I speak it with reverence, the proofs of divine benevolence have with every promulgation been growing fuller and fuller:— revealed religion thus co-operating with natural, co-operating with the great frame of the visible world, co-operating with every pulse and feeling of our own hearts in establishing the delightful truth, that GOD IS LOVE; and in calling upon us to love him, not from any cold and lifeless picture of the abstract beauty of holiness, beautiful as it unquestionably is in itself, but from the touching and all-subduing motive, BECAUSE HE FIRST LOVED US.

LECTURE VIII.

ON THE GENERAL FACULTIES OF THE MIND, AND ITS FREEDOM IN WILLING.

In the commencement of the successive series of lectures which I have had the honour of delivering before this respectable school of science, I stated, as it may be recollected by many of the audience before me, that the subject I proposed to discuss would be of considerable extent and variety: — that it would embrace, though with a rapid survey, the whole circle of physics in the most enlarged sense in which this term has been employed by Aristotle or Lord Bacon; and, consequently, would touch slightly, yet, as I hoped, with a correct outline, upon all the more interesting and important features of matter and of mind. It may be remembered, that I proposed to unfold to you the general principles, laws, and phænomena, as far as we are capable of tracing them, of the world without us, and the world within us; to follow the footsteps of nature, or rather of the God of nature, in the gradual evolution of that nice, and delicate, and ever-rising scale of wonders that surround us on every side, from the simplest elements to the most perfect and harmonious systems of visible or demonstrable

existences; from shapeless matter to form, from form to feeling, from feeling to intellect; from the clod to the crystal, from the crystal to the plant, from the plant to the animal, from brutal life to man. All this I have endeavoured to accomplish; feebly, and imperfectly, indeed, but I have still endeavoured it with whatever may be the powers that the breath of the Almighty has implanted within me.

But we have not stopped here; having reached in man the summit of the visible pyramid of creation, we have tremblingly ventured to take a glance at the interior of his mysterious structure; we have followed him, with no unhallowed eye, into the temple of the soul; we have amused ourselves, for, after all, it has been little or nothing more, with conjectures about its essence, and have commenced an analysis of those faculties so fearfully and wonderfully planned, which place him at an almost infinite distance from the brute creation, and approximate him to the sphere of celestial intelligences: to that order of pure and happy spirits with whom it is his high prerogative, if not forfeited by his own misconduct on earth, that he shall associate hereafter, and press forward in the pursuit of an infinite and self-rewarding knowledge, and in the fruition of an endless and unclouded felicity.

This last topic, however, we have entered upon, and nothing more: we have noticed, indeed, the general furniture of the mind, and the diversified faculties with which it is endowed,

but we have only extended our investigation beyond such notice to the principles of perception, thought, and REASON, or the discursive power; and to those communications, or ideas of objects or subjects, derived externally or from within, upon which the discursive power is ever exercising itself; and which, as they are obtained from the one or the other of these two sources, are denominated ideas of sensation or of reflexion.

Now, besides an ability to *perceive*, *think*, or *reason*, we find the mind possest of an almost infinite variety of other attributes or faculties, implanted in it for the wisest and most beneficent purposes. We behold it endowed with consciousness, judgment, memory, imagination; with a power of chusing or refusing; with admiration and desire; hope and fear, love and hatred; grief and joy, transport and terror; with anger, jealousy, and despair. And we behold each of these faculties, as called into action, producing a correspondent effect upon the organs of the body; giving rise to what the painters call EXPRESSION, or the language of the features; and to articulate sounds, or the language of the lips; lighting up the eye, and animating the countenance; invigorating the speech, and harmonizing its periods; or, on the contrary, filling the eye and the countenance with gloom or indignation, and the voice with sighs and bitter rebukes.

The external signs thus produced, and representative of the inward emotion, operate in their turn with a reflex influence, and rekindle in the

mind the feelings that have given birth to them. And hence the origin and soul-subduing power of tender or impassioned poetry, or of manly and forcible eloquence; as also the cause why we feel equally hurried away by the classical debates of the senate, and the fictitious distresses of the drama.

We behold, moreover, in different persons, these energetic principles differently modified or associated in every variety of combination: sometimes one of them, and sometimes another, and sometimes several leagued together, peculiarly active, and obtaining a mastery over the rest. And we behold these effects in different instances, from different causes; as peculiarity of temperament, peculiarity of climate, custom, habit, or education. And hence the origin of moral and intellectual character; the particular dispositions and propensities of individuals or of whole nations. Hence one man is naturally violent, and another gentle; one a prey to perpetual gloom, and another full of hope and confidence; one irascible and revengeful, and another all benevolence and philanthropy; one shrewd and witty, and another heavy and inert. Hence the refinement and patriotism of ancient Greece; the rough hardihood of the Romans; and the commercial spirit of Carthage; and hence, in modern times, the silent and plodding industry of the Dutch; the chivalrous honour of the Spaniards of the last century, unpoisoned by the deadly fever of Corsican morality; the restless loqua-

city and intriguing ambition of the French; and, may I be permitted to add, the high heroic courage, and love of freedom, the generosity and promptitude to forgive injuries, the unswerving honesty and lofty spirit of adventure, that peculiarly signalize the inhabitants of the British isles: all which are subjects that yet remain to be treated of and elucidated, and which seem to promise us an ample harvest of entertainment and instruction.

Let us begin with the mental faculties themselves. These, as we have already seen, are numerous and complicated; so much so, indeed, that it is difficult to arrange and analyze them; and hence, I do not, at the present moment, recollect a single treatise upon the subject which gives us a clear and methodical classification of them. I shall take leave, therefore, to offer a new distribution; and shall divide them into the three general heads, of powers or faculties of the UNDERSTANDING; powers or faculties of ELECTION; and powers or faculties of EMOTION. To the first belong the principles of perception, thought, reason, judgment, memory, and imagination; to the second, those of chusing and refusing, or of WILLING and NILLING, to adopt an old and very expressive metaphysical term, that ought never to have grown obsolete; to the third belong those of hope, fear, grief, and joy, love, hatred, anger, and revenge, or whatever else is capable of moving the mind from a state of tranquillity and rest.

All these are, properly speaking, acts or actions of the mind; yet, as during the operation of the last set, the mind becomes at times irregularly and involuntarily agitated and affected, though by the force of its own attributes, as the voluntary muscles of the body are often thrown into trepidation and spasms by the contraction of their own fibres, metaphysicians, and especially those of Germany, have seemed inclined to restrict the name of mental actions to the operations of the understanding and the will, and to give the name of *affections* or *passions* to those productive of mental emotion: to those transitions of feeling into which the mind is involuntarily hurried by the stimulus of this class of its own powers, and under the stress of which it may thus far be said to be passive; and hence, if I mistake not, the application of the term passions, (which has so much puzzled the metaphysicians,) to certain conditions or powers of the mind, which import activity and exertion. It is upon the same ground, that where the mind is completely subdued, and suffers extreme violence, we employ the term with peculiar emphasis; thus, when a man is raging either with anger or love, he is said pre-eminently to be in a passion, or to entertain a passion; and thus again, but in a far more serious and solemn sense, the Christian world applies the same term in its highest force of signification to the agony of our blessed Saviour.

Now it is the peculiar feature of physiology, and especially as studied upon the principles of induction, that, as far as it has proceeded, it has discovered a general adaptation of means to a proposed end; and has hence placed the doctrine of final causes, as it has been incorrectly, and not without some degree of confusion, denominated — of causes, however, operating to a final intention, — upon a basis too strong to be shaken by the ridicule of many modern philosophers, sheltering themselves under an erroneous construction of Lord Bacon's views upon the subject.* What, then, are the uses or proposed ends of this extensive and complicated machinery of the mind of man? What are the respective parts which its various faculties, in the order in which we have now arranged them, are intended to fulfil, and the means by which they are to operate?

Their object is threefold, and in every respect most important, and admirably calculated to prove the wisdom and benevolence of the Almighty Architect: they are the grand sources by

* Causarum finalium inquisitio sterilis est, et, tanquam Virgo Deo consecrata, nihil parit. Such is his celebrated aphorism: but the term *inquisitio* does not relate to the subject or doctrine itself, but merely to its being made a branch of physical instead of metaphysical philosophy. The discoveries of modern times have sufficiently shown that Bacon was deceived upon this last point. But it is perfectly clear from other passages in his writings that he did not mean to controvert the doctrine itself. See Stewart's Elements, vol. ii. p. 454.

which man becomes endowed with knowledge, moral freedom, and happiness; and is hence fitted to run the elevated race of a rational and accountable being. From the powers of the understanding he derives the first; from those of volition or election the second; and from the passions or motive powers the third. Yet never let it be forgotten, that he can in no respect, or at least to no considerable extent or good purpose, possess either the one or the other, unless the mind, as an individual agent, maintain its self-dominion, and exercise a due degree of government over its own forces. This, I think, must be obvious to every one; and it is in this harmonious balance, this equable guidance and control, that the perfection of the human character can alone consist and exhibit itself. Unless the faculties of the understanding be called forth, there can be no knowledge; and unless they be properly directed, though there may indeed be knowledge, it will be of a worse nature than utter ignorance; we shall pluck, not of the mixt tree of the knowledge of good and evil, as it stood before the fall, but from the tree of the knowledge of evil alone, without any union or participation of good. In like manner, unless the will and the passions be under an equal degree of guidance, the mind can be neither independent nor happy; a mental chaos must usurp the place of order, and the whole be misrule and confusion.

We are too much in the habit, both in common life and in philosophy, of regarding the fa-

culties of the mind as distinct agents from the mind itself, as though the latter were nothing more than a house or repository for their reception. This is particularly true in respect to the faculty of the WILL; for we are perpetually told that the will operates upon the understanding or the mind; and that unless the WILL be free, the man himself can have no freedom.

Now the will, like the memory or the judgment, is a mere power or ability, and freedom is another power or ability; but powers or abilities of one kind cannot belong to or be the property of powers or abilities of another kind: they can only belong to or be the property of some agent, and in this case the mind is the only agent. The question, therefore, whether the will be free, can only mean, if it mean any thing, whether the mind be free, of which the will is a power or attribute; and to the question thus modified, I have no hesitation in stating, that the mind is perfectly free to do whatever it wills. I do not say whatever it *desires;* for the DESIRE is a different faculty from the WILL; and though too generally confounded with each other, for the want of clear ideas upon the subject, the two are frequently in a state of direct opposition. Thus a man may desire to fly, but he never wills it; and for this plain reason, that though the action may be a matter of desire, it can never be a matter of volition; for to suppose the will or power of chusing to be exerted upon a subject in which there is no power of chusing, is to suppose an absurdity. In like manner, on the con-

trary, the school-boy may will to get his task, though sorely against his desire or inclination, and the timid female, for the benefit of her health, may will to be plunged into the cold bath, though with as great a reluctance. So when a kind and indulgent father chastises his son for disobedience, the mind, urged by proper motives, consents, and consequently wills it; it prefers inflicting the chastisement to abstaining from it: but while it wills or prefers the punishment, it is so far from desiring it, that it probably hates it more than the child itself does.

It has been said that, in this case, the feeling of desire is still exercised; that the father, though he does not desire the punishment, desires the ultimate good of his child; that the same power of the mind is therefore still in activity, though directed to a different object; and, consequently, that willing is nothing more than desire in a higher range of the scale, or a state of predominant exertion. But this is to confound rather than to simplify the feelings of the mind. Desire is always accompanied with pleasure, and can never be altogether separated from it; for no man can desire that which is wholly and essentially painful. Now, though the father takes a pleasure in the good of his child, he takes no pleasure, but, on the contrary, great and unmixed pain in his chastisement; and unless pleasure and pain be one and the same feeling, we cannot apply the simple idea of desire to both, though that of the will is equally applicable. And hence the will and the desire must necessarily be regarded as

different faculties of the mind. In like manner, a person labouring under a severe fit of tooth-ache may say that he desires to have the tooth taken out; but in saying this he does not desire the pain of its extraction, but only the ease which he hopes will follow upon its removal: for he hates the pain, and would avoid it, and have the tooth removed without it, if possible; but he consents to, or wills it, for the sake of that prospective advantage which alone is the object of his desire, as it is also of his will. So that here again, while the desire is limited to the one state of body, the will applies to both, and affords another proof that they are two distinct mental powers. In like manner, Revelation tells us repeatedly, and as strictly as it does emphatically, that God "hath no pleasure or desire in the death of the wicked;" but it tells us also, that God is, nevertheless, effecting, and, consequently, willing, their death or punishment every day.

Freedom of mind, then, or an exercise of the will, is a distinct power or attribute from that of desire, and can only respect actions in which there is a condition of choice. A man standing on a cliff, has a power of leaping twenty yards downward into the sea, or of continuing where he is; and, having this option, he is free, and exercises his will accordingly. But he has no power of leaping twenty yards upwards into the air, and it can never become a question with him—a subject of deliberation or option—whether he shall leap upwards or not; and, conse-

quently, as this can never become a question with him, the mind can never will it, and its freedom remains undisturbed.

Here, then, we rest: the mind is free to do whatever it wills. But the ingenuity of man has not been content with letting the subject remain at this point: it has pushed it still farther, and enquired whether the mind is free to will as well as to act after it has willed? and this, after all, is the real drift of the enquiry with which the world has been so long harassed, whether the will itself be free?

This question is a complex one; and its complexity has not always been sufficiently traced out and explained. The mind of every intelligent being can only will, or, in other words, be determined to do or forbear an act by a motive or moving power, and in this respect it is subject to a necessity issuing from the nature of things; but if, as I shall endeavour to show, the mind, by a voluntary operation of some one or more of its other faculties, of itself constitutes the motive, annuls it, or changes it for another, it must necessarily follow, that it has all the freedom of willing, as well as of acting, that an intelligent being is capable of possessing.

Now, the grand aim of every living, and especially of every intelligent being, is good, pleasure, or happiness; for they all, as in the words of the poet, imply the same thing:—

> O Happiness! our being's end and aim,
> Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, whate'er thy name.

But good, pleasure, or happiness, are generic names for a thousand different objects, each of which is pursued as many different ways, not only by different individuals, but sometimes at different periods, by the very same person. In all these cases we perceive so many different motives or moving powers. Yet whence comes it, not only that different persons but that the same individual should have a different motive or moving power to-day from what he had yesterday, or perhaps only half an hour before?

The cause may, indeed, be some sudden and impetuous gust of passion by which the mind may be stormed and led captive, as by a *coup-de-main;* but it may also be a deliberate determination of the mind itself. And, in truth, this last is the general cause, to which a sudden and impetuous ebullition of the passions forms but a few occasional exceptions. It is this exercise of deliberation that alone renders man a rational and accountable being. All human laws act upon the same principle: they suppose him (saving the few extreme cases just alluded to) to be under the influence of a controlling judgment, and they reward or punish him accordingly. And such is the force of habit and long association, that we not unfrequently behold the judgment exercising this control, in a mind evidently unsound and wandering; and the cunning maniac concealing a skilful design or a deep-rooted passion till the due moment arrives for executing the one, or gratifying the other.

Now, in all these cases, the determination of the judgment, which forms the motive or moving power, is as much a voluntary act of the mind, whether right or wrong, as the change of one or more ciphers in a common arithmetical sum, in consequence of our discovering an error upon working it a second time. This determination, or motive, however, may be changed every hour, or even every minute; for the mind may take a new view of the subject: it may obtain clearer ideas from fresh sources; or other affections may be called into play than those which have hitherto produced an influence; and what before was decided to be a certain path to pleasure, may next be decided to be as certain a road to misery and ruin.

And so active is the judgment in asserting its control, that even where the mind is borne down by the most violent passions, it still strives, at times, to recover its authority, and is seldom quiet till it has succeeded. Let me offer a single example in elucidation of this assertion.

Behold the enamoured youth, who, after having struggled for years with an unebbing current of obstacles, finds himself, at length, in possession of the fair object of his heart's affection. Here, the reigning power must necessarily be the passion of love, and it would be somewhat cynical to look for any thing else. Ask him in what his happiness consists, and what are the motives that stimulate every action of his life, and he will at once point to his beloved bride, without

whom, he will tell you, that all nature would be a blank; and, with whom, that a wilderness would be a paradise. Behold her next, by the stealthy and startling hand of death, snatched away from his embraces. What now is the condition of the mind? the new motives that distract it? and the conduct to which they give rise? Is it possible that an ember of happiness can remain to him now?—Yes, even here, in the rack of anguish, he has still his delight—a lonely and melancholy one, I am compelled to grant, but he has his delight notwithstanding; and the mind is as much hurried away, and as violently, by the present impulse, which is to weep over her remains, as by the past, which was to devote himself to her wishes:

> He haunts the deep cathedral shade,
> The green sward where his love is laid,
> And hugs her urn, and, o'er the tomb
> Hangs, and enjoys the specter'd gloom.
> And oft to thee he lifts his eye,
> Mild empress of the spangled sky!
> And thanks thy dewy beams, that guide
> His footsteps to his clay-cold bride.
> And oft he asks the starry train
> That circle round thy silver reign,
> By which her parting spirit pass'd,
> And where she stay'd her flight at last.
> He asks — and thither would he go —
> For what has nature now below?

Thus far the mind has unquestionably evinced little or no control; and I bring forward these descriptions as instances of its subjugation. But

even here, in one of the severest trials with which mankind can be visited, the mind gradually finds the means of recovering its ascendancy; the passions, by degrees become tranquillized, and in their turn subdued; the heart softened, the judgment corrected and fortified, and the reason set at liberty for reflection. The pale sufferer perceives, at length, that happiness, to be genuine, must be neither violent nor transitory; that its foundation must be permanent, and its nature unalloyed. He yields himself to this train of contemplation; and the mind, now fully reinstated in its government, indulges a sober and rational grief, and arrives at a sober and rational conclusion. It determines that earth has no such happiness to offer him; it may perhaps lead him further, and prompt him to seek it in a sublimer source.

This description I have drawn from the natural passions of the human heart — passions that, in a greater or less degree, are common to all countries and ages; but there are passions of which uncultivated nature knows nothing, which are the baneful offspring of a morbid civilization and immoral habits, and which possess, if possible, a still more tyrannical control over the judgment than any that nature herself has implanted within it. Such is the passion for GAMBLING, which has often, even in the sobriety of our own climate, maddened the brain of men who, but for this, had been worthy members of society, and plunged them into the foulest vices, and at

length, into the deadly gulph of suicide. One of the best pictures of the heart-rending despair of such a wretch, just before the perpetration of this horrible crime, is to be found in the description of Beverley in "*The Gamester*," who is thus painted to the life, in the inevitable ruin into which he was thrown after having staked the last resource and final hope of his wife and family on one unfortunate and fatal hazard: —

"When all was lost, he fixed his eyes upon the ground, and stood some time with folded arms, stupid and motionless; then, snatching his sword that hung against the wainscot, he sat him down, and with a look of fixed attention drew figures on the floor. At last, he started up; looked wild, and trembled; and, like a woman, seized with her sex's fits, laughed out aloud, while the tears trickled down his face. So he left the room."

Yet, even here, under the fell sway of this accursed incantation, we are not without examples of its being occasionally broken through, and its deadly fetters shaken off by the virtuous resolution of a mind determined to prove its independence, and to act according to the dictates of its better judgment. As an example of which, among many others, I may refer to the conduct of one of the first statesmen of our own country and our own age; — a statesman, whose name will ever be dear to Britain, on various accounts, but chiefly, perhaps, since under his administration, she set the glorious example to the world

of abolishing the slave-trade. In early life it is well known that Mr. Fox was irresistibly addicted to this intoxicating passion; and it is also equally known, that in his maturer life, he tore himself from the further prosecution of it, by a courageous determination from which he never departed.

It appears obvious, then, that the mind both can and ought to maintain a general mastery over all its faculties; and is able, at all times, except in extreme cases, to furnish itself with motives. And hence, though it is perfectly true that it cannot will, or, in other words, cannot choose or refuse without a motive, and to this extent is under a necessity, yet the origination or change of motives being vested in itself, it is equally true that it is so far free to will, as well as to act or perform what it wills.

If the distinction here offered had been properly attended to, we should, as I am inclined to think, have had fewer opponents in all ages, to the doctrine of the freedom of the mind, or of the will as it is commonly denominated. Among the chief of these opponents we may rank the Fatalists of ancient, and the Necessarians of modern times.

The general train of argument by which they have been led, and the ground of its adoption, are not essentially different. Motives, volitions, and actions, are supposed by both sects to be of the same nature, in respect to relative force and operation, as physical causes and effects; and

consequently, the same catenation, or necessary dependence of one fact upon another, which marks the experienced train of events in the natural world, is conceived to be perpetually taking place in the moral: "All voluntary actions," as Mr. Hume observes, "being subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, and there being a continued chain of necessary causes pre-ordained, and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human being.*" Or, as another writer upon the same subject has expressed it, — "The course of events, both moral and physical, is fixed and immutable; and thoughts, volitions, and actions, proceed in one interrupted concatenation from the beginning to the end of time, agreeably to the laws originally established by the great Creator."

So that, under the same circumstances the same motives must be produced in the mind of every man, give rise to the same volitions, and be succeeded by the same actions; every one of these, to adopt the language of the Fatalists, being equally a link of that

Golden everlasting chain,
Whose strong embrace holds heaven, and earth, and main.

If it were not so, it is pretended that there could be no mutual dependence or confidence between man and man. No person, from the

* Essays: On Liberty and Necessity; vol. ii.

appearance of one action as performed by his neighbour, could infer a second, or form any opinion of his character. And even the doctrine of divine prescience must be entirely relinquished; since, without such a necessary and consecutive connection, it must be impossible for the Deity himself to foresee any future event, or to know it otherwise than as it occurs at the moment.

It was not my intention to have touched upon this controversy, but the principles upon which it hinges are so closely blended with the subject before us, that it is impossible altogether to elude it, though the remarks I propose to offer shall be as brief and compressed as I am able to make them.

In the first place, then, whatever be the necessary connection between motives, volitions, and actions, it is by no means true that they are "subjected to the *same laws of necessity* with the operations of matter." Let me support this assertion by a reference to a few simple facts. A needle, or an iron ball, placed betwixt two magnets of equal power, will fall to neither of them, but remain midway at rest for ever, suspended between equally contending attractions. Now, if the same laws of necessity control the moral as control the physical world, a similar moral cause must produce a similar moral effect; and the traveller who, by accident, after having lost himself in a forest, should meet with two roads running in opposite or different directions,

and offering in every respect an equal attraction, must, like the needle or bullet, remain for ever at rest, because the motive to take one course is just equipoised by the motive to take the other. But can any man in his senses suppose he would remain there for ever, and so starve himself between equally contending attractions? Or rather, can any man suppose such a fact, provided the traveller himself, were in his senses? Yet Montaigne, in support of this hypothesis, has actually supposed such a fact, and has put forth the following whimsical or facetious example: "Where the mind," says he, "is at the same time equally influenced by two equal desires, it is certain it can never comply with either of them, because a consent and preference would evince a dissimilarity in their value. If a man should chance to be placed between a bottle of wine and a Westphalia ham, with an equal inclination to eat and to drink, there could, in this case, be no possible remedy; and by the law of necessity he must die either of hunger or thirst. The Stoics, therefore," continues he, "who were most rigidly attached to the doctrine of fatalism, when asked how the mind determines when two objects of equal desire are presented to it, or what is the reason that out of a number of crown pieces it selects one rather than another, there being no motive to excite a preference, reply, that this action of the mind is extraordinary and irregular, and proceeds from an impulse equally irregular and fortuitous. But it would be better," con-

tinues Montaigne, in my estimation, "to maintain that no two objects can be presented to us so perfectly equal, but that some trifling difference may subsist, and some small superiority be discoverable either in the one or the other."

And no doubt it would be better to maintain such a position; but, who does not see that this is to give up the question? to renounce the point upon which we are at issue, and openly to confess that there does not exist in the moral world the same counterpoise of cause and cause that is to be perpetually met with in the natural.

Let us confine ourselves to one more example. A cannon-ball, discharged from the centre of a circle, and equally attracted to the north and to the east, will proceed towards neither point; but at an angle of 22½ degrees, or immediately between the two. But is there any one, unincumbered with a strait-waistcoat, who can suppose that such a rule has any application to the motive powers of the mind? who can conceive, that a man, starting at Blackfriar's Bridge, and having business so equally urgent at Highgate and at Mile-end, that he is incapable of determining to which place he shall proceed first, would proceed to neither, but take a course between the two, and walk in a straight line to Hackney or Newington Green? Yet, unless he should thus act, not occasionally, or by accident, but uniformly, and at all times, there is not in the mind the same law of operation, the same sort of necessity, as in matter; but a something,

whatever it may be, producing and designed to produce an irreconcilable distinction; and, in the correct language of the Epicurean philosophers, perpetually labouring to prevent the same blind force from vanquishing the one as it leads captive the other:

> Ne mens ipsa necessum
> Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agundis,
> ET DEVICTA QUASI, COGATUR FERRE, PATIQUE. *
>
> Lest the mind
> Bend to a stern necessity within,
> AND, LIKE A SLAVE, DETERMINE BUT BY FORCE.

But we are told, that unless the moral world were thus constituted, there could be no mutual confidence between man and man; no series of actions could be depended upon, and it would be impossible to distinguish between one character and another; or, in other words, how long the same individual would maintain the same character.

Now this kind of argument, if accurately examined, just as much invalidates the doctrine it is intended to support as the preceding. There is no one who pretends to place the same degree of confidence in the general course of human actions as in the experienced train of natural events. Even where the circumstances to reason from are equally definite, moral dependence is in all instances less certain than physical, and never

* De Rer. Nat. ii. 289.

amounts to more than a probability. The closest friendships may fail, the purest virtue become tarnished; and, in the words of Sophocles, which I must beg leave to put into our own language —

> The power of all things cease; e'en sacred oaths
> At times be broke, and the determin'd mind
> Forego its steady purpose.

Material causes, on the contrary, are regular in their operations, and uninterrupted in their effects. Nobody doubts that the sun will rise to-morrow; that a cannon-ball will sink in water; or that, if the lamps over our heads were to be extinguished, we should be in darkness. The power of Buonaparte, when in the zenith of his success, was absolute and almost unbounded, but did even this ensure steadiness of conduct? Quite the reverse. We behold the decrees of to-day overthrown by those of to-morrow, and, in the blind and overwhelming career of his ambition, his hosts of blood-hounds that have just plundered his enemies next sent against his friends; we behold every thing in nature, that is within his reach, tottering and out of joint; while every thing that is beyond and above him continues steadfast and unchangeable; the air is as vital as ever, the seasons as regular in their courses, and, to adopt the beautiful language of our poet laureate —

> The moon,
> Regardless of the stir of this low world,
> Holds on her heavenly way.

But we are farther told, that unless there be the same fixed and dependent chain established in the moral creation which unquestionably exists in the physical, the Deity himself could have no prescience or foreknowledge of human conduct. And so forcible has this argument appeared to some men, and men, too, of acknowledged worth and piety, that in the dilemma into which they have felt themselves thrown, like the Brahmins of the East, they have utterly abandoned the doctrine of divine prescience in favour of that of moral liberty.

Shallow and impotent conclusion! Absurd admission of an hostility that has no existence! As though he who sees through infinite space, is incapable of seeing through the brief duration of time; or as though, like Theseus in the Cretan labyrinth, the great author of nature stands in need of a thread to guide him through the maze of his own creation, and depends upon every preceding event as a direction-post to that which follows. There are contingencies in the natural as well as in the moral world, though they are far less frequent because far less necessary. Miracles are of this description; they are direct and palpable deviations from the common laws of nature, the common routine of causes and effects; and he who denies that the Deity can know any thing of contingencies, in the one case, ought also to deny that he can know any thing of them in the other; for the necessary and consecutive chain of causation, upon which alone

such philosophers found the attribute of prescience, is equally broken in both instances. But such philosophers have to deny still more than this, or they must abandon their principle altogether. They have equally to deny that the Deity can see or know any thing of such anomalies, even when present; for if he can only know events as successive and necessary links of preceding events, the tie being broken, on their appearance, and the anomalous events detached, he can have no more knowledge of them when gone by or present than when future. It may, perhaps, be thought, that when present and operating they pass before him. Pass before him! O puerile and miserable conception of the Divinity! All nature is equally before him, in every point of space, and every moment of eternity, and he who denies God to be every where, must deny him to be any where; unless he sees and knows every thing, he must see and know nothing. Miracles and moral contingencies, then, are as much provided for, and must be so, as the most common train of natural events. It is true we know nothing of the arrangement by which they subsist, but they are and must be provided for nevertheless. It is here and here only we ought to rest — in an equal acknowledgment of human ignorance, and divine perfection; — for it is, assuredly, not quite consistent either with the modesty of genuine philosophy, or the reverence of religious faith, to controvert a truth because we cannot account

for it; or to pluck away attribute after attribute from the diadem of the Deity, out of mere compliment to the demand of a fanciful and empty hypothesis. I retreat from this subject, however, with pleasure. It is too perplexed and mysterious for popular discussion, and I am fearful of darkening it by illustration. I should not have touched upon it, but that I have been forced, by the regular progress of our own enquiries; and now turn, with a free and unfettered foot, to the study of the passions; their general nature and influence upon human actions and language; which we shall enter upon in our next lecture.

LECTURE IX.

ON THE ORIGIN, CONNEXION, AND CHARACTER OF THE PASSIONS.

We have entered upon an enquiry concerning the nature and operation of the various faculties that constitute the general furniture of the mind. These we have divided into three classes; the faculties of the understanding, the faculties of volition, and the passions or faculties of emotion. The commencement of the present series of lectures was devoted to an illustration of the first; the second we discussed in our preceding study; and we now advance to a brief analysis of the third.

In sailing over the sea of life, the passions are the gales that swell the canvas of the mental bark; they obstruct, or accelerate its course; and render the voyage favourable or full of danger, in proportion as they blow steadily from a proper point, or are adverse and tempestuous. Like the wind itself, they are an engine of high importance and mighty power. Without them we cannot proceed; but with them we may be shipwrecked and lost. Reined in, therefore, and attempered, they constitute, as I have already

observed, our happiness; but let loose and at random, they distract and ruin us.

> How few, beneath auspicious planet born,
> With swelling sails make good the promis'd port,
> With all their wishes freighted. YOUNG.

Let it not be forgotten, however, that the passions are not distinct agents, but mere affections or emotions, mere states or conditions of the mind, excited by an almost infinite variety of external objects and events, or internal operations and feelings. And here, the first remark that will probably occur to us is, that, derived from sources thus numerous and diversified, they must themselves form a numerous and motley host. Some of them are simple, others complex; some peculiar to certain circumstances or individuals, others general, and embracing all countries and conditions; some possessing a natural tendency to promote what is good; and others, what is mischievous and evil; while many of them, again, though distinguished by separate names, only differ from other passions in degree; and hence, naturally merge into them upon a change in the scale.

It has often occurred to me, that if we were to follow up all the passions, multiplied and complicated as they are, to their radical sources, and to draw out their respective genealogies, we might easily reduce them to four — Desire, Aversion, Joy, and Sorrow. And as aversion

and sorrow are only the opposites of desire and joy, and must necessarily flow from their existence in a state of things in which all we meet with is not to be desired or enjoyed, it is possible that desire and joy ought alone to be regarded as the proper parent stocks of all the rest. Let us examine them for a few minutes under this system of simplification.

Perhaps the oldest, simplest, and most universal passion that stirs the mind of man, is DESIRE. So universal is it, that I may confidently ask, where is the created bosom — nay, where is the created being, without it? And Dryden is fully within the mark in asserting, that

> Desire's the vast extent of human mind.

AVERSION, which is its opposite, is less universal, less simple, and of later birth. It is less universal, for though there is no created being exempt from it, nor ought to be so upon certain points, it is more limited in its objects and operation. It is of later date, at least among mankind, for the infant desires before it dislikes; and hence there is as much physical truth as picturesque genius in the following exhortation of Akenside, to the lovers of taste and nature: —

> Through all the maze
> Of YOUNG DESIRE, with rival steps pursue
> The charm of beauty.

And it is less simple, as being the opposite of desire, and in a certain sense flowing from it,

and connected with its existence; the whole of its empire being founded on objects and ideas that the elder passion of desire has rejected.

Now the main streams that issue from DESIRE, running in different directions, and giving rise to multitudes of secondary streams, are the three following:—LOVE, HOPE, EMULATION. Examine them attentively, and you will find, that, different as they are from each other, they all possess the sperm and parentage of DESIRE, and possess it equally.

LOVE is not simple desire, but flows from it, and is so closely connected with it, that some shade of the latter passion is, in every instance, to be found in the former. The terms are hence, in some particular senses, and especially when employed loosely, used in all languages synonymously: whence EROS (Ἔρως) among the elegant Greeks, and CUPIDO among the Romans, was the god equally appointed to preside over both passions. It is from the latter tongue we obtain in our own language the word *cupidity*, which in like manner embraces both ideas. Spenser has made desire the offspring of love, rather than love the offspring of desire; but this is to invert the order of nature. The first instinctive passion discoverable in infant life, as I have already observed, is desire — a desire of satisfying the new-born sensation of hunger; and love—that is, love of the object that gratifies it, follows from the gratification itself; nor can we, through any period of life, love what in our own

estimation is undesirable. In many cases, for there are innumerable shades belonging to both, love may be regarded as the same passion as desire, but with an increase of intensity; as hatred, which is its opposite, is the same passion as aversion, but with a parallel advance in the scale. There are, however, various marks of difference; and I may observe, that while desire is never without a less or greater degree of uneasiness, love, though it is sometimes accompanied with the same feeling, is occasionally free from it, and always so, when perfectly genuine.

Before we proceed to the two other main branches which radiate from DESIRE, let us follow up the subsidiary streams into which the passion of LOVE ramifies. These run in two opposite directions, according as they possess a virtuous or a vicious tendency; and in each direction they are extremely prolific, and offer to us a numerous progeny. Thus, on the one hand, we behold the passion or feeling of love giving birth to charity, benevolence, philanthropy, pity, mercy, fellow-feeling, which the Latins called compassion, and the Greeks sympathy; generosity, friendship, and ardour. They form a chaste and a happy group, are full of social affection, and are hence often called, after the name of the eldest sister, the CHARITIES of life or of the heart.

> Mercy, and Truth, and hospitable Care,
> And kind connubial Tenderness, are there;
> And Piety, with wishes placed above,
> And sweetest Sympathy, and boundless Love.
>
> GOLDSMITH, *altered*.

On the other hand, we behold issuing from the same source a variety of restless and turbulent affections, which, from their characteristic violence, contribute equally, perhaps, to the unhappiness of those who possess them, and to the world on which they are exercised. To this tribe belong avarice, or the love of gain; ambition, or the love of power; pride and vanity, or the love of pomp, splendour, and ostentation; selfishness, or the love of the person, in common language, self-love: though the whole of these being of a selfish character, this latter term might, with as much propriety, apply to every one of them, as that of charity or the love of others to each of the preceding division.

Most of these are admirably described or allegorised by Spenser, in his Fairie Queene, which will be found to afford a most powerful illustration of the general hints here offered. I would readily bring instances in proof of this remark if our time would allow: as a single example of the force of his imagination, let me especially direct your attention to his entire delineation of avarice or mammon, and particularly the following picturesque representation of his dwelling—

Both roofe and floore, and walls, were all of gold,
But overgrowne with dust and old decay,
And hid in darkness, that none could behold
The hew thereof: for vew of cherefull day
Did never in that house itselfe display,

But A FAINT SHADOW OF UNCERTAIN LIGHT:
SUCH AS A LAMP, WHOSE LIFE DOES FADE AWAY;
OR AS THE MOONE, CLOATHED WITH CLOWDY NIGHT,
DOES SHEW TO HIM THAT WALKES IN FEARE AND SAD AFFRIGHT.*

HOPE I have enumerated as the second main-stream that emanates from the passion of DESIRE. Try the world, examine your own hearts, and you will agree with me that this is its source. Hope must spring from desire, and cannot exist without it: as it rises in the scale, it becomes trust or confidence; and confidence, according to the alliance it forms with other feelings or affections, gives birth to two very different families. United to a vigorous judgment and an ardent imagination, it produces courage, magnanimity, patience, intrepidity, enterprise; combined with vanity or self-love, the complex and mischievous brood is self-opinion, impudence, audacity, and conceit.

Hope, however, is not produced singly. It is a twin passion, and its congenital sister is Fear. This has not been sufficiently attended to by pathognomists; but examine the general tenour and accompaniment of the passions as they rise in your hearts, and you will find the present statement correct. Hope and fear spring equally from desire — the hope of gaining the desired object, and the fear of losing it. They run the same race, though with varying degrees of

* B. ii. cant. vii. xxix.

strength, and terminate their joint career in the antagonist extreme points of fruition or despair; the powers of hope growing gradually more intense as it approaches the former goal, and those of fear as it approaches the latter.

I have said that at these boundaries they terminate their respective career; but fear does not always cease with fruition. Uncertainty and change are so strongly written on all earthly enjoyments, that even in the firmest possession we have still some fear of losing them; so that we can seldom say, "what a man hath, why doth he yet fear for?" though nothing is more pertinent than the opposite inquiry, "what a man hath, why doth he yet hope for?" Fruition without fear is reserved for, and will be, the great prerogative of a higher state of being.

Fear, however, like hope, in its progress through life, forms other alliances than that which springs during its infancy. Combined with a sense of failure or imperfection in our own powers, it takes a right direction, and produces caution, timidity, bashfulness, diffidence, respect, and complaisance: united to friendship, love, or complacency, it engenders gratitude, devotion, reverence, veneration, and awe, which are only different degrees of the same feeling: and hence the term FEAR, in the sense we are now taking of it, becomes an apt and beautiful type of every religious affection; of desire; as love, gratitude, zeal, devotion, and awe; for we have just traced it as branching up in this direct line of descent.

The connexions of fear, moreover, like those of hope, are of a bad as well as of a good character: united to a judgment that measures its powers amiss, and entertains too mean an opinion of them, it degenerates into irresolution, doubt, cowardice, and pusillanimity: combined with a restless and irritable imagination, it begets suspicion, jealousy, dread, terror; and terror, when combined with hate, gives birth to the passion of horror. It is in this last character, as connected with the fancy or imagination, that the term FEAR is for the most part employed by the dramatists; and it is to this that Collins has entirely confined himself in his celebrated ode upon the subject.

Thou to whom the world unknown,
With all its shadowy shapes, is shown;
Who seest, appall'd, th' unreal scene
When Fancy lifts the veil between,—
Ah, Fear! ah, frantic FEAR!
I see, I see thee near.
I know thy hurried step, thy haggard eye:
Like thee I start, like thee disorder'd fly.

The third main passion which issues from the common stock of DESIRE I have said is EMULATION. This, when properly attempered, and connected with what have already appeared to be the social affections, is one of the noblest and most valuable emotions that actuates the human heart. It commences early, and often accompanies us to the closing scene of life. It inspirits the play of the infant, the task of the school-boy, and the busy

career of the man. It gives health and vigour to the first, applause and distinction to the second, and riches and honour to the third. But emulation, instead of being connected with the social, is often connected with the selfish affections; and in this case it degenerates into rivalry, an ungenerous strife to equal or surpass a competitor where there is a chance of success; or into envy, which is a mixture of emulation and hatred, where there is not.

The antagonist passion to DESIRE is AVERSION, which has also, like desire, different degrees of intensity, and a family of diversified characters, though in neither respect so numerous or complicated as the former.

It not unfrequently unites itself to pride, and produces as its progeny the jaundiced family of scorn, contempt, and disdain; the last of which is thus described by Spenser:

> His looks were dreadful, and his fiery eyes,
> Like two great beacons, glared far and wide,
> Glancing askew, as if his enemies
> He scorned in his overweening pride;
> And stalking stately, like a crane did stride
> At every step upon the tip-toes high;
> And all the way he went, on every side
> He gazed about, and stared horribly,
> As if he, with his looks, all men would terrify.

Aversion, combined with a quick sense of being wronged, whether real or imaginary, becomes anger; anger, when violent or ungovernable, is denominated rage or fury; and, when

stimulated by a determination to retaliate, it assumes the name and shape of revenge. Hatred is only aversion advanced to a higher degree in the scale; and hatred, colleaged with a fixed and clandestine desire to injure, degenerates into malice; the foulest, most despicable, and most devilish of all the passions that can harass an intelligent being, and the most opposite to the character of the divinity; for God is love, and the stamp of benevolence is imprinted on every part of creation.

> De secrètes beautés quel amas innombrable!
> Plus l'Auteur s'est caché, plus il est admirable! *
>
> What boundless beauties round us are display'd!
> How shines the Godhead mid the darkest shade!

Such, then, are the numerous and diversified families that issue directly or collaterally from the passion of desire, or of aversion as its opposite. I stated this passion to be almost universal in its range, and I submit to you whether this statement has not been verified.

The two other radical sources into which we are to resolve the remaining passions of the heart are JOY and SORROW: of equal weight and moment in the scale of life, but less numerous and complicated in their offspring; and which will, therefore, detain us but for a few minutes.

Joy, when pure and genuine, is a sweet and vivacious affection. It is the test and index of happiness or pleasure. Its influence, like that of

* Racine le fils, Poëme de la Religion.

gravitation, extends to remote objects; and it lightens the severest labours by its foretaste. It is the breath, the nectar of heaven, and the high reward which stimulates us to a performance of our duty while on earth.

Joy, like several of the preceding passions, has different names assigned to it, in its different stages of ascent; at its lowest point, it is ease, content, or tranquillity; at a certain elevation, it is called delight or gladness; somewhat farther in the scale, exultation; beyond this, rapture or transport,—for the terms, as applied to this passion, are synonymous; and advanced far higher, it is ecstasy—joy so overwhelming as to take away the senses, and prevent all power of utterance. Among the Greeks, however, the term ECSTASY was used in a more general sense, and applied to any overwhelming affection, whether of joy or sorrow; and Shakspeare, who has often carried it farther than the Greeks, occasionally makes it a feature of madness or mental distraction, which is not passion but disease. The following from his Hamlet is an instance of this signification.

> Now see that noble and most sovereign reason,
> Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh;
> That unmatch'd form and feature of blown youth
> Blasted with ECSTASY.

Combined with activity, joy produces the light-hearted family of cheerfulness, gaiety, mirth, frolic, and jocularity; the best and most lively

picture of which that the world has ever seen, is given by Milton in his Allegro, mirth being here placed at the head of the whole.

> Haste thee, nymph, and bring with thee
> Jest and youthful Jollity,
> Quips, and cranks, and wanton wiles,
> Nods, and becks, and wreathed smiles,
> Such as hang on Hebe's cheek,
> And love to live in dimple sleek;
> Sport, that wrinkled care derides,
> And Laughter holding both his sides.
> Come, and trip it as you go
> On the light fantastic toe.
> And in thy right hand lead with thee
> The mountain nymph, sweet Liberty.

Possessing features in many respects similar, we meet with another lively tribe, which are equally the offspring of joy, but of joy in alliance with an ardent imagination. These are sentimentalism, characterised by romantic views or ideas of real life; chivalry, which is the sentimentalism of gallantry, caparisoned for action, and impatient to enter the burning list,

> Where throngs of knights and barons bold
> In weeds of peace high triumphs hold,
> With stores of ladies, whose bright eyes
> Rain influence, and judge the prize.

This extravagant passion had its use in the feudal times; but it has for ages become antiquated, and in modern warfare has certainly too much gone out of fashion.

To the same tribe belongs enthusiasm, the joyous or ecstatic devotion of a high-wrought fancy to some particular cause or party, the chief of which are religion and patriotism: and under the influence of which, the body is wound up to a display of almost preternatural exploits, and an endurance of almost miraculous privations and labour.

The sprightly passion of joy gives birth also to a third tribe, in consequence of its union with novelty. It is a listening and attentive group, and consists of admiration, surprise, wonder, and astonishment: upon which I need not enlarge, except to remark that the word astonishment is, at times, made use of to express a very different feeling, produced by novelty and terror; and which is more accurately distinguished by the name of amazement. These mixed passions, however, are very apt to run into each other, as I shall have occasion to notice more at large in a subsequent study; and perhaps the most exquisite feeling a man can possess of the purely mental kind, is derived from a contemplation of scenery, or a perusal of history, where every thing around him is grand, majestic, and marvellous, and the terrible keeps an equal, or rather nearly an equal pace with the delightful.

The opposite of JOY is SORROW — a fruitful mother of hideous and unwelcome children; fruitful I mean on earth, but shut out with a wall of adamant from the purer regions of the skies.

Sorrow is as much distinguished by different names as any of the preceding affections, according to the height it reaches in the general scale of evil. And hence, at one point, it is sadness; at another, woe or misery; at a third, anguish; and at its extreme verge, distraction or despair.

Connected with a sense of something lost, or beyond our reach, it gives rise to regret and grief: and when in union with a feeling of guilt, it becomes remorse and repentance.

Its two bosom companions, however, are fear and fancy. When allied to the former alone, it produces the haggard progeny of care, anxiety, vexation, and fretfulness; the first of which is thus admirably described by Hawkesworth, in his ingenious but melancholy piece, entitled Life, an Ode; in which care is directly stated, as in the present case, to be a mixed breed of woe or sorrow and fear.

> Who art thou, with anxious mien
> Stealing o'er the shifting scene?
> Eyes with tedious vigils red,
> Sighs by doubts and wishes bred;
> Cautious step and glancing leer,
> Speak thy woes, and speak thy fear.

When sorrow associates herself with both fear and fancy, she then produces the demon brood of dejection, gloom, vapours, moroseness, heaviness, and melancholy; all of them begotten, like the last,

> In Stygian cave forlorn,
> 'Mongst horrid shapes, and shrieks, and sights unholy.

Such is the origin of melancholy, as given by Milton, in his Allegro, or ode to Mirth; but in his Penseroso, or ode to Melancholy herself, he derives her from a purer source, and dresses her in the pensive character of a religious recluse. The picture shows a fine imagination; but is, perhaps, less true to nature than the preceding.

Come, pensive nun, devout and pure,
Sober, steadfast, and demure,
All in a robe of darkest grain,
Flowing with majestic train,
And sable stole of cypress lawn
Over thy decent shoulders drawn —
Come, but keep thy wonted state,
With even step, and musing gait,
And looks commercing with the skies,
Thy rapt soul sitting in thine eyes.
There, held in holy passion, still
Forget thyself to marble, till
With a sad, leaden, downward cast,
Thou fix them on the earth at last.

Despair or distraction brings up the rear of the miserable and tumultuous group before us. This passion has generally been contemplated as a mingled emotion; but it is perhaps far less so than most of the rest. It is a concentration of pure, unmitigated horror, equally void of hope, fear, and all moral feeling—an awful type of the torments of the lower world. The sensorial power is hurried forward towards a single outlet, and with a rushing violence that threatens its instantaneous exhaustion from the entire frame, like the discharge of electricity accumulated in a Leyden

jar when touched by a brass rod. The eye is fixed; the limbs tremble; upon the countenance hangs a wild and unutterable sullenness. The harrowed and distracted soul shrinks at nothing, and is attracted by nothing: the deepest danger and the tenderest ties have equally lost their command over it.

Despair is, hence, the most selfish of all the passions. In its overwhelming agony, and its pressing desire of gloom and solitude, it approaches to what is ordinarily called HEART-ACHE; but, generally speaking, the emotion is far more contracted and personal, and the action far more precipitous and daring. Despair, as it commonly shews itself, is either hopelessness from mortified pride, blasted expectations, or a sense of personal ruin.

The gamester, who cares for no one but himself, may rage with all the horror of despair; but the heart-ache belongs chiefly to the man of a warmer and more generous bosom, stung to the quick by a wound he least expected, or borne down, not by the loss of fortune, but of a dear friend or relation, in whom he had concentrated all his hopes. The well-known picture of Beverley is drawn by the hand of a master, and he is represented as maddened by the thought of the deep distress into which his last hazard had plunged his wife and family; but if his selfish love of gaming had not triumphed over his relative love for those he had thus ruined, he would not have been involved in any such reverse of for-

tune; nor, without the same selfishness, would he further have added to their blow by a deed that was sure to withdraw him for ever from all share in their misery, and overwhelm them with an accumulated shock. While Beverley was in despair, it was his wife who was broken-hearted.*

The picture which Spenser has drawn of despair, as seated in his own wretched cave, has been praised by every one from the time of Sir Philip Sidney; but it has always appeared to me that his description of Sir Trevisan, who was fortunate enough to escape from the enchantment of this demon-power, is still more forcibly drawn in the passage where, on the commencement of his flight, he is represented as accidentally meeting with the Red Cross Knight:

He answered nought at all; but adding new
Feare to his first amazement, staring wyde
With stony eyes, and hartless, hollow vew,
Astonisht stood, as one that had aspyde
Infernall furies with their chaines untyde.
Him yett againe, and yett againe, bespake
The gentle Knight, who nought to him replyde;
But, trembling every ioynt, did inly quake,
And foltring tongue at last these words seem'd forth to shake —

"For God's dear love, sir Knight, doe me not stay;
For loe! he comes, he comes fast after mee!"
Eft looking back, would faine have runne away;
But he him forst to stay, and tellen free
The secrete cause of his perplexitie.†

* Study of Medicine, vol. iv. p. 133. edit 2nd, 1825.

† Faerie Queene, b. i. c. ix. 24, 25.

Such, as it appears to me, are the chief passions or faculties of emotion discoverable in the human mind. I submit, however, the present analysis and classification of them with some degree of diffidence; for, as far as I am aware, it is the first attempt of the kind that has ever been ventured upon; and, like other first attempts, it may perhaps be open to the charge of considerable imperfections and errors. Be this, however, as it may, it at least offers us a new key to the mind's complicated construction in one branch of its study, simplifies its machinery, and perhaps unfolds a few springs which have never hitherto been sufficiently brought into public view.

I have said that the use of the passions is to furnish us with happiness, as that of the intellectual faculties is with knowledge, and that of the faculties of volition with freedom. But from the survey thus far taken, it must be obvious to every one, that the passions furnish us with misery as well as with happiness. And it may, perhaps, become a question with many, whether the harvest of the former be not more abundant than that of the latter. We cannot, therefore, close this subject better than by briefly inquiring whether the passions produce happiness at all? Whether, allowing the affirmative, they produce more happiness than misery, and whether the present constitution of things would be improved if those that occasionally produce misery were to be banished from the list?

Supposing, by a decree of the Creator, all the mental passions were to be eradicated from the human frame, and nothing were to remain to it but a sense of corporeal pain and pleasure, — what would be the consequence under the present state of things, with this single alteration? Man would cease to be a social being; the sweet ties of domestic life would be cut asunder; the pleasures of friendship, the luxury of doing good, the fine feeling of sympathy, the sublimity of devotion, would be swept away in a moment. The world would become an Asphaltitis, a dead and stagnant sea, with a smooth unruffled calm, more hideous than the roughest tempest. No breeze of hope or fear, of desire or emulation, of love or gaiety, would play over it: the harmony of the seasons would be lost upon us, and the magnificence of the creation become a blank. The wants and gratifications of the body might instigate us, perhaps, to till the soil; to engage in commerce and mechanical pursuits, and to provide a generation to succeed us. And if literature should exist at all, a few cold and calculating philosophers might spin out their dull fancies upon abstract speculations, and a few Lethean poets write odes upon indifference; but all would be selfish and solitary. The master-tie would be snapped; the spiritus rector would be evaporated, and every man would be a stranger to every man.

To a state of being thus torpid and monotonous, let us now grant the pleasurable passions,

and withhold those that accompany or indicate uneasiness. Now, uneasiness, as I have already observed, is, in some degree or other, an essential attendant upon desire, hope, and emulation; and hence these passions must as necessarily be excluded here as under the former scheme. For a similar reason, we must allow neither generosity, nor gratitude, nor compassion; for put away all sorrow and aversion, all mental pain and uneasiness, and such affections could have no scope for their exertion: they must necessarily have no existence.

But still the world would be thronged with a gay and lively troop of passions; love and transport, mirth and jollity, would revel with an uninterrupted career: — not a cloud would obstruct the laughing sunshine; and man would drink his full from the sea of pleasure, and intoxicate himself without restraint.

But how long would this scene of ecstasy continue? Under the present constitution of nature, not a twelvemonth. In less than a year, the world, in respect to its inhabitants, would cease to exist: worn out by indulgence, and destroyed for want of those very uneasinesses, those pains and sorrows, those aversions and hatreds, which, when skilfully intermixed and directed, like wholesome but unpalatable medicines, chiefly contribute to its moral health; and form the best barriers against that misery and ruin, which, when superficially contemplated, they seem expressly intended to produce; but

which man must be obnoxious to in a state of imperfection and trial, and would be infinitely more so but for their presence and operation.

The sum of the inquiry, then, is, that all the passions have their use, — that they all contribute to the general good of mankind; — and that it is the abuse of them, the allowing them to run wild and unpruned in their career, and not the existence of any of them, that is to be lamented. While there are things that ought to be hated, and deeds that ought to be bewailed, aversion and grief are as necessary to the mind as desire and joy. It is the duty of the judgment to direct and to moderate them; to discipline them into obedience, and attune them to harmony. The great object of moral education is to call forth, instruct, and fortify the judgment upon this important science; to let it feel its own power, and accustom it to wield the sceptre entrusted to it with dexterity and steadiness. Where this is accomplished, the violent passions can never show themselves — they can have no real existence; for we have already produced evidence that they are nothing more than the simpler affections, discordantly associated or raised to an improper pitch. Where this is accomplished, the sea of life will, for the most part, be tranquil and sober, — not from indifference or the want of active powers, but from their nice balance and concord; and if, in the prosecution of the voyage, the breeze should be fresh, it will be still friendly, and quicken our course to the desired

haven. Finally, wherever this is accomplished, man appears in his true dignity — he has achieved the great point for which he was created, and visions of unfading glory swell before him, as the forthcoming reward of his present triumph.

LECTURE X.

ON THE LEADING CHARACTERS AND PASSIONS OF SAVAGE AND CIVILISED LIFE.

In the preceding lecture but one I stated, as may, perhaps, be remembered by many of the audience before me, that, of the numerous and complicated faculties which form the nice mechanism of the human mind, sometimes one, sometimes another, and sometimes several in conjunction, appear peculiarly active and prominent, and acquire a mastery over the rest; and that such effect is, in different instances, the result of different causes, as peculiarity of temperament, peculiarity of climate, or peculiarity of local or national habits and associations. Let us pursue this subject, and make it a groundwork for the present lecture.

All violent passions are evil, or in other words, produce, or tend to produce, unhappiness: for evil and unhappiness are only commutable terms. There is no proposition in morals that admits of clearer proof. Some violent passions are evil intrinsically; others as extremes of those that are good; and all of them as refractory and hostile to the legitimate control of the understanding. For happiness, as we had lately occasion to prove,

is a state of discipline; and is only to be found, in any considerable degree of purity and permanency (without which qualities it is unworthy of the name), in a regulated and harmonious mind; where reason is the charioteer, and reins, and guides, and moderates the mental coursers in the great journey of life, with a firm and masterly hand.

It may, hence, be supposed, that the greatest degree of violence and unhappiness to be met with any where, is among savages; since, unquestionably, it is here that the traces of discipline are most feeble and obscure. And such, in fact, is the concurrent opinion of moralists and civilians. But it is an opinion which should be given with some degree of hesitation. It is true so far as the simpler passions, and especially those of the selfish class, are concerned,—passions which are more or less common to all countries and conditions; but civil life has passions peculiar to itself, and passions, too, of peculiar force and obstinacy, that

Grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength,

which no system of internal discipline seems at all times capable of moderating; which, in too many instances, we behold defying, with equal contumacy, all the laws of religion and morality; and, consequently, introducing into the world pains and penalties, mischiefs and miseries, which the tribes of barbarous and uncultivated nature, amidst all their evils, know nothing of.

To a certain extent, it is, however, probable, that the common opinion is correct, and that the greatest portion of violence and wretchedness is to be met with in savage life.

Now what are the passions that are chiefly brought into action, in this low and lamentable state of existence? Let us take a brief survey of them, — it may prove an interesting inquiry, — and examine the changes they undergo, and the new affections they give rise to, as man emerges from chaos to order, from the gloom of ignorance to the light of civilisation, morality, and science.

One common character runs through savages of every kind. The empire of the heart is divided between two rival deities or rather demons — Selfishness and Terror. The chief ministers of the first are lust, hatred, and revenge; the chief ministers of the second are cruelty, credulity, and superstition. Look through the world, and you will find this description apply to barbarians of every age and country.

It is equally the history of Europeans and Africans; of the Pelasgi, who were the progenitors of the Greeks, and of the Celts and Scythians, the successive progenitors of the English. All the discoveries of modern circumnavigators confirm the assertion; and though the captivating names of Friendly and Society Islands have been given to two distinct groups in the vast bosom of the Pacific Ocean, and the inhabitants in several of them have made some progress in the first rudiments of civilisation and

government, there is not a people or a tribe to be met with, who are yet in a savage state, that are not still slaves to these debasing and tyrannical passions. The gentleness of courtship, or rather the first proof of affection, among the savages of New South Wales, consists in watching the beloved fair one of another tribe to her retirement, and then knocking her down with repeated blows of a club or wooden sword. After which impressive and elegant embrace, the matrimonial victim is dragged, streaming in her blood, to the lover's party, and obliged to acknowledge herself his wife. Cannibalism, in times of war, is still common to several of the islands; human immolation to most of them. It was at the bloody shrine of revenge, that Captain Cook fell a sacrifice in Owhyhee, one of the best-informed and most disciplined of all the islands; nor has any one, perhaps, who ever read the interesting history of Prince Lee Boo, forgotten the delight he manifested at St. Helen's, on discovering a bed of groundsel, which he immediately converted to an article of food. All of them believe in magic — are the dupes of priestcraft and witchcraft — and in carving images of their deities, seem to think they can never represent them under figures sufficiently terrific and disgusting.

The simple but violent passions, then, common to mankind in savage life are selfishness, lust, hatred, revenge, terror, cruelty, credulity, and superstition. These are differently modified, as

well as combined with other passions according to the force of collateral circumstances, as the dulness or vivacity of the intellectual faculties, the warmth or frigidity of the climate, the tameness or picturesque grandeur of the scenery, and the political constitution and habits of the people. Let us see how far this remark is supported by history.

From the cap or caf of the Caucasus descended those streams of adventurers that under the names of Getes, Goths, Scythians, and Scandinavians, over-run all the north of Europe, and progressively spread themselves from the Caspian Sea to the Thames. Born in the midst of snows, brought up in the midst of perils, and stretching their barren track from lake to lake, and from mountain to mountain, through the wildest, the boldest, the sublimest, and most fearful line of country that indents the face of the old world, they caught the gloomy grandeur that surrounded them; exchanged the love of women for the love of war; and carried fierceness and terror into the whole of their political institutions, their sullen ritual, and their mythology. They neither gave nor would consent to receive quarter; their highest honour being to fall in battle, and their deepest disgrace to sink into the grave by a natural death. They had their heaven, but it was only for heroes; and they denominated it Valhalla, or the hall of slaughter. They had also their hell, but it was only for those who died at home, and who, as they taught, were immediately conveyed to it, and tormented for ever.

for their cowardice, with hunger, thirst, and misery of every kind. This audacious contempt of death, and burning desire to enter the hall of their ferocious gods, is correctly described by Lucan, who calls it a happy error —*felices errore suo.*

We here meet with all the passions I have enumerated as characteristic of savage life, but modified and peculiarly directed by local circumstances, which at the same time give birth to other passions equally fierce and violent.

Nerved by nature with a firm, robust constitution, and nursed in the midst of cliffs and cataracts, and torrents and tempests, they drank in courage and independence with every breath of air; their only delight was the gloomy one of hunting out difficulties and dangers; their only lust that of battle and conquest; and their only fear that of being thought cowards on earth, and being shut out from the hall of slaughter in heaven. To adopt once more the language of Lucan, and follow up his correct description, which, nevertheless, before a mixed audience I must endeavour to give in our own tongue,

> In error bless'd, beneath the polar star,
> That worst of fears, the fear of death they dare;
> Gasping for dangers, prodigal of pain,
> Spendthrifts of life, that must return again.*

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* Certe populi, quos despicit Arctus
Felices errore suo, quos ille timorum
Maximus haud urget lethi metus. Inde ruendi
In ferrum mens prona vivis, animæque capaces
Mortis; et ignavum redituræ parcere vitæ.
Phars. Lib. i. 458.

The natural passions of cruelty, hatred, and revenge seem to have remained untouched, and the whole character of the heart concurred in giving a terrible enthusiasm to their superstition. Patriotism they had none, for they had no country; and they only so far sacrificed their personal liberty, and concentrated themselves into tribes and clans, with leaders of limited authority at their head, as they found best calculated to give success to their lawless enterprises. [And hence the origin of the feudal system, and the first rude efforts towards a basis of government and civilisation in northern Europe.

Let us contrast this picture with one of a different kind.

Seated in an early period of the world in the vicinity of these ferocious mountaineers, but at the southern foot of the Caucasus, instead of at its summit, we behold another set of barbarians, who progressively spread themselves into the softer regions of the south and west, under the names of Gomerians or Cymerians, and Celts. Their patronymic appellation sufficiently proves them to have been the sons of Gomer, and gives them a near connexion with the tribes we have just noticed. The country which formed their cradle was the finest part of Asia Minor, a country that has been regarded in all ages as the garden of the world. Soft tepid airs; a rich productive soil, that scarcely demanded cultivation; plains and sloping hills extending in every

direction, and covered with fattening verdure; fountains interspersed and meandering rivers; banks blossoming with the choicest flowers, and suffused with the sweetest odours; the refreshing foliage of deep umbrageous woods; and over all the blue and cloudless canopy of the skies, diffusing light and laughter and benevolence, seemed labouring with happy concert to subjugate the rugged feelings of the savage heart, and attune it to harmony and peace. Nor was the magic force exerted in vain. The agreeable ideas hereby excited, prompted them, in their migrations, to seek, as far as they were able, for regions of a similar character; and the growing impulse of internal pleasure thus derived from external beauty gave a new direction to their mental powers. Selfish lust softened gradually into social love; the activity of a sportive fancy subdued the gloomy dictates of cruelty and revenge; the Gorgon form of fear gave place to the young radiance of hope; and superstition dropped her circlet of snakes, and half listened to the soothing song of reason and of truth.

In proof of this, it is only necessary to mention that they spread themselves from the head-spring of the Danube or Ister, as it was formerly called, to the mouth of the Tagus, and peopled in their progress Phrygia, so celebrated for its dithyrambic music and vigorous dance; the Troad, or country of Troy, ages ago

Married to immortal verse;

Thrace, of scarcely less distinction than Troy;

Hungary, the greater part of Germany, Gaul, Italy, Spain, and the British islands; sometimes confining themselves to small independent tribes, and sometimes, as in the warmer regions more especially, sinking conjointly into subjugation, under one ambitious and powerful chieftain. Different local circumstances diversified their general character; but for the most part we find them equally courteous and courageous, faithful to their engagements, hospitable to strangers, full of patriotism, loyalty, and domestic virtue; and let me add, it is to the quarter I am now speaking of that the Greeks were indebted not only for their Phrygian music, which formed their most enthusiastic and maddening movements, as I have just observed, but also for their Lydian, which formed its opposite, and was equally adapted to quell the cares and fury of the breast, and melt it into feelings of tenderness and affection. It is under this description Dryden speaks of it in his Ode to Alexander's Feast—

> Softly sweet in Lydian measures
> Soon he soothed his soul to pleasures.

And thus a greater than Dryden, in his well-known poem, entitled l'Allegro—

> And ever against eating cares
> Lap me in soft Lydian airs;
> In notes with many a winding bout
> Of linked sweetness long drawn out:
> With wanton heed, and giddy cunning,
> The melting voice through mazes running,
> Untwisting all the chains that tie
> The hidden soul of harmony.

Such, in most parts of the world, has been the effect of climate and surrounding scenery. But there is another cause, and a still more powerful one, that ought not to be omitted in the consideration of national character: and that is the government and habits of a people.

These may, in the first instance, be produced by accident; they may be the result of the cause already adverted to; but, when once formed and established, they lay a much firmer basis for public feeling and conduct than can be derived from any physical impulse whatever.

Persia had at one time as much reason as Macedonia to boast of her military hardihood and heroism; and, under the guidance of Cyrus, is well known to have overrun all Egypt and Asia Minor, taken Babylon, and destroyed the Assyrian empire. But her government was at that time most excellent; her code of laws full of wisdom; her administration of justice exemplary; and her morals the simplest and most correct in the Pagan world. Her youth, from the age of seven to that of seventeen, were allowed no other food than bread and cresses, and no other drink than water. They were all educated at public schools, provided by the state, and superintended by masters of the highest character for sobriety and science; who were enjoined by the constitution to use every means of inspiring them with a love of virtue for its own sake, and an equal abhorrence of vice. With the exception of the Macedonians, the Persians are the only people who enacted a law against ingrati-

tude, punishing with a brand on the forehead every one who was convicted of so heinous a crime; a regulation which, I shrewdly suspect, if carried into execution in the present day, would woefully disfigure the faces of great multitudes of our contemporaries. The ear of the prince, moreover, was open to the advice of every one, but with this salutary limitation, to prevent the royal presence from being pestered with political busy-bodies: the adviser in proposing his opinion was placed upon an ingot of gold; if his counsel were found useful, the ingot was his reward; if trifling, or of no value, his reward was a public whipping.

So long as this system of simplicity and political jurisprudence continued, the Persians were the most powerful people in the world; but the temptations of a warm luxurious climate, and the influx of enormous wealth, from the conquest of surrounding countries, threw them gradually off their guard; their discipline became relaxed, their laws slighted, their manners changed; and the nation which was able to conquer Phrygia, Lydia, Egypt, and the proud empire of Assyria, not two centuries afterwards, fell prostrate before an army of little more than thirty thousand Greeks, under the banners of Alexander the Great.

If we turn our attention to the Greeks who triumphed on this proud occasion, their whole history will furnish us with a repetition of the

same lesson. The mildness of their climate, the luxuriance of their soil, the picturesque beauty of their country, attuned all the rougher passions to harmony, and gave birth to an equal mixture of the gentler and the sublimer virtues. Composed of a variety of small separate states, united by a confederate tie, they felt a generous rivalry to surpass each other in whatever could contribute to enlarge or adorn the human understanding. And hence, while the well-balanced liberty they possessed inspirited them to defend it against every foreign aggression, in philosophy and ethics, in poetry and oratory, in music and painting, in sculpture and architecture, they became models of excellence for all other countries, and for all future ages. They too had their superstitions and their mythology; but the genius that pervaded every thing else pervaded these. A few grossnesses, indeed, which it is wonderful they should ever have allowed, deformed the whole machinery; but every thing besides, though wholly fictitious and ideal, was uniformly elegant, and for the most part instructive. Every grove, and stream, and mountain, was, in their opinion, instinct with some present deity, and under his immediate protection; and while the sacred heights of Olympus, the bright residence of their gods, was peopled, not with savage heroes and bloody banquets, as among the Scandinavians, but with the divinities of wit, and wisdom, and beauty—with the Loves,

the Graces, and the laughing Hours, and the sister train of Music and Poetry.

Such was Greece: but what is she now? Her climate and bewitching scenery are the same; but her spirit and constitution are no more.—What, then, is she now? or rather, what was she till of late? for the spirit of past ages has again in some measure revived in several parts of her. A few of her islands are under British protection; and a few others are struggling to throw off the yoke that has for ages equally subjugated them in body and in mind. But with the exception of these insular and more fortunate spots — NANTES IN GURGITE VASTO—what is she now? The eye sickens at the sight, and the tongue falters while it tells the change. A land of slaves and of barbarous usurpers; where the scourge of the cold Ottoman flays at his will the descendants of those who fell at Thermopylæ, and triumphed at the Granicus — whilst the tame victims that still submit to it, prove themselves well worthy of the fate that has befallen them: —

In all, save form alone, how changed! — and who,
That marks the fire still sparkling in each eye,
Who but would deem their bosom burn'd anew
With thy unquenched beam, lost Liberty!
And many dream withal the hour is nigh,
That gives them back their fathers' heritage:
For foreign arms and aid they fondly sigh,
Nor solely dare encounter hostile rage,
Or tear their name defiled from Slavery's mournful page.

Hereditary bondsmen! know ye not,
Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow?
By their right arms the conquest must be wrought?
Will Gaul or Muscovite redress ye? No!
True, they may lay your proud despoilers low,
But not for you will Freedom's altars flame. —
Shades of the Helots! triumph o'er your foe!
Greece! change thy lords, thy state is still the same;
Thy glorious day is o'er, but not thy years of shame.

Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild;
Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields;
Thine olive ripe as when Minerva smiled,
And still his honied wealth Hymettus yields;
There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds,
The free-born wanderer of thy mountain air:
Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds;
Still in his beam Mendeli's marbles glare;
Art, Glory, Freedom, fails, but Nature still is fair.*

A thousand other examples of like effect, from like causes, might easily be adduced. Insomuch, that it has become a general maxim among political writers, that nations, like individuals, have a natural youth, perfection, and dissolution. It is a maxim, however, that must be received with some degree of caution. The experiment, notwithstanding that the world has now continued for nearly six thousand years, has never been tried in its hardier and colder regions: and we have already seen, that in the warmer climates, there is a cause operating towards the production of national decay, peculiar to itself,

* Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, cant. ii.

and distinct, therefore, from the law of general necessity. Yet, even in the warmer regions of the earth, the fact does not hold universally; for the Chinese have historic documents of the continuance of their empire for nearly four thousand years: one of the chief of which is, the famous record of an eclipse of the sun, in the reign of Ching-Kang, 2155 years before the commencement of the Christian era: while Persia, though conquered by the Romans, and shorn of more than half its extent in elder times, has still, under some form or another, descended to the present day, through a period of nearly three thousand years. And, wild and wandering as is the life of the Arab tribes, they may at least make a boast of having uniformly retained their customs, their liberty, and their language, for a longer period than any other people, and amidst all the changes that have befallen the most splendid empires around them; and are at this day, in habits, government, and national tongue, nearly the same as they were in the time of the patriarch Job; and probably as they were long before the earliest epoch to which the Chinese can make any pretensions.

There can be no doubt, however, that the very perfection of a people, in the arts of civilisation and refinement, has a natural tendency to produce the seeds of future decay and dissolution; and, although the Chinese and Arabians have not hitherto given proofs of any such change, it is

only, perhaps, because they have for ages continued stationary, and have never reached the absolute perfection we are speaking of. I shall close the present lecture, therefore, with pointing out a few of those passions and other affections which immediately spring from what may be called the manhood, or summit of civilisation, are chiefly distinctive of it, and pave the way for its downfall.

In order, however, to give strength and bearing to the picture, let us first glance at the passions and emotions of mankind in a simpler state; in that middle condition of moral cultivation usually to be met with in the villages and smaller towns of a highly-civilised people, where the moral affections have sweetened the heart, but refinement has not yet sweetened the manners. Let us transport ourselves for a few minutes to Wales, the Highlands of Scotland *, or the banks of the Garonne. In any of these regions, we shall be received upon a proper introduction, and often without any introduction whatever, with an honest though a homely welcome; the chief virtues of the heart we shall find to be chastity, sincerity, frugality, and industry; its chief feelings, cheerfulness, content, and good-will: if they know little of the sublimer, they know nothing of the turbulent passions: —

* See, for a correct description of the amusements, superstitions, and manners of the Scottish peasantry, Burns's *Halloween*, and his *Cottar's Saturday Night*.

Far from the maddening crowd's ignoble strife,
Their sober wishes never learn to stray;
Along the cool sequester'd vale of life
They keep the noiseless tenour of their way.

At the same time, we shall find an evident distinction of national character; the first of these tribes evincing an enthusiastic fondness for the shadowy traditions and the antiquated, perhaps the fabulous heroes of their country, from some of whom every one believes himself to be lineally descended; the second, an ardent attachment to their respective lairds, and the hardy individuals that compose their respective clans; and the third, an elastic and ebullient vivacity, that seems to fit them for happiness in any country, and almost under any circumstances.

If from these scenes of simple life and ingenuous manners, we pass to the crowded capitals of refinement and luxury, we shall see more, perhaps, to admire, but certainly more to disrelish and weep over; a strange intermixture of the noblest virtues and the foulest vices; the mind in some instances drawn forth to its utmost stretch of elevation and genius, and in others sunk into infamy and ruin; a courtesy of attention that enters into all our feelings, and anticipates all our wants; delicacy of taste; punctilious honour; sprightly gallantry; splendour and magnificence; wit, mirth, gaiety, and pleasure of every kind. Of national character, however, we find little or nothing: like the pebbles in a river, all roughnesses are smoothed

away by mutual friction into one common polish. It is easy, indeed, to perceive that every thing tends to an extreme; the jaded taste becomes fastidious, and is perpetually hunting for something new; gallantry degenerates into seduction; fine, trembling honour, into an irritable thirst to avenge trifles; the heart is full of restlessness and fever. In the general pursuit of happiness, contentment is altogether unknown; no one is satisfied with his actual rank and condition, and is perpetually striving to surpass or supplant his neighbour; and striving, too, by all the machinery he can bring into play. Hence, in the more refined ranks, all is flattery, servility, and corruption; in the busy walks of traffic and commerce, all is wild venture, speculation, and hazard; the bosom is distracted with the civil warfare of avarice, ambition, pride, envy, and sullen rancour; the whole surface is at length hollow and showy, and the face becomes no index to the feelings. There is no necessity for dwelling on those open and atrocious villains, that, like vermin on a putrid carcass, such a state of things must indispensably generate and fatten; — the haggard tribe of anxiety, vexation, and disappointment— the downfall of splendour — the mortification of pride — the failure of friendship — the sting of ingratitude — the violation of sacred trusts — blasted expectations, and disconcerted projects — the cup of joy dashed from the lips that are sipping it — hope shipwrecked on the verge of

possession — the agony of the mighty adventurer, who for months beforehand sees the tempest of his ruin rolling towards him; sees it, but dares not meet it; sees it, but perhaps cannot avert it — harrowed through every nerve by the gaunt spectres of approaching shame, by the lamentations of his own family reduced to beggary, and the cutting rebukes of other families whom a misplaced confidence has involved in one common destruction — the demon train of distraction, madness, suicide: — these, and a thousand miseries such as these, that naturally flow from, and are naturally dependent upon, a state of superabundant and diseased refinement, without taking into the account the flagrant and atrocious villanies which fall within the cognizance of the criminal judge, are sufficient to prove, that the nation which has reached the utmost pitch of civil perfection, is in danger of degeneracy and decay; and justify the doubt I ventured to suggest, at the opening of the present lecture, as to which of the two extremes of society is pregnant with the greatest share of moral evils — that of gross barbarism, or that of an exuberant and vitiated polish.

LECTURE XI.

ON TEMPERAMENTS, OR CONSTITUTIONAL PROPENSITIES.

The social principle — that horror of solitude and inextinguishable desire of consorting with our own kind, which every man feels in his bosom, and which impels him to prefer misery with fellowship, to ease and indulgence without it — laid the first foundation for cities and states; and the nature of the social compact, peculiarity of climate, and community of habits and manners, unite in producing that general tissue of feelings and propensities, which constitutes, and is denominated, national character; which gives vivacity to the French, a refined taste to the Italians, phlegmatic industry to the Dutch, a free and enterprising spirit to the English, and a military genius to the Germans.

But independently of these national tendencies, that run through the general mass of a people, it is impossible for us to open our eyes without perceiving some peculiar propensity, or prominent moral feature, in every individual of every nation whatever; and which, if strictly analysed, will be found as much to distinguish him from all other individuals as the features of

his face. This is sometimes the effect of habit, or of education, which is early and systematic habit, and which every one knows is capable of changing the original bent of the mind, and of introducing a new direction; but it is far more generally an indigenous growth, implanted by the hand of nature herself; or, in other words, dependent on the original orgnization, admitting of infinite varieties, and produced by the ever-shifting proportions which the mental faculties and the corporeal organs bear to themselves, or to each other, and which it is impossible in every instance to catch hold of and classify.

The Greek physiologists, however, attempted the outlines of a classification; for they began by studying the individual varieties, which they ascribed to the cause just adverted to, and hence denominated them idiosyncrasies, or peculiarities of constitution.

They beheld, as every one must behold in the present day, for nature is ever the same, one man so irascible, that you cannot accidentally tread on his toe, or even touch his elbow, without putting him into a rage; another so full of wit and humour, that he would rather lose his friend than repress his joke; a third, on the contrary, so dull and heavy, that you might as well attempt to move a mile-stone; and possessing withal, so little imagination, that the delirium of a fever would never raise him to the regions of a brilliant fancy. They beheld one man for ever courting enterprise and danger; another

distinguished for comprehensive judgment and sagacity of intellect: one peculiarly addicted to wine; a second to gallantry, and a third to both: one generous to profligacy; another frugal to meanness; and a few, amidst the diversified crowd, with a mind so happily attempered and balanced by nature, that education has little to correct, and is almost limited to the act of expanding and strengthening the budding faculties as they show themselves.

The physiologists of Greece, and especially the medical physiologists, did not rest here. They attempted to cluster the different species of idiosyncrasies, or particular constitutions that had any resemblance to each other, and to arrange them into genera, which were denominated crases (κράσης) or temperaments. We have the express testimony of Galen*, that Hippocrates was the founder of this system. He conceived the state or condition of the animal frame to be chiefly influenced by the nature and proportion of its radical fluids, at least, far more so than by those of its solids. The radical fluids he supposed to be four, the elementary materials of which were furnished by the stomach, as the common receptacle of the food; but each of which is dependent upon a peculiar organ for its specific production or secretion. Thus the blood he asserted to be furnished by the heart; the phlegm, lymph, or finer watery fluid, by the head; the yellow bile by the gall-duct; and the black bile by the spleen. The

* De Temperament. ii. p. 60. § b.

perfection of health, or hygéia, as the Greeks denominated it, he conceived to result from a due proportion of these fluids to each other; and the different temperaments or predispositions of the body, to peculiar constitutions or idiosyncrasies, from a disturbance of the balance, and a preponderating secretion or influence of any one of them over the rest.

Hence Hippocrates established four genera of temperaments, which he denominated from the respective fluids whose superabundance he apprehended to be the cause of them, the BILIOUS or CHOLERIC, produced by a surplus of yellow bile, and dependent on the action of the gall-duct or liver; the ATRABILIARY or MELANCHOLIC, produced by a surplus of black bile, and dependent upon the action of the spleen; the SANGUINEOUS, produced by a surplus of blood, and dependent upon the action of the heart; and the PHLEGMATIC, produced by a surplus of phlegm, lymph, or fine watery fluid, dependent upon the action of the brain.

This arrangement of Hippocrates continued in great favour with physiologists, and with very little variation, till the beginning of the last century, at which time it was warmly supported in all its bearings by the quaint but solid learning of Sir John Floyer.* And even to the present hour, notwithstanding all the changes that have

* See his Physician's Pulse-watch; or an Essay to explain the Old Art of Feeling the Pulse, and to improve it by the Help of the Pulse-watch. 2 vols. 8vo. Lond. 1707.

taken place in the sciences of physiology, anatomy, and medicine, and the detection of some erroneous reasonings and opinions in the writings of Hippocrates upon this subject, intermixed with much that is admirable and excellent, — it has laid a foundation for all the systems of temperaments, constitutions, or natural characters, that have more lately been offered to the world. Most of these, however, have been distinguished by an introduction of five other genera, denominated a WARM, a COLD, a DRY, a MOIST, and a NERVOUS or irritable temperament: the first four of these five having been added to the list by Boerhaave, but unnecessarily, as they may readily be comprehended, as I shall presently show you, under the four simple temperaments of Hippocrates; while the fifth, in the general opinion of modern physiologists, is requisite to supply what must be admitted to be a chasm in the Greek hypothesis.

I have dwelt the longer upon this subject, because it has an immediate and very extensive bearing upon the popular phraseology of the present day, in all nations; and will give us a clear insight into the meaning of various colloquial terms and idioms, which we are in the constant habit of employing, in many instances, without any definite signification.

The two usual words to express the moral disposition or propensity of a man, and especially as connected with the passions, are TEMPER and HUMOUR. Both are Latin terms: the first, in its

original sense, imports mingling, compounding, modifying, or qualifying, and has an obvious reference to the combination of the four radical fluids just mentioned; on the peculiar *temper* or *proportion* of which to each other we have just seen that the Greek physiologists supposed the idiosyncrasy or peculiar constitution to depend: and hence TEMPER is, in a certain sense, synonymous with CONSTITUTION itself, though somewhat more generally applied to the frame of the mind than of the body.

HUMOUR, in like manner a Latin term, is derived from the Greek χυμὸς (chumos), and in its simple and radical sense imports moisture, juice, or fluid of any kind: in which sense we still employ the terms *humid* and *humidity*, derived from the same source. In physiology and popular language, HUMOUR is synonymous with TEMPER; and the explanation now offered will sufficiently show us how, from such a derivation, it comes to be employed as significative of mental disposition. Every one must see instantly, that, like the term temper, it has a reference to the general mass of the four radical fluids, which, upon the Greek hypothesis, are essential to the life of man; the peculiar combination of which with each other produces the peculiar HUMOUR or prevailing CURRENT of every individual. It is curious, and in many instances highly entertaining, to trace the transmutations of meaning that a word, from accidental circumstances, is thus frequently com-

pelled to undergo, so as to express, in one age, a very different idea from what it had in a preceding. Even in the present day, however, and in common language, we still occasionally employ the term HUMOUR, and its derivatives, in its original sense; as when we speak of the *humour* of the blood, meaning thereby a peculiar acrimonious fluid; and still more openly when we speak of the aqueous *humour* of the eye.

Humid and *humidity* continue steady to the radical idea, for they import fluidity, and nothing else. Nay, so strongly have we imbibed the diffusive spirit of the Greek doctrine upon the subject before us, that we not unfrequently carry forward the same idea of fluidity without our being aware of it; as when, for example, we speak of a *vein of humour*, or *a humorous vein*, in which case we evidently refer to a fluid circulating in a canal. Thus Prior, in his well-known imitation of Adrian's lines to his soul:

> Thy *humorous* vein, thy pleasing folly,
> Lies all neglected, all forgot;
> And pensive, wav'ring, melancholy,
> Thou dread'st and hop'st thou know'st not what.

We are not only told, however, in popular language, that every man has his humour, or vein of humour, but that one man is of a *choleric* humour, or turn of mind, by which we mean, that he is naturally irascible, or inclined to anger; that another man has a *melancholic* turn, by which every one understands that he is na-

turally gloomy and low-spirited; that a third is of a *sanguine* disposition, importing that he is naturally prone to high hope and confidence; and that a fourth is of *phlegmatic* habit, signifying that he is naturally dull and sluggish.

Now, in thus expressing ourselves, we show that we have imbibed, though often without being aware of it, not merely the language, but the first principles of the Hippocratic school, and employ their own terms as illustrative of their own doctrine. Choler (χολὴ), for example, is Greek for bile; and the bilious temperament of the Greeks was peculiarly characterised by irascibility, or an habitual propensity to anger. So melancholy (μελαγχολία) is literal Greek for black bile; that which, as I have already observed, they supposed to be produced by the spleen; and to the melancholic, or, as the Latins called it, atrabilious or black bile temperament, they, in like manner, ascribed a prevailing disposition to gloom or depression of spirits. Sanguine is a Latin term, importing blood; and to the sanguineous temperament, or that which, on their hypothesis, indicates a brisk and exuberant flow of blood, they attributed a propensity to ardent expectation, mirth, gaiety. Phlegmatic (φλεγματικος), again, is a Greek term, denoting lymph or aqueous fluid; and to the temperament abounding with this cold and spiritless humour, as they conceived it to be, they referred habitual indolence or sloth.

We often hear of the term RULING PASSION: this is rather of modern than of ancient origin. It is frequently, however, employed without any clear meaning, and confounded with temper, humour, or idiosyncrasy. Now, the temper, or idiosyncrasy, may be the result of a combination of passions, in which case all of them cannot take the rule; and hence that only is, properly speaking, the ruling passion, which takes the lead of the rest, and gives to the particular temper or humour a particular variety. Pope has not always paid sufficient attention to this distinction. Roscommon has correctly maintained it in the following couplet:

> Examine how your HUMOUR is inclined,
> And which the RULING PASSION of your mind.

If this view of the subject be correct, it will follow that crases or temperaments are the genera or grand divisions under which the moral characters or dispositions of mankind, possessing any considerable degree of resemblance to each other, may be naturally arranged. Tempers, humours, or idiosyncrasies, are the species which compose the different genera and ruling passions, the varieties or singularities of emotion, by which one individual belonging to the same species is distinguished from another.

The species and varieties may be innumerable, and would require a folio volume for their se-

parate analysis and description, rather than a single lecture. Let us, then, confine our attention to the genera, or primary division of moral and physical constitutions into temperaments, and illustrate this part of the preceding classification by a few familiar examples.

All mental propensities or dispositions, then, may be arranged under five separate heads; each of which constitutes a temperament, and is distinguishable by a correspondent effect, produced on the corporeal organs, and the external features and figure. So that the mind and body, for the most part, maintain a mutual harmony, and the powers of the one become, in a general view, a tolerably fair index of those of the other. To these heads, genera, or temperaments, I have given the names of sanguineous, bilious or choleric, atrabilious or melancholic, phlegmatic, and nervous. These names and characters, as I have already observed, with the exception of the last, are derived from the Greek physiologists; the principles of animal chemistry on which they are founded, are, in many instances, erroneous: but the physiological facts which they are designed to illustrate are, for the most part, incontrovertible, and it is not easy to change the general arrangement for a better.

I. Let us commence with the SANGUINEOUS TEMPERAMENT, or that conceived to depend upon a powerful action or peculiar energy of the system of blood-vessels.

Hereditary bondsmen! know ye not,
Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow?
By their right arms the conquest must be wrought?
Will Gaul or Muscovite redress ye? No!
True, they may lay your proud despoilers low,
But not for you will Freedom's altars flame. —
Shades of the Helots! triumph o'er your foe!
Greece! change thy lords, thy state is still the same;
Thy glorious day is o'er, but not thy years of shame.

Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild;
Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields;
Thine olive ripe as when Minerva smiled,
And still his honied wealth Hymettus yields;
There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds,
The free-born wanderer of thy mountain air:
Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds;
Still in his beam Mendeli's marbles glare;
Art, Glory, Freedom, fails, but Nature still is fair.*

A thousand other examples of like effect, from like causes, might easily be adduced. Insomuch, that it has become a general maxim among political writers, that nations, like individuals, have a natural youth, perfection, and dissolution. It is a maxim, however, that must be received with some degree of caution. The experiment, notwithstanding that the world has now continued for nearly six thousand years, has never been tried in its hardier and colder regions: and we have already seen, that in the warmer climates, there is a cause operating towards the production of national decay, peculiar to itself,

* Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, cant. ii.

and distinct, therefore, from the law of general necessity. Yet, even in the warmer regions of the earth, the fact does not hold universally; for the Chinese have historic documents of the continuance of their empire for nearly four thousand years; one of the chief of which is, the famous record of an eclipse of the sun, in the reign of Ching-Kang, 2155 years before the commencement of the Christian era: while Persia, though conquered by the Romans, and shorn of more than half its extent in elder times, has still, under some form or another, descended to the present day, through a period of nearly three thousand years. And, wild and wandering as is the life of the Arab tribes, they may at least make a boast of having uniformly retained their customs, their liberty, and their language, for a longer period than any other people, and amidst all the changes that have befallen the most splendid empires around them; and are at this day, in habits, government, and national tongue, nearly the same as they were in the time of the patriarch Job; and probably as they were long before the earliest epoch to which the Chinese can make any pretensions.

There can be no doubt, however, that the very perfection of a people, in the arts of civilisation and refinement, has a natural tendency to produce the seeds of future decay and dissolution; and, although the Chinese and Arabians have not hitherto given proofs of any such change, it is

only, perhaps, because they have for ages continued stationary, and have never reached the absolute perfection we are speaking of. I shall close the present lecture, therefore, with pointing out a few of those passions and other affections which immediately spring from what may be called the manhood, or summit of civilisation, are chiefly distinctive of it, and pave the way for its downfall.

In order, however, to give strength and bearing to the picture, let us first glance at the passions and emotions of mankind in a simpler state; in that middle condition of moral cultivation usually to be met with in the villages and smaller towns of a highly-civilised people, where the moral affections have sweetened the heart, but refinement has not yet sweetened the manners. Let us transport ourselves for a few minutes to Wales, the Highlands of Scotland *, or the banks of the Garonne. In any of these regions, we shall be received upon a proper introduction, and often without any introduction whatever, with an honest though a homely welcome; the chief virtues of the heart we shall find to be chastity, sincerity, frugality, and industry; its chief feelings, cheerfulness, content, and goodwill: if they know little of the sublimer, they know nothing of the turbulent passions: —

* See, for a correct description of the amusements, superstitions, and manners of the Scottish peasantry, Burns's *Halloween*, and his *Cottar's Saturday Night*.

Far from the maddening crowd's ignoble strife,
Their sober wishes never learn to stray;
Along the cool sequester'd vale of life
They keep the noiseless tenour of their way.

At the same time, we shall find an evident distinction of national character; the first of these tribes evincing an enthusiastic fondness for the shadowy traditions and the antiquated, perhaps the fabulous heroes of their country, from some of whom every one believes himself to be lineally descended; the second, an ardent attachment to their respective lairds, and the hardy individuals that compose their respective clans; and the third, an elastic and ebullient vivacity, that seems to fit them for happiness in any country, and almost under any circumstances.

If from these scenes of simple life and ingenuous manners, we pass to the crowded capitals of refinement and luxury, we shall see more, perhaps, to admire, but certainly more to disrelish and weep over; a strange intermixture of the noblest virtues and the foulest vices; the mind in some instances drawn forth to its utmost stretch of elevation and genius, and in others sunk into infamy and ruin; a courtesy of attention that enters into all our feelings, and anticipates all our wants; delicacy of taste; punctilious honour; sprightly gallantry; splendour and magnificence; wit, mirth, gaiety, and pleasure of every kind. Of national character, however, we find little or nothing: like the pebbles in a river, all roughnesses are smoothed

brownish, with a tendency to yellowness; the hair black or dark-brown; the body moderately fleshy; the muscles firm and well marked; the figure expressive. The temper of the mind exhibits abruptness, impetuosity, and violence of passion; hardihood in the conception of a project, steadiness and inflexibility in pursuing it, and indefatigable perseverance in its execution. It is to this temperament we are to refer the men who, at different periods, have seized the government of the world. Hurried forward by courage, audacity, and activity, they have all signalised themselves by great virtues or by great crimes, and have been the terror or the admiration of the universe. Such were Alexander, Julius Cæsar, Brutus, Attila, Mahomet, and Charlemagne, in earlier periods; and such in later times Richard III., Tamerlane, Cromwell, Nadir Shah, Charles XII. of Sweden, and the tyrant of our own day, Napoleon Buonaparte.

This temperament, like the last, with which it is so closely connected, is characterised by a premature appearance of the moral faculties. The men I have just named, when merely emerging from youth, are well known to have conceived and executed enterprises that would have been worthy of their maturest judgment. Where the lineaments of this character are peculiarly strong, and the susceptibility, as frequently occurs, is very acute, the individuals are highly irascible, and launch into a passion from

very trivial causes. * Homer has ascribed this part of the general temperament to many of his heroes, particularly to Achilles; and every politician knows that it was a prominent feature in the constitution of Buonaparte, who seems, indeed, in the occasional insults he offered to many of the highest characters at his own court, and in the general presence of his court, to have copied from the Grecian chieftain, who thus addressed Agamemnon, the head of the Grecian princes, the ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, presiding at a general council, in reply to Agamemnon's reprimand:

O monster! mix'd of insolence and fear,
Thou dog in forehead, but in heart a deer!
When wert thou known in ambush'd fights to dare,
Or nobly face the horrid front of war?
'Tis ours the chance of fighting fields to try;
Thine to look on, and bid the valiant die.
So much 'tis easier through the camp to go,
And rob a subject, than despoil a foe.
Scourge of thy people, violent and base!
Sent, in Jove's anger, on a slavish race;
Who, lost to sense of generous freedom past,
Are tamed to wrongs, or this had been thy last.

In this temperament we discover, as I have already observed, an union of an active exuberant bilious, with an active exuberant sanguineous system. The temperament called bilious is, therefore, properly speaking, a complex genus, deriving its features from both systems, and from both in a state of energetic operation.

* Richerand, ut suprà, sect. ccxxxi. p. 449.

III. If we put away this predominant energy of the sanguineous system, or sink it below its level, if we suppose the bilious system alone predominant, and then add a deranged action of some abdominal organ, or of the nervous department — the vital functions, from the change we have now taken for granted in the sanguineous system, being carried on in a weak and irregular manner, we shall arrive at the ATRABILIOUS, BLACK-BILE, OR MELANCHOLY TEMPERAMENT. The skin will assume a deeper tinge; the countenance appear sallow and sad; the bowels will be inactive, all the excretions tardy, the pulse hard, and habitually contracted. The corporeal sadness exerts an influence over the cast of ideas; the imagination becomes gloomy, the temper full of suspicion. The species and varieties afforded by this genus are almost innumerable, for the causes are peculiarly diversified. Hereditary disease, long-continued sorrow, incessant study, habitual gluttony, the abuse of pleasures of various kinds, and a thousand other circumstances, may equally become sources of this distressing condition, under some shape or other. And perhaps Le Clerc is correct in regarding it, in his Natural History of Man, as in every instance a morbid affection, rather than a natural and primitive constitution.

The character of Tiberius, of Louis XI., and of Pygmalion, as drawn by the nice hand of Fenelon in his Telemachus, give striking elucidations of this temperament in its moral bearings.

M. Richerand has also pointed out examples in Torquato Tasso, Pascal, Gilbert, and Zimmermann; but perhaps the most perfect picture that has been furnished to the world is to be found in the life of the celebrated Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

IV. Let us pass on to the fourth temperament—the PHLEGMATIC, LYMPHATIC, PITUITOUS, or WATERY, for the terms are all synonymous, and by all these terms it has been denominated. The proportion of fluids is here too considerable for that of the solids, or, in other words, the excernent system which secretes them from the general mass of the blood is in peculiar activity; and the result is, that the body obtains an increased bulk from the repletion of the cellular texture. The fleshy parts are soft; the skin fair; the hair flaxen or sandy; the pulse weak and slow; the figure plump, but without expression; all the vital actions more or less languid; the memory little tenacious, and the attention wavering; there is an insurmountable desire of indolence, and aversion to both mental and corporeal exercise.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that, among the illustrious lives of Plutarch, we do not meet with an individual of this character. They are for the most part a good-natured group, not formed for the transaction of public affairs, who have never disturbed the earth by their negotiations or their conquests, and are rather to be sought for in the bosom of private life than at the helm of states. The emperor

Theodosius may, perhaps, be offered as an example in earlier times; and in our own day the deposed Charles IV. of Spain, who resigned himself altogether into the hands of the infamous Godoy, surnamed Prince of the Peace; Augustus king of Saxony, who resigned himself equally into the hands of Buonaparte; and Ferdinand of Sicily, who in lucky hour, but of too short duration, at length surrendered the government of his people to our own country.

V. The last temperament I have noticed is the NERVOUS or IRRITABLE, as it has been sometimes, but incorrectly denominated. In this constitution the sentient system, or that susceptible to external impressions, is predominant over all the rest. Like the melancholic, it is seldom natural or primitive, but morbid and secondary, acquired by a sedentary life, reiterated pleasures, romantic ideas excited by a long train of novel or other fictitious and elevated histories; and peculiarly distinguished by promptitude but fickleness of determination, vivacity of sensations, small, soft, and wasted muscles, and generally, though not always, a slender form. The diseases chiefly incident to it are hysterical and other convulsive affections.

Let us close with two brief remarks upon the general survey before us. The first is, that these temperaments or generic constitutions are perpetually running into each other; and consequently, that not one of them, perhaps, is to be found in a state of full perfection in any indivi-

dual. Strictly speaking, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox belonged equally in the main to the second of them: there was the same ardour, genius, and comprehensive judgment in both; but the former had the bilious temperament, with a considerable tendency to the sanguineous; and hence, with more irritability, had more self-confidence, audacity, and sanguine expectation: the latter, while possessing the same general or bilious temperament, was at the same time more strongly inclined to the lymphatic; and hence his increased corporeal bulk; and, with less bold and ardent expectation, he possessed one of the sweetest and most benevolent dispositions to be met with in the history of the world. The first was formed to be revered, the second to be beloved; and both to be admired and immortalised.

The closing remark I have to submit is, that each of these temperaments, how widely soever they may differ from each other, is capable of being transmuted into any of the rest. Galen has particularly dwelt upon this most important fact, and has especially observed that a man of the most elevated and sanguineous constitution may be broken down into a melancholic habit by a long series of anxiety and affliction; while, on the other hand, the most restless and audacious of the bilious or choleric genus may be attuned to the sleek quiet of the phlegmatic temper by an uninterrupted succession of peaceful luxury and indulgence. Of what moment is this well-

established fact in the nice science of education! The temperaments of boys may be born with them; but they are capable of alteration, nay, of a total reversion, both in body and mind, each of which may be made to play upon the other; the one by a discipline of gymnastic exercises, and the other by a discipline of intellectual studies. The Greeks were thoroughly aware of this mutual dependence; and hence, as we have already seen, * made gymnastic games a regular part of the tuition of the Academy; thus rearing at one and the same time, and rearing, too, in the self-same persons, a race of heroes and of sages, and turning the wild and savage luxuriance of nature to the noblest harvests of wisdom and virtue.

* Vol. II. Ser. II. Lect. XI.

LECTURE XII.

ON PATHOGNOMY, OR THE EXPRESSION OF THE PASSIONS.

In our last lecture, we examined how far the state of the body has an influence upon that of the mind: in the study we are now entering upon we shall take the opposite side of the question, and examine how far the state of the mind has an influence upon that of the body.

This influence, if it exist, may be either instantaneous or permanent: it may be produced by some sudden affection or emotion of the mind, exciting an abrupt change in the features, the muscles, or other soft and flexible parts of the body; or it may result from the habitual character of the moral propensity, slowly and imperceptibly operating on parts that are less pliant, and giving them a fixed and determinate cast. The former constitutes the study of Pathognomy, or of the signs, language, or expression of the passions: the latter, the study of physiognomy, or of the signs, language, or expression of the genius or temper.

Let us investigate each of these in the order in which I have now stated them; and devote our present attention to the former of the two.

Suppose a man of a mild but courageous disposition, reclining at ease, and alone, beneath some overspreading forest tree, on a summer's evening, should be suddenly surprised by the attack of a ruffian, who should attempt to rob or murder him; — what would be the change of feelings and of figure he would undergo? The tranquillity of his mind would be transmuted into horror, rage, and probably revenge, or an attempt to retaliate; while the negligent ease of his posture, the relaxed muscles of his face, the natural vermeil of his cheeks, his half-opened lips, half-closed eyelids, and easy breathing, would suddenly start into tension, energy, suffusion: he would be instantly on his feet, in an attitude of determined resistance; still trembling with fear, he would collect all his soul into a strong and desperate effort to overcome the wretch: his muscles would swell with violent rigidity; his heart contract with unusual force and frequency; his lungs heave powerfully; the whole visage become inflated, dark, and livid; the eye-balls roll and look wildly; the forehead be alternately knit, and worked into furrows; the nostrils would open their channels to the utmost; the lips grow full, stretch to the corners of the mouth, and disclose both rows of teeth, fixed and grinding upon each other; the hair stand on end, and the hands, spasmodically clenched, or grasping and grappling with the assassin.

Now it has been made a question whether these rapid and violent movements are instinctive

signs of the passions prevailing in the mind, or voluntary muscular exertions, called for by the stress of the case, and constituting the means of resistance. Which opinion soever be adopted, it must be allowed to run parallel with the whole range of internal passions, and external expressions. And hence, the advocates for the latter principle contend, that the various transitions of feature, position, and attitude, which accompany the different emotions of the mind, and indicate their nature, are, in every instance, the effect of habit, or are suddenly called forth to operate some beneficial purpose. It is from experience alone, we are told, that we are able to distinguish the marks of the passions; that we learn, while infants, to consider smiles as expressions of kindness, because they are accompanied by endearments and acts of beneficence; and frowns, on the contrary, as proofs of displeasure, because they are followed by punishment. So in brutes, it is added, the expression of anger is nothing more than movements that precede or prepare the animal for biting; while that of fondness is a mere fawning or licking of of the hand. The glare of an enraged lion is the mere consequence of a voluntary exertion to see his prey more clearly; and his grin, or snarl, the natural motion of uncasing his fangs, before he uses them.*

* Essays on the Anatomy of Expression in Painting, by Charles Bell, p. 84. 4to. 1806.

I cannot readily adopt this hypothesis, as applied either to man or to quadrupeds. The power of expression possessed by the latter is, doubtless, far more limited than that possessed by the former; but brutes still have expression, and that, too, in the face, as well as in the general movements of the body; and expression, moreover, dependent upon the peculiar frame or feeling of the sensory, and therefore as strictly its genuine and specific symbols, as words are the symbols of ideas. In man, indeed, the changes of the countenance seem to proceed upon a systematic provision for this purpose; they constitute a natural language, and this so perfectly, that there is not an emotion in the mind which is without its appropriate sign; whilst we meet with various muscles in the face, which have no other known use than that of being subservient to this important purpose: particularly those that knit the eyebrow into an energetic and irresistible meaning; and those of the angle of the mouth, employed in almost every motion of this organ expressive of sentiment; but peculiarly and forcibly called into action in that arching of the lip which is the natural sign of contempt, hatred, or jealousy.

Mr. Charles Bell, to whom we are indebted for an elegant and admirable treatise on the anatomy of expression in painting, supports this last opinion; but rejects the doctrine of instinctive expression in the face of quadrupeds; contending, that even in the passion of rage, by far

the most strongly marked on the countenance, the changes which take place in the features are nothing more than motions accessory to the grand object of opposition, resistance, and defence.* The inflamed eye, however, and fiery nostrils of the bull, can scarcely be ascribed to this cause; for they add nothing to the power of striking: they may, indeed, be proofs or effects of the general excitement; but to say this, is to say nothing more than that they are proofs or effects of the passion they indicate; and consequently its natural language or expression. They are never employed on any other occasion. "In carnivorous animals," observes Mr. Bell, "the eye-ball is terrible, and the retraction of the flesh of the lips indicates the most savage fury. But the first is merely the excited attention of the animal, and the other a preparatory exposure of the canine teeth." Now if the first be merely excited attention, we must meet with it in every instance in which the mere attention of carnivorous animals, and nothing but the mere attention, is called forth. But is the glaring and terrible eye-ball here alluded to a mark of simple attention? Has any one ever seen it so in any animal, whether carnivorous or graminivorous, quadruped, biped, or footless? Has he ever seen it exhibited on such occasion, I will not say constantly and invariably, as upon this opinion it ought to be,

* Essays, &c. by Charles Bell, edit. 1. pp. 85, 86.

but in a single case of simple attention? And in like manner, I may ask respecting the tremendous retraction of the flesh of the lips, and exposure of the teeth,—not merely of the canine teeth or tusks, as stated above, but of all the teeth of both jaws, as far as such retraction will allow — has any one ever witnessed this movement in the action of mere seizing or biting, as, for example, in the case of devouring food? Mr. Bell himself seems sufficiently to settle this point, by telling us, in the beginning of the passage I have just quoted, that "the retraction of the flesh of the lips indicates the most savage fury." And I may add, it indicates nothing else; it is not wanted, and is never made use of, in the muscular movement of mere biting, and consequently is an immediate symbol of the passion called into exercise. It commences with the commencement of this passion, and is limited to its continuance and operation.

What, then, it may be asked, is the use of external expression, in instances of this kind, if it do not add to the power of defence or resistance? The proper answer must be found in the general object and intention of nature upon the whole of the case before us.

Man, by his constitution, is designed for society and mental intercourse. But what is to draw him to his fellows? to strip him of timidity and reserve, and fix him in communion and confidence? The language of expression — the natural characters of the countenance — the

softened cheek — the smiling lip — the beaming eye — the mild and open forehead — the magic play of the features in full harmony with each other; — which tell him, and, where artifice does not mimic nature, tell him infallibly, that the mind to which they belong is all sympathy, benevolence, and friendship, and will assuredly return the confidence it meets with. But we have sufficiently seen in the last two lectures, that the mind is not always thus constituted; that at times it is the store-house of rage, revenge, malevolence, suspicion, and jealousy; and that to confide in it would be misery and ruin. How is a man to be on his guard on such an occasion? He again looks at the countenance, and, instead of being attracted, he is instantly repelled: the characters are now hideous; and the Almighty, as formerly upon Cain, has set a mark upon the forehead, that it may be known.

Such, then, is the real use of that instinctive language of the features which is perpetually interpreting the condition of the mind; a language of the highest importance, and of universal comprehension; and which, if ever disguised and fallacious, is almost infinitely less so than that of the lips or language. Its characters are most perfect in mankind; but they are occasionally to be traced in quadrupeds: below which class, however, the signs of the passions, whether sought for in the face, or in any other organ, grow gradually more indistinct; or, per-

haps, from our knowing less of the manners and expression of the inferior classes, they appear so to ourselves, though not so in reality to others of the same kinds.

> Nec ratione aliâ proles cognoscere matrem
> Nec mater posset prolem; quod posse videmus;
> Nec minus, atque homines, inter se nota cluere.*
>
> Hence alone
> Knows the fond mother her appropriate young,
> Th' appropriate young their mother, mid the brutes
> As clear discern'd as man's sublimer race.

In contemplating, then, the passions, or other affections of the mind, as cognisable by external characters, they easily resolve themselves into two descriptions — the ATTRACTIVE and the REPULSIVE; the signs of which are to be sought for in man, and the nobler ranks of quadrupeds, chiefly in the face, but considerably also in the attitudes and motions of the body; while, in other animals, we are so little acquainted with these signs, as to be incapable of offering any very satisfactory or extensive opinion upon the subject.

In the ATTRACTIVE AFFECTIONS, the features, limbs, and muscles are uniformly soft and pliant — in the REPULSIVE, as uniformly tense, and for the most part rigid. The characters of the latter, therefore, are necessarily more marked and imposing than those of the former, though both

* De Rer. Nat. ii. 949.

are equally true to their purpose. And in more definitely answering the question, whether the characters in either case be the effect of habit or voluntary exertion to execute the feeling of the mind at the moment, or whether they be the mind's natural and instinctive symbols; it may be still farther observed, that in all instances they are the latter, and in a few instances both; for it by no means follows, that they are not instinctive symbols, because they serve at the same time to ward off our danger, or to inflict retaliation on an assailant. In the attractive feelings or passions, they are perhaps, for the most part, instinctive signs alone: for the natural language of dimples, smiles, laughter, a lively, sparkling eye, or that softened outline, and uniform sweep of the whole figure, which every one knows to be indicative of tranquillity and repose, is so clear to every one, that he who runneth may read it, and be assured of finding a contented and happy companion, if not a propitious season for a suit the heart is set upon. And although in a few of the repulsive passions, as rage, terror, and revenge, I have already given examples of their being mixed modes, in the greater number of even this last class they are probably as simple instincts as in the whole of the former: For what other use than that of mere instinctive indications can we possibly assign to tears, sighs, frowns, erection of the hair of the head, or the dead paleness, shivering, and horripilation, the creeping cold, that makes the multi-

tude of the bones to tremble, under the influence of severe terror or dismay?

In all this, there is one fact peculiarly worthy of attention; and that is, the admirable simplicity which runs through the whole; so that the same muscles are not unfrequently made use of to produce different and even opposite effects: and this, too, by variations, and shades of variations, so slight, that it is difficult, and in some cases almost impossible, to seize them with the pencil. When Peter of Cortona was engaged on a picture of the iron age, for the royal palace of Pitti, Ferdinand II., who often visited him, and witnessed the progress of the piece, was particularly struck with the exact representation of a child in the act of crying. "Has your majesty," said the painter, "a mind to see how easy it is to make this very child laugh?" The king assented; and the artist, by merely depressing the corner of the lips, and inner extremity of the eye-brows, which before were elevated, made the little urchin, which at first seemed breaking its heart with weeping, seem equally in danger of bursting its sides with immoderate laughter. After which, with the same ease, he restored the figure to its proper passion of sorrow.

The nerves that influence the expression take their rise almost entirely from one common quarter, the medulla oblongata, or that lower portion of the brain from which the spinal marrow immediately issues *; and as all their chief

* See Vol. I. Ser. I. Lect. xv. p. 410

ramifications associate in the act of respiration, we can readily see why the lungs, the heart, and the chest, in general, should so strikingly participate in all the changes of expression, and work up alternately sighs, crying, laughter, convulsions, and suffocation. *

I have said, that under the repulsive passions the muscles and features are for ever on the stretch; though the tension is often irregular, and alternately softens and stiffens. This general remark will apply to grief, pain, and agony; rage, suspicion, and jealousy; horror, despair,

* This subject has been of late perspicuously and admirably pursued by Mr. Bell, in a series of communications to the Philosophical Transactions, and especially in the Volume for 1822, p. 284, who closes his remarks as follows: "To those I address, it is unnecessary to go further than to indicate that the nerves treated of in these papers are THE INSTRUMENTS OF EXPRESSION, from the smile upon the infant's cheek to the last agony of life. It is when the strong man is subdued, by this mysterious influence of soul and body, and when the passions may be truly said TO TEAR THE BREAST, that we have the most afflicting picture of human frailty, and the most unequivocal proof that it is the order of functions which we have been considering that is then affected. In the first struggles of the infant to draw breath, in the man recovering from a state of suffocation, and in the agony of passion, when the breast labours from the influence at the heart, the same system of parts is affected — the same nerves, the same muscles; and the symptoms or characters have a strict resemblance. These are not the organs of breathing merely, but of natural and articulate language also, and adapted to the expression of sentiment, in the workings of the countenance and of the breast; that is, by signs as well as by words."

and madness; though, as I have formerly observed, this last affection cannot with strict propriety be introduced among the passions, being a mental disease rather than a mental emotion.

Let me justify this remark by a few illustrations. "A man in great PAIN," observes Mr. Burke, "has his teeth set; his eye-brows are violently contracted; his forehead is wrinkled; his eyes are dragged inwards, and rolled with great vehemence; his hair stands on end; his voice is forced out in short shrieks and groans; and the whole fabric totters." *

In GRIEF, there is still more violence and tension, though the tension is irregular and alternating. Where the grief is of long continuance, and deeply rooted, it gives a pale and melancholy cast to the countenance; an air of reserve to the manner; and an emaciation to the entire form; as though the sad sufferer were fondly nursing the viper passion that devours his bosom. Such is the exquisite description of Viola, as given of herself in the Twelfth Night:—

> She never told her love,
> But let concealment, like a worm i' th' bud,
> Feed on her damask cheek. She pined in thought;
> And, with a green and yellow melancholy,
> She sat like patience on a monument,
> Smiling at grief.

* Sublime and Beautiful, part iv. sec. 3. Cause of Pain and Fear.

At other times, the passion is characterised by a mingled tumult of agitation, restlessness, and bitter bewailing. Such is the general picture of Constance, in King John; who thus, among other exclamations, weeps over the ill-fated Prince Arthur: —

"

Grief fills the room up of my absent child;
Lies on his bed; walks up and down with me;
Puts on his pretty looks; repeats his words;
Remembers me of all his gracious parts;
Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form:
—Then have I reason to be fond of grief.

In RAGE, there is the same tension, but the same irregular agitation of the muscles. "The features," as Mr. Bell justly observes, "are unsteady; the eye-balls are seen largely; they roll, and are inflated. The front is alternately knit and raised in furrows, by the motion of the eye-brows; the nostrils are inflated to the utmost; the lips are swelled, and, being drawn, open the corners of the mouth *; the muscles are strongly marked. The whole visage is sometimes pale, sometimes inflated, dark and almost livid; the words are delivered strongly through the fixed teeth; the hair is fixed on end, like one distracted; and every joint should seem to curse and ban." Perhaps the finest picture of this mighty passion ever presented to the world, is to be found in Tasso's descrip-

* Anatomy of Painting, p. 139.

tion of the combat between Tancred and Argante: but it is too long for quotation, and would lose half its spirit if given in any other language than the original.

It is in the features of rage that the higher kinds of quadrupeds make the nearest approach to this form of expression in man. The bull terribly denotes it, by his inflamed eye, wide and breathing nostrils, and the prone position of his sturdy head, waiting the due moment to strike his antagonist to the ground. But of all quadrupeds, not perhaps excepting the lion, the war-horse exhibits the loftiest and most imposing character. The noblest and truest description of him that has ever been painted is in the book of Job. Allow me to quote it somewhat more correct to the original than the rendering in our common version, which is nevertheless, in the main, unexceptionable: —

Hast THOU bestowed on the horse mettle?
Hast thou clothed his neck with the thunder-flash?
Hast thou given him to launch forth as an arrow?
Terrible is the pomp of his nostrils:
He paweth in the valley, and exulteth;
Boldly he advanceth against the clashing host;
He mocketh at fear, and trembleth not;
Nor turneth he back from the sword.
Against him rattleth the quiver,
The glittering spear, and the shield:
With rage and fury he devoureth the ground,
And is impatient when the trumpet soundeth.
He exclaimeth among the trumpets "aha!"
And scenteth the battle afar off,
The thunder of the chieftains, and the shouting.

JEALOUSY is a fitful, unsteady passion: but still the muscles are constantly more or less on the stretch; "the eye-lid is fully lifted, and the eye-brows strongly knit, so that the eye-lid almost entirely disappears, and the eye-ball glares from under the bushy eye-brow. There is a general tension on the muscles, which concentrate round the mouth; and the lips are drawn so as to show the teeth, as in great pain or fury. Much of the character of the passion, however, consists in rapid vicissitudes from love to hate; now absent, moody, and distracted; now courting love; now ferocious and revengeful. It is hence difficult to represent it in painting. In poetry alone can it be truly represented in the vivid colours of nature; and even of poets, Shakspeare, perhaps, is the only one who has shown himself quite equal to the task." * It is thus he describes the workings of Othello's heart, on his first crediting the slander of the seduction of Desdemona by Cassio: —

O that the slave had forty thousand lives!
One is too poor, too weak, for my revenge.
Now do I see, 'tis true: — look here, Iago, —
All my fond love — thus do I blow to heaven. —
'Tis gone. ——
Arise, black Vengeance, from the hollow hell!
Yield up, O Love! thy crown and hearted throne
To tyrannous Hate! — swell, bosom, with thy fraught,
For 'tis of aspics' tongues.

* Bell, ut suprà, p. 137.

The general expression and features of FEAR Mr. Burke has compared to those of severe pain. Mr. Charles Bell objects to this; but Mr. Burke does not mean simple fear, but terror; which, as we observed in a former lecture, is FEAR united to an active IMAGINATION; and in this sense of the passion, Homer has frequently employed it: witness the emotion of Priam upon the first tidings of the death of Hector*: —

> Terror and consternation at the sound
> Thrill'd through all Priam's soul: erect his hair,
> Bristled his limbs, and with amaze he stood,
> Mute and all motionless.

The extreme of this kind of terror is DISTRACTION: the total wreck of hope, the terrible assurance of utter and inextricable ruin. The expression of distraction or despair must vary with the action of the distress. Sometimes it will assume a frantic and bewildered air, as if madness were likely to afford the only relief from mental agony. Sometimes there is at once a wildness in the looks, and a total relaxation and impotency of the muscles, as if the wretch were falling into insensibility; a horrid gloom, and an immovable eye, while yet he hears nothing, he sees nothing, and is unconscious of every thing around him. Such is the description of despair, as given in the well-known passage of Spenser: —

* Il. lib. xxii. 405.

The darksome cave they enter, wher they find
That cursed man, low sitting on the ground,
Musing full sadly in his sullein mind:
His griesie lockes, long growen and unbound,
Disordred hong about his shoulders round,
And hid his face, through which his hollow eyne
Lookt deadly dull, and stared as astound;
His raw-bone cheekes, through penurie and pine,
Were shronke into his iawes, as he did never dine.*

The best picture of this passion is Hogarth's, whose scene is admirably chosen, and consists of the gaming-house, with its horrible implements and furniture, in which the maddening sufferer had thrown his last stake, and met his utter ruin.

Tension, then, permanent or alternating, is the main character of the violent and repulsive passions; but if the attack be abrupt and intolerably vehement, the nervous system becomes instantaneously exhausted, as by a stroke of lightning; and the muscles are instantly relaxed, paralysed, and powerless. Milton has given us an exquisite exemplification of this in the following picture of Adam, immediately after the first deadly transgression:—

On th' other side Adam, soon as he heard
The fatal trespass done by Eve, amazed,
Astonied stood, and blank! while horror chill
Ran through his veins, and all his joints relax'd.
From his slack hand the garland wreath'd for Eve
Down dropp'd, and all the faded roses shed.
Speechless he stood, and pale.

* Faerie Queene, b. i. cant. ix. xxxv.

But let us turn to a pleasanter subject. I have said, that in the expression of the attractive passions all is flexible and pliant. Their characters are necessarily less powerful, and many of them are common to the entire class.

In perfect tranquillity and content of mind, when all the passions are lulled into a calm, and the gentle spirit of imagination alone is stirring on the surface of the mental lake, there is, as I have already observed, a softened outline, a smooth and uniform sweep of the entire figure; every feature of the body uniting in the repose of the soul. Such is often the picture of him who loves Nature for her own sake, and listens with soothing meditation, amidst the steeps, the woods, or the wilds, that stretch their romantic scenery around him; and calls for no companions, for he feels no solitude.

> To sit on rocks, to muse o'er flood and fell,
> Slowly to trace the forest's shady scene,
> Where things that own not man's dominion dwell,
> And mortal foot hath ne'er or rarely been;
> To climb the trackless mountain all unseen,
> With the wild flock that never needs a fold;
> Alone o'er steeps and foaming falls to lean;
> This is not solitude: 'tis but to hold
> Converse with Nature's charms, and see her stores unroll'd.*

But let this tranquillity be broken in upon by any of the agreeable passions, and still something of the same softness and pliancy of feature will

* Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, canto ii.

remain; and the changes will be neither numerous nor powerful. This remark may be strikingly verified by turning to Le Brun; and still more so by turning to other French pathematists, who have still further subdivided the passions. In ADMIRATION and agreeable SURPRISE, there is a slight muscular agitation; and a gentle advance to stretching or tenseness in simple ATTENTION, VENERATION, and elevated REVERY; but there is no constraint. The whole is calm, placid, and void of exertion. RAPTURE and LAUGHTER make a somewhat nearer approach to the former qualities, and especially the low broad grin of the Dutch painters; but the muscles, though stretched, are still flexible and at ease. In eager DESIRE we approximate more closely the tension of the violent and repulsive passions: but eager desire is a compound emotion; it is desire with uneasiness, and consequently borders upon pain, if it do not enter its boundary.

Hence the attractive affections are far more easy to be expressed by the painter than by the poet, and fall immediately within the range of classical sculpture, which limits itself to the calm and the dignified, and has rarely been known to wander into the regions of intensity, distortion, or violence.

The poet, incapable of catching those transient lights and shades, that unutterable play of feature into feature, by which the passions of this class are chiefly distinguished from each other,

is compelled to have recourse to collateral imagery, complex personification, or allegorical accompaniments. To this remark it will be difficult to find an exception in any writer. Let us take Collins as an example, who is one of the best and boldest of our lyric bards. His description of Hope, in his celebrated Ode to the Passions, is exquisitely fine, but, after all, somewhat indefinite; the whole of its figure being that of a beautiful nymph, with fair eyes, an enchanting smile, and wavy golden hair, accompanied with a lyre or some other instrument, for we are not told what, which she strikes to a song of future or prospective pleasure, amidst the echo of surrounding and responsive rocks, and woods, and valleys.

> But thou, O Hope, with eyes so fair,
> What was thy delighted measure?
> Still it whisper'd promised pleasure,
> And bade the lovely scenes at distance hail.
> Still would her touch the strain prolong,
> And from the rocks, the woods, the vale,
> She call'd on Echo still through all the song.
> And where her sweetest theme she chose,
> A soft responsive voice was heard at every close,
> And HOPE enchanted smiled, and waved her golden hair.

The portrait is graceful, elegant, and animated; but I may venture to say, that the only real expression of the character of Hope is derived, not from the features of her person, but from the subject of her song, the whisper of promised pleasure, the hail of distant scenes. I say not

this, however, as a proof of the imperfection of the artists, but of the art itself.

Let us try another description from the same captivating production. The *mellow horn* having just been sounded and laid down by MELANCHOLY, the poet proceeds as follows:

> But O how alter'd was its sprightlier tone
> When CHEERFULNESS, a nymph of healthiest hue,
> Her bow across her shoulders slung,
> Her buskins gemm'd with morning dew,
> Blew an inspiring air, that dale and thicket rung,
> The hunter's call, to Faun and Dryad known.
> The oak-crown'd sisters and their chaste-eyed queen,
> Satyrs and sylvan boys were seen
> Peeping from forth their alleys green;
> Brown Exercise rejoiced to hear,
> And Sport leap'd up, and seized his beechen spear.

The remark I have just made will apply to the whole of this admirable group, than which a finer or more correct and accordant was never offered to the world. The passion of CHEERFULNESS gives, indeed, a specific expression and character to the countenance that sufficiently identifies it to the beholder, and is sufficiently capable of being seized and fixed by the painter; but it is not calculated for poetry, and the only feature Mr. Collins has copied into his description is that of a *healthy hue*. But he has admirably atoned for this poverty of his art by the picturesque scenery and associates with which he has surrounded her, and in which the province of poetry has an inexhaustible mine of wealth; and

as much exceeds that of painting as painting exceeds poetry in the delineation of specific features and attitudes. Cheerfulness, though not distinguishable by the features of her person, is sufficiently made known to us by the company she keeps, by her attire, her manner, and her accoutrements.

One of the finest pictures and sweetest groupings of this allegorical kind to be met with in our own language, is contained in the following verses of Dr. Darwin's Ode to May in his Botanic Garden. They are worthy of Anacreon or Pindar.

Born in yon blaze of orient sky,
Sweet MAY, thy radiant form unfold;
Unclose thy blue, voluptuous eye,
And wave thy shadowy locks of gold.
For thee the fragrant zephyrs blow;
For thee descends the sunny shower;
The rills in softer murmurs flow,
And brighter blossoms gem the bower,
Light Graces, dress'd in flowery wreaths,
And tip-toe joys their hands combine;
While Love the fond contagion breathes,
And, laughing, dances round thy shrine.

The subject is a pleasing one; but it swells before me to infinity, and I must drop it. In the lecture for next week, we shall enter upon the doctrine of physiognomy, or the permanent influence of the mind upon the exterior of the body.

LECTURE XIII.

ON PHYSIOGNOMY AND CRANIOGNOMY, OR THE EXPRESSION OF THE TEMPER AND TALENTS.

THE ingenuity of man is never satisfied with research. In tracing out the disposition of the mind by the variable features of the face, it has been discovered that this last, though a general criterion, is not always an infallible sign. It does not in every instance, it is said, disclose even the present and acting emotion; for, in some persons, the symbols are naturally slight and evanescent; while in others, from a long and skilful course of hypocrisy and dissimulation, they are repressed, or even fraudulently exchanged, for symbols representative of affections which have no real existence. But still less do they manifest the fixed and permanent propensity of the mind, which is ever pursuing its specific drift, whatever be the transition of the passions or of the features from one character to another. And it has hence been inquired whether there may not be some soberer and less variable index by which the natural bent and tendency of the mind may be detected; a something, that no art can imitate, no dissimulation conceal, enwoven in the toughest and

hardest, as well as in the softer and more flexible parts of the body — in the very tissue and figure of the bones; and consequently which

Grows with our growth, and strengthens with our strength.

From such inquiries has arisen the study, for it can scarcely be called the science, of PHYSIOGNOMY,—*Temper indication*, or *Temper-dialling*,— for such is the meaning of physiognomy, when strictly translated. It is a figurative term, which supposes the body to be a dial-plate on which the habitual turn or bearing of the mind is shadowed by means of the index or gnomon of some fixed and prominent external distinction, which retains its power and purpose amidst all the fleeting changes of the passions, and the mask of made-up smiles and serenity.

This study is of early date, and in its descent to our own day has met with a perpetual alternation of evil report and good report, in proportion as it has acquired the favouritism or encountered the rejection of public opinion. Aristotle appears to have been the first philosopher who attempted to reduce it to any thing like a scientific pursuit, and to fix it upon any thing like permanent and undeniable principles. His definition of it is excellent: "It is the science," says he, "by which the dispositions of mankind are discoverable by the features of the body, and especially by those of the countenance." And in the developement of this pursuit

he advanced it as a leading doctrine, that a peculiar form of body is invariably accompanied by a peculiar disposition of mind; that a human intellect is never found in the corporeal form of a beast; and that the mind and body exercise a reciprocal influence over each other: referring us for examples of the former to delirium and intoxication, in which the mental follows upon the corporeal derangement; and, for examples of the latter, to the passions of fear and joy, in which the body inversely displays the affections of the mind.

As the result of this principle and illustration, he argues, and no modern writer upon the subject has ever argued more clearly, that whenever among mankind a certain bodily character appears, which by prior experience and observation has been found uniformly accompanied by a certain mental disposition, we have a right to infer that it is necessarily connected with it; and we may fairly and legitimately ascribe it to the individual that exhibits such character. And, pursuing this line of application, he tells us further, that our observations may be drawn from other animals as well as from men; for, as a lion possesses one bodily form and mental character, and a hare another, the corporeal characteristics of the lion, such as strong hair, deep voice, large extremities, when discernible in a human being, cannot fail to raise in the mind an idea of the strength and courage of that noble animal; while the slender limbs,

soft down, and other features of the hare, whenever visible or approximated among mankind, betray the mental character of that pusillanimous quadruped.

It is impossible to refuse our assent to sentiments so just and obvious; and to this extent almost every one is a physiognomist by nature; for no man can walk the streets without noticing, in the first place, a marked and striking difference between one face and another face, one form and another form; and, in the second place, without ascribing, in consequence of such difference, the possession of vigour to one person that passes by, wisdom to a second, magnanimity to a third, folly to a fourth, debility to a fifth, and meanness to a sixth.

Physiognomy, therefore, as to its general principles, has perhaps never been altogether neglected; it seems in almost every age to have influenced men's opinion and conduct in first associating with strangers; and has not unfrequently excited a favourable or an unfavourable prepossession before a word has been spoken or an action performed. As a science, though an imperfect one, it was pursued, upon the general doctrines of Aristotle, among the Greeks and Romans, till the downfall of all the sciences upon the irruption of the northern barbarians into Europe, towards the close of the fifth century; and was for a long time so systematically cultivated at Rome, that Cicero was in the habit of publicly availing himself of its force when-

ever, by employing it so as to excite contempt or hatred, it could be turned to the advantage of his client; of which we have striking examples in his orations against Piso, and in favour of Roscius; while we learn from Suetonius that the emperor Titus engaged a professed physiognomist, of the name of Narcissus, to examine the features of Britannicus as to his character and chance of success in his claims upon the empire against himself; who, it appears, gave an opinion in favour of Titus, and declared, and, according to the event, declared truly, that Britannicus would never live to assume the imperial purple.

In this curious fact of history we find physiognomy united at an early period of the Roman empire with magic or judicial astrology; and we also find that upon its revival, on the general resurrection of science about the middle of the fifteenth century, one of its first and most unfortunate occurrences was a connexion of the same kind; from which it only separated to form other and successive alliances with metaphysical theology, alchemy, the doctrine of signatures and sympathies, and the theosophy of the Mystics and Rosicrucians. So that it again fell into contempt with the most liberal and enlightened part of mankind; who, however, did not give themselves the trouble to sift the wheat from the chaff. And though occasionally started afresh in literary journals, and other publications of considerable merit and authority, as, for example, by Dr. Gwyther and Dr. Parsons in our

own Philosophical Transactions; by Pernetti and Le Cat, in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy; and in the separate writings of Lancisi, Haller, and Buffon; it was not till the appearance of the elegant and popular work of M. Lavater, the well-known dean of Zurich, that physiognomy was again able to establish itself as a scientific pursuit in the good opinion of mankind.

The two grand objects of M. Lavater were to clear physiognomy of its mystical and other adventitious connexions, and to advance it to the rank of an exact and demonstrable science. The first of these was as judicious as the second was absurd: for he himself was at the time in possession of nothing more than a certain number of detached facts or fragments, which he did not venture to communicate to the world in any higher form than that of essays. His work is chiefly distinguished by a spirit of analysis, and at times of anatomy, to which no other work on the subject had hitherto pretended. Instead of generalising the human form, and taking the features by the group, as was the case with Aristotle, and is the case with mankind at large, he aimed at separating the features from each other, and endeavoured to assign to each its peculiar bearing. And, fully believing that the general character of the mental disposition runs with a uniform and uninterrupted harmony through every feature and every organ, he frequently trusted to a single feature or a single

organ for its developement. In doing which he usually selected such as were least flexible, and by the mass of mankind least suspected; as the form of the bones, particularly those of the head or face; the shape of the ears, hands, feet, or even of the nails; and he hereby endeavoured to baffle all dissimulation, and to avoid confounding the permanent temper with those occasional flights of passion by which the flexible features are disturbed and varied.

We have not time to follow up M. Lavater's hypothesis into these points of detail, nor would it be altogether worth our while if we had. The author was a learned and most excellent man, but at the same time a man of a warm and enthusiastic imagination; and, notwithstanding that his remarks are in many respects precise, and his distinctions acute, and afford evident proof of their being the result of actual observation: and notwithstanding, moreover, that they are richly illustrated, after the laudable example of Baptista Porta, by expressive and elegant engravings, — the declamatory tenour of his style, the singularity and extravagance of many of his opinions, his peremptory and decisive tone upon the most vague and disputable topics, his puffing up trifles into matters of magnitude, and the absurd extreme to which he pushed his hypothesis, so as to make it embrace and exemplify the face and features of all nature as well as those of man and the higher ranks of quadrupeds; these and various other sproutings of the

warm and luxuriant fancy I have just referred to, prevented his work from obtaining more than a transient popularity; and it sunk beneath the attacks of M. Formey and other Continental writers, who laboured, and some of them perhaps disingenuously, to point out its defects and extravagancies.

Perhaps one of the most whimsical of M. Lavater's opinions is, that no person can make a good physiognomist unless he is a well-proportioned and handsome man; a position which seems to be altogether at variance with his own progress in the study, for the dean of Zurich had few pretensions to such a figure. Another singularity of opinion was that of his extending his physiognomic characters to the peculiarity of the hand-writing; and in this instance reviving the reveries of many of the ancient mystics, who pretended to confide in the same mark; whilst, by interweaving into the body of this science a belief in apparitions, and this, too, upon very peculiar and fanciful principles, he has indirectly connected it with the dark and exploded study of divination, from which it was one of his first and most prominent objects to separate it.

I will only farther observe, that in the wide extent to which he carried this favourite and fascinating science of his heart, he describes the whole material world as subject to its dominion; amuses us with a developement of the propensities, partialities, and ruling passions, not only of

men and quadrupeds, but of birds, fishes, reptiles, and insects, from the unequivocal language of their external expression; and makes the reputable class of tradesmen, probably without their knowledge, the deepest physiognomists in the world; for the trader, says he, when in the act of dealing, not only at once decides that his customer has an honest look, a pleasing or forbidding countenance, and trusts or forbears to trust him accordingly; but determines by its colour, its fineness, its exterior, the physiognomy of every article of traffic. How far the former part of this last remark may apply to M. Lavater's own countrymen, the honest and enlightened traders of Zurich, I will not pretend to say; but it is highly probable that there are some before me who have not always felt themselves able to read the characters of the countenance quite so well as is here supposed of them, and to whom a few additional lessons from the Zurich counting-house, or the Zurich professor, might have been every now and then of no small service in the transactions of buying and selling; and have saved them, in various instances, from bad debts and impositions.

Having pointed out these defects, it becomes me to observe, that, with all its blemishes, M. Lavater's Essays form the best and fullest book on the subject we at present possess. To say nothing of its language, which, though far too florid, is animated, and often elegant, it is a rich repository of isolated facts, shrewd re-

marks, and ingenious suggestions; and with less fancy, and more judgment, would have been, and must have been, the favourite text-book of every physiologist in this branch of natural philosophy. Nor, even as it is, can it ever be neglected by any one who is desirous of establishing physiognomy upon a permanent and sober basis; and of analysing the causes, and determining the real principles, upon which every one pretends to judge, whether rightly or wrongly, of the internal qualities of the mind, by the external features of the body; and consequently, as in the case of astronomy, gives proof that the study is founded in nature, although its specific laws have not had the good fortune, like those of gravitation, to be systematically sought out and exemplified.

It is from this last circumstance, in connexion with M. Lavater's desultory and erratic mode of handling his subject, that other philosophers have been induced to abandon altogether the common ground of the general form and features, upon which mankind in all ages, whether learned or unlearned, have hitherto reasoned, and to inquire whether there may not be some less sensible and obvious, but at the same time more fixed and scientific, more exact and immediate index in some part of the human figure, which may infallibly direct us to the same ends. No minister has hence devised more schemes for taxation, no insurance-broker more modifications for a lottery, than this general

research has given rise to — this philosophical rage

> T' expatiate free o'er all this scene of man,
> This mighty maze, but not without a plan;
> This wild where weeds and flowers promiscuous shoot;
> This garden, tempting with forbidden fruit.

Of all these attempts, however, there is but one that is in any degree worthy of notice, or that has acquired any considerable degree even of transitory popularity; and this is the hypothesis of Dr. Gall of Jena, who has been greatly indebted to his friend Dr. Spurzheim for a popular diffusion of his doctrine over most parts of Europe. This learned philosopher, being determined to deviate as far as possible from the beaten path, left the face or front of the head to the rest of the world, and took the crown and back part for his own use. He conceived, first, that as all the faculties of the mind are limited to the common sensory or organ of the brain, nature, like a skilful general, instead of confounding every part with every part, and every faculty with every faculty, has marshalled this important organ into a definite number of divisions, and has given to every faculty the command of a separate post. He conceived, secondly, as the general mass of the brain lies immediately under the cranium or scull-bone, and is impacted into its cavity with the utmost exactness, that if any one or more of the aforesaid faculties, or, which is the same thing, any one or

more of the aforesaid divisions of the brain allotted to their control, should be peculiarly forward and active, such divisions must necessarily grow more abundant, and give some external token of such abundance by a constant pressure against those particular portions of the cranium under which they are immediately seated, and which, by uninterrupted perseverance, and especially in infancy and early life, when the bones of the cranium yield or are absorbed easily, they must elevate and render more prominent than any other part. * And, thirdly, he conceived, that every man having some faculty or other more marked or active than the rest, or, in his own phraseology, more sensibly manifested, from which, indeed, his peculiar disposition or propensity takes its cast, must necessarily also have some peculiar prominence, some characteristic bump or embossment, by which his head is distinguishable from all others, or at least from all others of a different temper, or attracted by different objects of pursuit; and that nothing more is necessary than to determine the respective regions of the different faculties which belong to the brain, in order to determine at

* "It seems to me, that at least a great part of every organ lies at the surface; and that if the part of any organ be well developed, the whole participates of this developement." — Spurzheim, Physiognom. System, p. 264. In p. 240., he admits, however, that "the organs are not confined to the surface."

the same time, from the external bump or prominence, the internal propensity or character.

These premises being in his own mind satisfactorily established, Dr. Gall next set to work with a view of deciding the relative parts of the brain possessed by the different faculties or their respective sentient organs. And having settled this important point to his own thorough conviction, he immediately made a map of the outside of the head, divided it into corresponding regions, and was able, in his own opinion, to indicate to a demonstration the characteristic temper or tendency of every man presented to him by a mere glance of the eye, or a mere touch of the finger. For, in the language of Dr. Spurzheim, "in order to distinguish the developement of the organs, it is not always necessary to touch the head; in many cases the eye is sufficient." *

Let me not, however, do injustice to the talents of the inventor of this hypothesis. For he is not only possessed of a lively ingenuity and fancy, as his speculation, thus far unfolded, must suggest to every one, but he is also a man of learning, and of patient and indefatigable research. And such is the plausibility of his scheme, that he has contrived to enlist under his banners not a few philosophers and physiologists of considerable eminence and merit, among whom I may especially mention Dr. Bojames, who was one of the first to publish an

* Physiog. Syst. p. 261.

account of this singular line of study to the world, and, as already observed, Dr. Spurzheim, who is at this moment lecturing upon the subject in this metropolis. *

The allotments of the different parts of the brain, and the consequent laying down of the outside of the cranium into a superficial map of mental qualities or sensations, was a work of great patience and investigation. To accomplish it, hundreds, perhaps thousands of human sculls, of known characters and propensities, were examined, and their peculiar impressions, whe-

* This lecture was delivered at the time of Dr. Spurzheim's first visit to England, for the purpose of illustrating his hypothesis, which has certainly possessed every advantage of which it is susceptible from his exertions and talents. Yet it is well known, that scarcely an individual among the more distinguished anatomists or physiologists of our own country have been led to adopt his views. To the discrepancy of Sir Everard Home's conceptions the author will have occasion to advert in a subsequent note. The following is the opinion of Mr. Charles Bell in his very excellent paper on the nerves of the orbit of the eye, as contained in the Philosophical Transactions for 1823, p. 306. "But the most extravagant departure from all the legitimate modes of reasoning, though still under the colour of anatomical investigation, is the system of Dr. Gall. It is sufficient to say, that, without comprehending the grand divisions of the nervous system; without a notion of the distinct properties of the individual nerves; or, without having made any distinction of the columns of the spinal marrow; without even having ascertained the difference of cerebrum and cerebellum, Gall proceeded to describe the brain as composed of many particular and independent organs, and to assign to each the residence of some special faculty."

ther prominences or indentations, were noticed and arranged. These were afterwards compared with the respective tempers and inclinations of the particular subjects while alive; and the whole tried by the craniognomy, as it was called, of other animals celebrated, in common language, for the acuteness of their respective instincts; but, in the language of Dr. Gall, for the acuteness of their predominant organs of sensation; in whose sculls correspondent symbols were observed, or supposed to be observed.

The whole was hence reduced to one regular system: the brain was found to consist of thirty-three separate parts or chambers, and consequently the superincumbent cranium was divided into as many sections, from the lowest part of the back of the head, over the crown, to the orbits of the eyes. It is not my intention to dwell upon any of these chambers or superficial sections. To enumerate them, with a few explanatory hints, is all we can find space for; and even this, I am afraid, cannot be done without an occasional verification of the poet's remark, that there may be situations in which, although

> To laugh is want of goodliness and grace,
> Yet to be grave exceeds all power of face.

The following is the classification of the different mental powers of the brain, and the order in which they lie, according to the table of Dr. Bojames, one of Dr. Gall's earliest and most assiduous pupils, commencing, as I have already

observed, at the lowest part of the back of the head. I. Organ of tenacity of life. II. Of self-preservation. III. Selection of food. IV. Organ of the external senses. V. Instinctive sexual union. VI. Organ of the mutual love of parents and their offspring. VII. Organ of friendship. VIII. Organ of courage. IX. Organ of murder or assassination. X. Of cunning. XI. Circumspection. XII. Vanity, conceit, or self-love. XIII. Love of glory. XIV. Love of truth. XV. General memory, otherwise called sense of places and things. XVI. Painting, or sense of colours. XVII. Sense of numbers. XVIII. Musical sense. XIX. Sense for mechanics. XX. Verbal memory. XXI. Sense for languages. XXII. Memory of persons. XXIII. Liberality. XXIV. Talent for satire. XXV. Talent for comparing things. XXVI. Metaphysical talent. XXVII. Talent for observation. XXVIII. Goodness. XXIX. Theatrical talent. XXX. Theosophy. XXXI. Perseverance. The remaining two to complete the thirty-three being, at the time Dr. Bojames wrote, unappropriated; a sort of terra incognita, which the master of the system had not yet sufficiently explored, but one of which he subsequently discovered to be, the natural organ for theft or stealing. * A few alterations have since been made in the general arrangement, both by Dr. Gall himself and by several of his pupils,

* The Physiognomonical System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, &c. p. 280. 8vo. Lond. 1815.

especially by Dr. Spurzheim, but of no essential moment in a cursory survey.*

It is not a little singular that men should be supposed to be provided by nature with express organs for the cultivation of murder and theft; terms which are softened down by Dr. Spurzheim, in his own catalogue, into the words DESTRUCTIVENESS and COVETISENESS; but which, in the body of his work, he treats of under the common and more intelligible names.

The proofs of these organs have been laboured with peculiar force, and not without some apology for their formation. "Our opponents," says Dr. Spurzheim, "maintain that such a doctrine is both ridiculous and dangerous; ridiculous, because nature could not produce any faculty absolutely hurtful to man; dangerous, because it would permit what is punished as a crime by the laws. Gall was accustomed to answer, nobody can deny the facts which prove that theft exists; and as it exists, it is *not* against the will of the Creator; and there are very few per-

* The table, as modified by Dr. Spurzheim, gives us the following arrangement. 1. Order of amativeness. 2. Philoprogenitiveness. 3. Inhabitiveness. 4. Adhesiveness. 5. Combativeness. 6. Destructiveness. 7. Constructiveness. 8. Covetiseness. 9. Secretiveness. 10. Self-love. 11. Approbation. 12. Cautiousness. 13. Benevolence. 14. Veneration. 15. Hope. 16. Ideality. 17. Conscientiousness. 18. Firmness. 19. Individuality. 20. Form. 21. Size. 22. Weight. 23. Colour. 24. Space. 25. Order. 26. Time. 27. Number. 28. Tune. 29. Language. 30. Comparison. 31. Causality. 32. Wit. 33. Imitation.

sons who have never stolen any thing. The organ is, moreover, very considerable in inveterate thieves."*

The morality here offered is certainly not of the purest kind. It directly avows that the Creator has given an express sanction and countenance to robbery and murder by the construction both of the body and mind; by natural organs and propensities for the commission of these crimes. It cannot, indeed, be denied, that God has *willed* them, for nothing can take place contrary to his will. But there is a little logical nicety or special pleading in this assertion, and it is necessary to recall to our recollection what I endeavoured to prove in a late lecture †, that the WILL and the DESIRE are two distinct attributes; though in ordinary language confounded and used synonymously. It is true, then, that God has willed robbery and murder; but it is equally true that he has not desired them: it is equally true that he has most positively expressed his desire upon the subject, and has forbidden them under the severest threats. Our duty, therefore, is to attend to the prohibition: our moral conduct is to be collected from his desire, and not from his will, excepting where the word will is employed in its popular sense, and synonymously with desire. The professors of this new physiognomy, however, having

* Physiolog. System, &c. p. 398. 8vo. Lond. 1815.

† Vol III. Ser. III. Lect. VIII.

thus advanced their peculiar doctrine upon the subject before us, endeavour to illustrate it by copious examples of persons, who, from being endowed with the stealing bump and stealing organ, had a peculiar and irresistible propensity to rob and plunder. Among these, Dr. Spurzheim introduces various characters whom we should not very readily have suspected of belonging to a gang of thieves. He tells us of a chaplain in a Prussian regiment, a man of great intelligence and ability, who *could not avoid* (for these are his words) stealing handkerchiefs from the officers at the parade. He informs us, that Victor Amadeus I., king of Sardinia, took every where objects of little importance; and, what will still more astonish the audience before me, that M. Saurin, the Genevese pastor, though acquainted with the best principles of reason and religion, was overcome continually by this propensity to steal. He has given us, however, no authority for this last assertion; and no such calumny should be believed without full proof.

There is, indeed, an endeavour, on the part of Dr. Spurzheim, though I do not find he is supported by any of his colleagues, to let down, in some degree, this charge against nature and the Author of nature, by telling us, that though the organs exist that bear these names and produce a specific propensity, they do not urge on the individual to the actual commission of great crimes of this kind till they are very largely developed,

and the developement has not been controlled by other facultiés, which he seems to intimate may have an influence upon them. "These functions," says he, "are ABUSES, which result from the highest degree of activity of certain organs, which are not directed by other faculties." Now, in the first place, it should seem, by his own examples, that other faculties have very little control over the master-organ or propensity at any time: for, even admitting the truth of his extraordinary anecdote concerning M. de Saurin, there can be no doubt that all his faculties of morality and religion were habitually at work in repugnancy to his faculty of thieving, and yet, according to Dr. Spurzheim, to no purpose. But, secondly, the learned writer exhibits a strange inconsistency, in regarding the full developement of a function "as the abuse of a function." The function is a natural power; its growth is a natural power; and hence its full developement, or "the highest activity of the organ," instead of being an ABUSE of such organ or function, ought only to be regarded as its NATURAL PERFECTION. And, lastly, let the matter be how it may, the man, even in his moral character, is passive under every stage of its progress; or, in the more tangible and explicit language of M. Magendie, "Il est impossible de se changer à cet égard. NOUS RESTONS TELS QUE LA NATURE NOUS A FAITS."*

* Précis Elémentaire, 2 toms. 8vo. Paris, 1816, 1817.

Not a few persons will, perhaps, be surprised at finding, that nature has likewise kindly provided us with an impulsory organ for theatrical amusements; and that she thus seems satisfactorily to have settled the lawfulness and expediency, so eloquently and forcibly controverted by the learned Bossuet, about a century ago, of frequenting theatres and encouraging the drama.

The relative position, moreover, of the different organs I have thus far noticed, is an object of no small curiosity. In the map of the scull those of murder and thieving lie immediately next to those of friendship and courage; while the region for comedies and farces lies directly between the boundaries of moral goodness and theosophy or religion: concerning which last Dr. Bojames expresses himself as follows: "The organ of theosophy occupies the most elevated part of the os frontis. All the portraits of saints which have been preserved from former ages afford very instructive examples; and, if this character be wanting in any one of them, it will certainly be destitute of expression. It is excessively developed in *religious fanatics, and in men who have become recluse through superstition* and religious motives. It is the seat of this organ," continues he, with a subtlety of reasoning worthy of Aquinas, "which, according to Dr. Gall, has induced men to consider their gods as above them, or in a more elevated part of the heavens; for otherwise," he adds, "there is no more reason

for supposing that God exists above the world than below it."

The theological world cannot but be infinitely obliged to Dr. Gall and Dr. Bojames for this new and unanswerable proof of the divine existence. God, it seems, exists, and must exist, because many men have a bump upon the crown of the head which these philosophers choose to call a religious bump. Dr. Gall, indeed, contends openly that this organ "is THE MOST EVIDENT PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD." I quote the words of his learned colleague Dr. Spurzheim*, who is perpetually using the word proof in the vaguest manner possible, though a manner common to the school. "In general," says Gall, in continuation, "every other faculty of man and animals has an object which it may accomplish. Can it, then, be probable that God does not exist, while there is an organ of religion? HENCE GOD EXISTS."

The next benefit we obtain from the discovery of this important organ and embossment is, that it settles the long-contested question concerning the nature and extent of the divine residence — the locality or ubiquity of the Deity. God, it seems, must exist *above* us, for the religious bump is on the top of the scull; and he cannot exist any where else than above us, because there is no religious bump in any other direction.

* Physiolog. Syst. ut supr. p. 414.

The noble catholicism, moreover, of this incontrovertible proof cannot fail to be matter of the highest gratification; a catholicism that puts that of Christianity to the blush, at the thought of its own narrowness; for the demonstration before us extends equally to all gods, and to all religions: it is *found*, we are told, in the portraits of *saints;* but it is most *highly developed* in religious *fanatics*, and in men who have become recluse though *superstition*. Surely if Dr. Gall or Dr. Bojames had looked a little more closely, they might have discovered that the still vacant region (vacant, at least, at that time) is the seat of absurdity or folly, and that some heads they are acquainted with are not without its mental manifestation. There is not quite so much, perhaps, to condemn in Dr. Spurzheim's remarks upon the same organ; for this most able advocate of the school thinks more clearly, and writes more cautiously in the main; but he also very closely touches, at times, upon the region of absurdity, if he do not absolutely fall into its boundary; and, in uniting the name of our Saviour with that of Jupiter, seems to show, that the same cast of religion, as well as of moral philosophy, is common to the school. His remarks are as follows: "The pictures of the saints show the very configuration of those pious men whom Gall had first observed. It is also in this respect remarkable that the head of Christ is always represented as very elevated. *Have we the real picture of Christ?* Have artists given to

the head of Christ a configuration which they have observed in religious persons, or have *they composed this figure from internal inspiration?* Has the *same sentiment* among *modern* artists given to Christ an elevation of head, as among the ancient it conferred a prominence of the forehead upon JUPITER? At all events, the shape of the head of Christ contributes to PROVE this organization." *

Now in this very singular passage there are three propositions, concerning which, it is difficult to say which is to be admired most; a *proof* deduced from queries, which the author is incapable of answering; the idea that our Saviour possibly sat for his picture; and the idea that modern artists are possibly *inspired* when they paint his image from their own conceptions. I must leave the reader to make his own comments (for I dare not trust myself upon the subject) concerning the edifying resemblance which is here pointed out between the head of the Saviour of the world and that of the JUPITER of the Greek poets; and the unity of SENTIMENT which has ever, it seems, prevailed between ancient and modern artists, when engaged in studying these *sacred* models. †

* Physiolog. Syst. p. 412.

† It is always amusing, and sometimes instructive, to trace the learned rovings of different philosophical imaginations, when indulging in a like pursuit; to mark the point from which they set out, and follow up the parallelism or divergency of their respective courses, when aiming at a common

In seriousness and sobriety, however, it is not a little extraordinary, not only that folly or absurdity, but that wisdom, hypocrisy, gluttony, drunkenness, sensuality, mirth, melancholy, and some dozens of other powers and faculties of the most common kind, should have no chamber allotted to them, no protuberance or manifestation, in the hypothesis before us. During an interview I had some months ago with Dr. Spurzheim, I started this difficulty for explanation; but

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goal. Sir Everard Home, whom every one will allow to be as deeply versed in the internal structure and the external mapping of the brain as either Dr. Gall or Dr. Spurzheim, seems also, from a late article in the Philosophical Transactions (1821, p. 31.), to have felt a tendency to the study of phrenology. But from the only two regions he appears yet to have visited in his new voyage of discovery, his bearings are likely to be in every respect widely different from those of the German navigators, and calculated to lead to very different results. These regions are the supposed natural seats of MEMORY and CONCUPISCENCE. While Dr. Gall and Dr. Spurzheim fix the first of these, as far as they are able to ascertain its dominion, between the nose and the forehead (Spurz. p. 427.), Sir Everard has had to pursue his course into a far higher latitude, and did not reach it till he arrived at the vertex of the scull, that very region which the German craniognomists have already taken possession of for the faculty of *religious veneration*, as just noticed in the text: at the same time, that while these skilful explorers have decidedly fixed the organ of CONCUPISCENCE at the nape of the neck, the *ultima Thule*, or lowermost extremity of the cranial sphere (p. 344), Sir Everard has found it at its sinciput or highest point of the forehead; bordering, indeed, where we should little have expected it, upon the region of memory or religious veneration, according to Dr. Gall's hypothesis.

his reply was at least not satisfactory to myself. It may be sufficient to observe, as a single example, that for the organ of gluttony he referred us to the stomach; but this is rather to evade than to meet the difficulty. The stomach is unquestionably the organ of hunger, as the eye is of sight, and the ear of hearing; but if the painter, who derives a pleasure of a peculiar nature from the eye, as in the case of colours; or the musician, who derives a pleasure of a peculiar nature from the ear, as in the case of sounds, have an express chamber in the brain, by which such peculiar pleasure is alone excited, and on which it alone depends, so ought the glutton, who derives a pleasure of a peculiar nature from the stomach. While, if there be no such cerebral region or chamber in the brain, and, consequently, no external developement or manifestation of gluttony, or any of the other feelings or sentiments I have just glanced at, the system itself, even admitting its general truth, must be so far imperfect and unavailing: it must dwindle into a half science, and be more liable to lead us astray than aright.

There is also another powerful objection, which I will beg leave to state, as I stated it at the same time to the learned lecturer I have just alluded to, though, so far as appeared to myself, without a successful solution. It is this. The strictly obvious or natural divisions of the brain are but three; for we meet with three, and only three distinct masses, — the cerebrum or brain

properly so called, the cerebel or little brain, and the oblongated marrow. The first, as we have formerly observed, constitutes the largest and uppermost part; the second lies below and behind; the third level with the second, and in front of it; it appears to be a projection issuing equally from the two other parts, and gives birth to the spinal marrow, which is thus proved to be a continuation of the brain extended through the whole chain of the spine or back-bone.

Now as the brain consists naturally of three, and only three distinct parts, it may be allowable and pertinent to suppose that each of these parts is allotted to some distinct purpose; as, for example, that of forming the seat of thinking, or of the soul; the seat of the local senses of sight, sound, taste, and smell; and the seat of that general feeling which is diffused all over the body; but as the nice hand of the anatomist has confounded even so rational a speculation as this, by proving that many of the nerves productive of different functions originate in the same division of the brain, while others, limited to a single function, originate in different divisions of it*; as it has hereby shown that we know nothing of the reason of this palpable conformation, nor the respective share which each of these grand divisions takes in producing the general effect, — how fanciful and presumptuous must it be to partition each or any one of these divisions into

* See Stud. of Med. vol. iv. p. 6. 2d edit.

a number of imaginary regions, and to guess, for after all, it comes to nothing more, at the respective duties allotted to these boundaries of our own conceit!

But the most serious, or perhaps I should rather say the most *ludicrous*, and as it appears to me the most fatal objection to this hypothesis, is the extraordinary fact that the different professors of it cannot agree in dividing the brain, or in mapping the scull-bone; some of them telling us, that a bump or protuberance in a given situation imports one faculty, and others, that it imports another faculty; while one or two of them have, at different times, assigned different faculties or manifestations to the same bump. The organ which Dr. Gall at first called that of courage, he afterwards denominated that of quarrelsomeness, and still later that of self-defence. Now the qualities of self-defence and of quarrelsomeness are as opposite as those of light and darkness; while that of courage is distinct from both of them. So the organ of the theatrical talent he afterwards detected to be, and consequently denominated it, the organ of poetry; and Dr. Spurzheim has since found out that even this name, to adopt his own words, "does not indicate the essential faculty of the organ,"* which is rather that of fancy or imagination; and he has hence called it the organ of ideality. Gall asserts that there is no separate organ for

* Physiolog. Syst. p. 417.

: Spurzheim contends that there is, and that its protuberance lies near the crown of the head. Gall asserts that nature has furnished us with one region or propensity for assassination or murder, and two for thieving or stealing — daring and audacious stealing, and cunning circumspect stealing. Spurzheim is more moderate: he contends that nature has given us but one for each, and maintains that the second stealing bump of Gall manifests nothing more than a general propensity to reserve or secrecy.* Gall makes the same organ which impels various animals, as the chamois or wild goat, to prefer lofty situations, indicative of pride or self-love in man. This, in Bojames's table, is denominated the region of vanity or conceit; but as such a term will not cover the idea of fondness for elevated situations, Dr. Gall has since called it the region of haughtiness. Now this would do well enough for a conundrum-maker: — why is a wild goat like a proud man? because it is fond of what is haughty or lofty;—but such quirks and punnings are altogether unworthy of the dignity of serious philosophy. Dr. Spurzheim, indeed, has felt it so; but then he has still further confounded the hypothesis, by honestly confessing, in the first place, that he does not know where the organ that impels us to prefer one place rather than another resides, though he apprehends there is such an organ; whilst he positively affirms that

* Physiolog. Syst. pp. 400. 402.

the bump or protuberance of self-love or pride lies in another part of the head than that affirmed by his colleague and master.

"Who shall decide when doctors disagree?"

A thousand other objections and inconsistencies, each of them perhaps fatal to the hypothesis, might be pointed out, if we had time. I may especially ask, since murder and thieving have express organs in the brain, how it comes to pass that lying, and swearing, and backbiting have not equal organs? If the mechanic and the painter have organs that specifically identify them, why has not the haberdasher and the tailor? the latter more especially, since, as it has lately been attempted to be proved, by a learned writer on the subject, that the calling of the tailor is the oldest of all professions whatever; "a calling," says he, "that commenced immediately after the fall: for it was then that mankind sewed fig-leaves together, and made themselves clothes."

Even upon the subject of the religious bump, upon which I have said so much already, the professors of the new school cannot altogether agree; for while Dr. Gall and Dr. Bojames affirm that this protuberance on the top of the head indicates the existence of a God, and is the most cogent proof mankind possess of such existence, Dr. Spurzheim contends that it is no proof whatever — that his friends have mistaken the quality—and that it indicates neither religion

nor morality; both which, it seems, in the opinion of this enlightened philosopher, have nothing to do with each other: for, "one man," says Dr. Spurzheim, "may be religious without being just, and another may be just without being religious."* Dr. Spurzheim gives to this protuberance, therefore, a different and a far ampler scope, so as to cover, as all his names do, fifty or a hundred qualities at the same time. He calls it, indeed, the organ of veneration, which at first sight appears to have an approach to the name given it by Gall and Bojames; but then he especially tells us, "that this faculty does not determine the object to be venerated, nor the manner of venerating; and that it equally includes the veneration of God, of saints, of persons, or any thing else, however mean or contemptible." Yet this is the organ which Dr. Spurzheim has supposed to have been peculiarly developed in the head of the Saviour. As some amends, however, for his philosophical apostasy upon this point, he makes Dr. Gall's organ of *moral* goodness, in his explanation, the organ of *Christian* charity†, for so he expresses himself; introduces a new organ, which Gall will not allow, and a bump which Gall cannot find out, to indicate religious hope and faith, and which he places next to Gall's religious bump; at the same time totally defeating the value of his *amende honorable* by adding, that this organ

* Physiolog. Syst. p. 415. † Id. p. 416.

of faith and hope, "in persons ENDOWED with it in a higher degree," manifests credulity." *

Such, then, are a few of the inconsistencies of the new hypothesis, and the discordancies of its different professors with each other.

But it may be replied, that there is no reasoning against facts; that the gentlemen I allude to are men of learning and character; and that they have actually determined the moral propensities of a multitude of persons, by a reference to the rules of their own art. I admit the learning and character of these gentlemen, and most freely pay homage to them on this score; but these qualities, though a full security against voluntarily deceiving others, is no proof whatever against self-deception.

There is no science, perhaps, among those professed formerly, and held in the highest estimation, which has fallen into more contempt than that of judicial astrology. Yet this, when it was in fashion, was for ages embraced by men of the greatest learning and talents, and of unblemished integrity; and who, in a thousand instances, foretold events that actually came to pass; and persuaded themselves that they foretold them by the rules of their own art. Such, to confine ourselves to times comparatively recent, were Baptista Porta, Cardan, and Kepler, of the sixteenth century: the first, the most distinguished scholar, and the two last the most distinguished mathematicians of their age; and such were the Abbé de Rancé, the celebrated founder of the

* Phisiolog. Syst. p. 416.

monastery of La Trappe, and our own two learned countrymen and poets Cowley and Dryden, in the seventeenth century. And let the school before us, therefore, boast as much as they may upon this subject, we can bring far more numerous instances of individuals as honest, as successful, and incomparably more learned, who have devoted themselves to a science which is now utterly abandoned by every man in the possession of his senses. To talk, therefore, of the *occasional* success of the physiognomists before us, is to add not a barley-corn to the scale in their favour; since right they must sometimes be, upon the common doctrine of chances and the very nature of things; right they may sometimes be, from the common physiognomy of the face; right they may still more frequently be, from the artful and sweeping amplitude of the reply which may be made to cover a variety of tempers or propensities at the same time; and necessarily and infallibly right they do not profess to be.

The whole, in truth, is founded on hypothesis: here it begins, and here it ends; hypothesis, too, unsettled and disputed, in many of its points, among themselves. And yet, planting their feet upon this tottering and unsteady ground, they are perpetually uttering the proud and lofty words *science*, *proof*, and *demonstration*; than which a more palpable or grosser abuse of terms can never be employed or conceived.

In few words, how grossly imperfect must be

the range and condition of that science, which, upon their own showing, is capable of deciphering to us, that this man is a good musician; that a good painter; a third, a good linguist; a fourth, a good dramatist; a fifth, a good theologian; a sixth, a good murderer; and a seventh a good thief; and that any or all these may at the same time be ambitious, or courageous, or conceited, or cunning; while, if you ask them whether they are good liars, good backbiters, or good swearers; whether they are inclined to gluttony or sensuality, to wisdom or folly, to sympathy or hypocrisy, to timidity or confidence, to mirth or to melancholy; characters, the one or the other of which apply to every one you meet with, whether abroad or at home, they are compelled to acknowledge that their physiognomy or craniognomy does not extend to any one of these qualities, and that nature has either forgotten to put them into the catalogue with which the head is covered, or has marked them so bunglingly and obscurely, that they cannot read the writing.

LECTURE XIV.

ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE PASSIONS.

II

In an early lecture in the present series I observed that the passions, when called forth and operating, discover themselves by a double influence upon the organs of the body, the EXPRESSION OF THE FEATURES, and the CHARACTER OF THE LANGUAGE. The first we have already noticed; let the second serve as a subject for the lecture before us.

That the presence and operation of the passions give a peculiar style and animation to the language must have been observed by every one who has paid the slightest attention either to his own feelings, or to those of the world around him. The man who is in a state of calm and tranquillity will always have his ideas flow in a calm and tranquil current, and express them in an easy and uniform *tenour*. But let him be roused by some sudden and violent insult, or by some unexpected stroke of overwhelming joy or sorrow, and the tempest of his soul will give a corresponding tempest to his utterance. His speech, instead of being mild and uniform, will be vehement, energetic, exclamatory, and abrupt; his judgment will be borne down, his imagina-

tion ascendant; the face of nature will, in consequence, assume a new aspect, presenting a distorted, an unduly bright, or an unduly saddened picture, according to the nature of the predominant emotion; and the phraseology will partake of the colouring, and become proportionably figurative and fanciful.

This is not a sketch of any particular age or country, but of all ages and all countries; it is a sketch of mankind at large; and we draw from it these two conclusions: first, that the natural language of the passions is strong, ardent, and abrupt; or broken into short sentences or versicles; full of figure and imagination, and consequently possessing all the radical characters of poetry: and, secondly, that we may expect to meet with the boldest and most frequent use of this kind of language in those periods of every nation in which the passions have been most unrestrained and luxuriant, and therefore in their earliest and least cultivated state; for we have already seen, that in this state the most vehement and energetic passions are in perpetual play and activity.

Now the whole history of the world will confirm us in these two general corollaries; and it has hence been said, and in a restricted sense said truly, that the language of poetry is older than that of prose. Its principles are founded in nature, and in nature in her simplest and most unsophisticated state; and it is to these principles mankind uniformly recur, whenever

hurried by a violent shock of feeling from the polished tameness and monotony of colloquial speech. It is then we return to exclamations, interrogations, broken sentences, bold and daring comparisons; and, whether we be indifferent to the world or not, succeed in interesting it in our fate and condition.

Where, among uncultivated tribes, the passions chiefly called into exercise have been of the pleasurable and sprightly kind, such as we have already seen are the natural result of warmth and beneficence of climate, of tranquil scenery, and an atmosphere perfumed by the rival odours of spontaneous blossoms and balsams, the rude burst of delight has assumed a more regular or measured character, and been uttered in the form of chant or brisk melody, with such corresponding attitudes or movements of the body as might best co-operate in proving the exuberant gaiety of the heart. And hence music and dancing are nearly of as early origin as poetry: they were prompted by the same impulse, and had a direct tendency to heighten each other's power; while ingenuity soon taught the more dexterous of the tribes to imitate musical sounds by the invention of the simple instruments of pipes and rebecks. The Greek philosophers ingeniously and perhaps correctly ascribed the first carols of the human voice to an imitation of the wild notes of the birds; and the first idea of musical instruments to the occasional whispers of the breeze amongst beds of hollow reeds.

Lucretius has expressed himself upon this subject with so much sweetness, that I lament the constraint I feel under of quoting him before a popular audience rather in a translation than in his native beauty and elegance; yet the following verses will, I presume, give a faint idea of the high merit of the original.

And from the liquid warblings of the birds
Learn'd they their first rude notes, ere music yet
To the rapt ear had tuned the measured verse;
And Zephyr, whispering through the hollow reeds,
Taught the first swains the hollow reeds to sound;
Whence woke they soon those tender-trembling tones
Which the sweet pipe, when by the fingers press'd,
Pours o'er the hills, the vales, the woodlands wild,
Haunts of lone shepherds and the rural gods.
Thus soothed they every care, with music thus
Closed every meal, for rests the bosom then.
And oft they threw them on the velvet grass,
Near gliding streams, by shadowy trees o'erarch'd,
And, though no gold was theirs, found still the means
To gladden life. But chief when genial Spring
Led forth her laughing train, and the young year
Painted the meads with roseate flowers profuse,—
Then mirth, and wit, and wiles, and frolic, chief
Flow'd from the heart; for then the rustic Muse
Warmest inspired them; then convivial sport
Taught round their heads, their shoulders, taught to twine
Foliage, and flowers, and garlands, richly dight;
To loose, innumerous time their limbs to move,
And beat with sturdy foot maternal earth;
While many a smile and many a laughter loud
Told all was new, and wondrous much esteem'd.
Thus wakeful lived they; cheating of its rest
The drowsy midnight; with the jocund dance
Mixing gay converse, madrigals, and strains,

Run o'er the reeds with broad recumbent lip:
As, wakeful still, our revellers through night
Lead on their defter dance to time precise,
Yet cull not costlier sweets, with all their art,
Than the rude offspring earth in woodlands bore. *

Nature is ever the same; and hence music, and dancing, and poetry, and impassioned language are to be found at this moment, in all their energy and irregular wildness, among the barbarians of North America, those of the Polynesian islands, and even the negro tribes of Africa; while not unfrequently we hear an equally daring and figurative diction, though of a very different kind, vented by the last in a state of Mexican or West Indian slavery, alternately intermixed with terrible execrations on the heads of their cruel task-masters, and with the most piteous longings for freedom and their native land.

In like manner it existed, and was even cultivated with systematic attention, among the earliest savages of the hyperboreal snows, the Goths, Scythians, or Scandinavians; nor less so among the Celtic tribes of Gaul, Britain, and Ireland. The scalds of the former, and the bards or druids of the latter, were always held in the highest dignity and admiration; their persons were esteemed sacred; their rhapsodies were in measured flow, and had an enthusiastic effect in

* At liquidas avium voces imitarier ore
Ante fuit multo, quam lævia carmina cantu, &c.
Lib. v. 1378.

rousing their fellow-countrymen to arms, to religious rites, or funeral lamentations; in rehearsing the dangers they had encountered, and the victories they had gained; and in stimulating them to a contempt of torment and death under every shape, in the high career of heroic exploits, and the glory of living in the national hymns of future ages.

Such was the death-song of Regner Lodbrok, a Danish prince of the eighth century, and one of the most celebrated scalds of his day. It mischanced the warrior to fall into the hands of his enemies, by whom he was thrown into prison, and condemned to be destroyed by serpents. In this situation he solaced himself with rehearsing all the exploits of his life; and the following is a part of the ferocious verses he composed in the immediate prospect of the fate reserved for him, translated word for word by Olaus Wormius from the Runic original: "He only regrets this life who has never known distress: he who aspires to the love of virgins, ought always to be foremost in the roar of arms. In the halls of our father Balder (or Odin) I know there are seats prepared, where in a short time we shall drink ale out of the hollow sculls of our enemies. In the house of the mighty Odin no brave man laments death. I come not with the voice of despair to Odin's hall."

Mr. Gray has been peculiarly happy in inspiriting the old patriotic bard of Cambria with a similar contempt of death. The entire de-

scription is well known to every one; but it cannot be too often repeated, and ought not to be neglected on the present occasion. The picture of his standing on the battlements of Conway Castle, and terrifying the English conqueror with his dying prophecy, as the latter was descending the shaggy steep of Snowdon, is exquisite and inimitable.

> On a rock, whose haughty brow
> Frowns o'er old Conway's foaming flood,
> Robed in the sable garb of woe,
> With haggard eyes the poet stood,
> (Loose his beard and hoary hair
> Stream'd, like a meteor to the troubled air),
> And with a master's hand and prophet's fire
> Struck the deep sorrows of his lyre.

The detail of the prophecy is too long for quotation; but the following fragments, which form its opening and ending, ought by no means to be omitted.

> Ruin seize thee, ruthless king!
> Confusion on thy banners wait!
> Though, fann'd by Conquest's crimson wing,
> They mock the air with idle state!
> Helm, nor hawberk's twisted mail,
> Nor e'en thy virtues, tyrant! shall avail
> To save thy secret soul from nightly fears —
> From Cambria's curse, from Cambria's tears!
> — Fond, impious man! think'st thou yon sanguine cloud,
> Raised by thy breath, has quench'd the orb of day?
> To-morrow he repairs the golden flood,
> And warms the nations with redoubled ray.

Enough for me! — with joy I see
The different doom our fates assign.
Be thine despair, and sceptred care —
To triumph and to die are mine. —
He spoke: and headlong from the mountain's height
Deep in the roaring tide he plunged to endless night.

The first of these descriptions is derived from a people of Gothic or Scythian origin, whose ferocity of manners I have formerly pointed out, and endeavoured to account for: the second refers to a race of Celts or Cymbrians, for the most part of milder affections, and some tribes of which appear at a very early era of their history, and even in the infancy of civilisation, to have evinced a tenderness of sentiment, a fecundity of imagery, and a cultivation of style, that are truly wonderful, and have never been satisfactorily accounted for. And I now particularly allude to the traditional poems of the Highlands and the adjoining isles, so well known from Mr. Macpherson's translation, and occasional interweavings. Such is the elegance and delicacy of taste, as well as sublime genius and national enthusiasm, of these singular productions, that Dr. Johnson, as many of us may perhaps recollect, was to the last an infidel as to their genuineness. The first, however, has been sufficiently ascertained of late by the indefatigable and valuable exertions of the Highland Society, formed for the express purpose of inquiring into the nature and authenticity of the poems of Ossian, the Homer of the Highlands;

whose report has been published by Mr. Mackenzie, their liberal and enlightened chairman. They have sufficiently established the important fact that Ossian is not an imaginary being; that his name and general history are at this moment preserved by tradition over the whole of the Highlands and the Hebrides; and that several of his poems, to an extent of many hundred lines, as literally rendered by Macpherson, still live in the memory of many of the oldest inhabitants, of the simplest manners, and who are incapable either of writing or reading, having been taught them by their fathers in early life, as their fathers had in like manner received them from a long line of progenitors through an immemorial period. These poems, or fragments of poems, have in various instances been taken down in the original Gaelic, from the mouths of the venerable reciters, by persons of the greatest respectability, many of them appointed for this purpose by the Society I am now speaking of, and on being compared with each other, and with Macpherson's version, have been found to possess a close and literal agreement, in many instances through a range of some hundreds of lines, particularly in the important poems of Caricthura and Fingal. While, to enable the public to form a fuller judgment upon the subject, and to free themselves from every charge of prejudice, the committee, in their very excellent report, have not only given an unmutilated copy of their correspondence, but extensive specimens of the

original Gaelic itself, together with a new and verbal translation as well as Mr. Macpherson's version.

Against such evidence it is impossible to shut our eyes; and, admitting it, we must conclude with the committee, that, though Mr. Macpherson may have taken occasional liberties with the text from which he translated, omitted some passages, and supplied others that were perhaps lost, yet that the poetry called Ossianic is genuine; that it was common, and in great abundance; that it was peculiarly striking and impressive, and in a high degree eloquent, tender, and sublime. Of the epoch in which Ossian flourished we can form a tolerable guess: for, with occasional references to several of the earlier Roman emperors, and especially to Caracalla, the son of Severus, who by Ossian is called Caracal, we find through the whole of his accredited poems a total unacquaintance with the Christian religion; and hence he can scarcely be allowed to have lived earlier than in the second, or later than in the third or fourth century of the Christian era. So that the poems of Ossian must be of an antiquity not less by three or four centuries than the descent of Cæsar upon the British coast. And consequently we have at this moment a living proof of the existence of traditionary poems of the highest pretensions to genius, sublimity, and regularity of structure, that have been kept afloat in the memories of different generations for upwards of a thousand years, and some of

them with but few variations, or loss of their original integrity.

To account, in some degree, for this striking and isolated fact, we must, in the first place, recollect, that these poems are strictly national; and, by a perpetual appeal to national passions and feelings, must have deeply interested every one who heard them in their preservation! Secondly, we know from the writings of Julius Cæsar, that the British druids, and consequently the British bards, on his landing, were embodied into distinct colleges, subject to a discipline of rigid study, and compelled to commit to memory so great an extent of verses, that many of them required not less than twenty years to complete this part of their education; it being held impious to record sacred poems in written characters, or to transmit them in any other way than by tradition from race to race. And, lastly, it should not be forgotten that poetry constituted the noblest science of these early times, and that the highest honour a hero could receive was to be celebrated in deathless verse. To die unlamented by a bard, was deemed, indeed, so great a misfortune as even to disturb the ghosts of the deceased in another state. "They wander," says the son of Fingal, "in thick mists beside the reedy lake; but never shall they rise WITHOUT SONG to the dwelling of the winds."

Ossian seems to have been wonderfully skilled in the language of all the passions. Equally vehement, gentle, and sublime, he could rouse at

his will the fury of the brave, or melt him to tears of tenderness. The following passage, being part of the address of Fingal to his grandson Oscar, is full of heroism and fine feeling; and I give it from the version of Dr. Donald Smith rather than from that of Mr. Macpherson, as being not only more literal, but more beautiful.

Son of my son! said the king,
O Oscar, pride of the generous youth!
I saw the gleaming of thy sword,
And I gloried to behold thee victorious in the battle:
Tread close on the fame of thy fathers,
And cease not to be what they have been.
When Trenmor lived, of glorious deeds,
And Trathal, the father of heroes,
They fought every battle with success.—
Oscar! bend thou the strong in arms;
Protect the weak of hand, and the needy.
Be as a spring-tide-stream in winter
To resist the foes of the people of Fingal;
But like the soft and gentle breeze of summer
To those who ask thine aid.
So lived the conquering Trenmor;
Such after him was Trathal, of victorious prowess,
And Fingal — the support of the feeble.
On a day when Fingal had but few in his train,
By the fall of the soft murmuring Roya,
There was seen to sail in the midst of the ocean
A boat that conveyed a lovely woman.
It neither halted nor slackened
Till it reached the river-fall:
When out of it rose the beauty of female form.
She shone as a beam of the sun;
Her look exceeded her figure.
"Branch of beauty! covered with the dew of grief,"
This calmly I said,

" If blue [naked] swords can defend thee,
" Our dauntless hearts will second them."
" Thy protection I claim, for thou art Fingal,"
Replied the daughter of youth:
" By the excellence of thy might, and by thine eloquence,
" I claim speedy and opportune protection.
" Thy countenance is a sun to the forlorn,
" Thy shield is the dwelling-place of mercy.
" I am pursued over the sea:
" A hero of heavy wrath is following my track;
" The son of Sora's king pursues me;
" The mighty chief — whose name is Mayro Borb."
" Rest thou here under my protection,
" Beautiful form of the fairest hue!
" And, in defiance of Mayro Borb,
" Thou shalt find safety under the shade of my shield."

Perhaps the two sublimest passages in the poems of Ossian are, his Address to the Sun in his Carthon, and his description of the Spirit of Loda in his Carichthura, the genuineness of both which is ascertained beyond the power of suspicion. The first evinces sublimity combined with exquisite tenderness; and has a near resemblance to Milton's admirable address of the same kind. The second evinces sublimity combined with majestic terror, and has as near a resemblance to the mighty Spirit of the Cape in Camoens's Lusiad, though it is greatly superior. We have not time for quoting both these passages, and I shall confine myself, therefore, to the latter. I shall quote from Mr. Macpherson's version, which is sufficiently true to the original.

" The wan cold moon rose in the east. Sleep descended on the youths. Their blue helmets

glitter to the beam. But sleep did not rest on the king. He rose in the midst of his arms, and slowly ascended the hill, to behold the flame of Sarno's tower.—The flame was dim and distant; the moon hid her red face in the east. A blast came from the mountain: on its wings was the spirit of Loda. He came to his place in his terrors, and shook his dusky spear. His eyes appear like flames in his dark face: his voice is like distant thunder. Fingal advanced his spear in night, and raised his voice on high. 'Son of night, retire: call thy winds, and fly! Why dost thou come to my presence with thy shadowy arms? Do I fear thy gloomy form, spirit of dismal Loda? Weak is thy shield of clouds; feeble is that meteor thy sword! The blast rolls them together: and thou thyself art lost. Fly from my presence, son of night! call thy winds, and fly!'

"'Dost thou force me from my place?' replied the hollow voice. 'I turn the battle in the field of the brave. I look on the nations, and they vanish: my nostrils pour the blast of death. I come abroad on the winds: the tempests are before my face. But my dwelling is calm above the clouds; pleasant are the fields of my rest.'

"'Dwell in thy pleasant fields,' said the king. 'Let Comhall's son be forgotten. Do my steps ascend from my hills into thy peaceful plains? Do I meet thee with a spear on thy cloud, spirit of dismal Loda? Why then dost thou frown on me? Why shake thine airy spear?

Thou frownest in vain: I never fled from the mighty in war; and shall the sons of the wind frighten the king of Morven? 'No—he knows the weakness of their arms.'

"'Fly to thy land,' replied the form: 'take to the wind, and fly! The blasts are in the hollow of my hand: the course of the storm is mine. The king of Sora (the enemy of Fingal) is my son; he bends at the stone of my power. His battle is around Caricthura; and he will prevail! Fly to thy land, son of Comhal, or feel my flaming wrath!'

"He lifted high his shadowy spear! he bent forward his dreadful height. Fingal, advancing, drew his sword, the blade of dark-brown Luno. The gleaming path of the steel winds through the gloomy ghost. The form fell shapeless into air."

Ullin, Orran, and other ancient Gaelic bards, seem to have been almost as celebrated as Ossian; and even of Ossian's poetry Mr. Macpherson has not perhaps, after all, selected the most beautiful. The "Death of Gaul," published in 1780, by Dr. Smith of Campbelton, in Argyleshire, and accompanied with the original, as taken down from the memory of different Highland families, is one of the sweetest and tenderest, and at the same time one of the most regular pieces that has ever been composed in any language. Gaul was the bosom friend of Oscar, the son of Ossian, and the grandson of Fingal. The

story, in few words, is as follows. Fingal summoned his heroes for an expedition to the isle of Ifrona. A flood in the river Strumon prevented Gaul from joining them in time; but he put forth in his bark alone on the ensuing day. On his voyage he passed his friends, who were returning victorious, without his perceiving them, and landed singly on the hostile shore. Consistently with the chivalrous honour of the times, he would not fly; but struck his shield as a token of defiance to the islanders, against whom he maintained, singly, a desperate conflict, and kept the enemy at a distance; till at length a stone, rolled from above, disabled him from moving or fighting any longer; in which situation he was left by the dastardly enemy to pine and die without succour. His wife Evirchoma, anxious for his fate, embarked, with her infant son Ogall at her breast, in quest of her lord, whom she found in this pitiable condition; when, rousing all her might to assist him, she just succeeded in dragging him to the boat, and then fainted away over his body; in which state, speechless and in the act of dying, they were both discovered the next morning by Ossian, who had sailed in quest of them, and who was only able to save the child. From the poem thus introduced, and which is not generally known in this part of the island, I must beg leave to offer an extract or two. The following is Ossian's description of Evirchoma, as she witnessed the mournful departure of her husband:

In the light ship of rough waves
The hero followed us on the second morning.
But who is she, on the rock, like mist,
Looking, through tears, on Gaul?
Her dark hair wanders on the wind,
And her soft hand, white as foam, surrounds her forelock. —
Young is the boy on her bosom,
Sweet is her lullaby in his ear.
But a sigh has wafted away the song: —
On Gaul are thy thoughts fixed, Evirchoma.

The following is an exquisite picture of mingled and overwhelming passions — courage, heroism, and tenderness. Having chivalrously planted his standard, and singly defied all the enemy, a rushing thought of his wife and his child, of Evirchoma and Ogall, damps his resolution for a moment; but he is instantly recalled to himself by the idea of the spirit of his heroic father hovering over him:

Morni! behold me from the mountain.
Thy own soul was an impetuous current,
Foaming white within a rocky strait:
Such is the soul of thy son. —
Evirchoma! — Ogall! —
But mild beams belong not to the storm:
The soul of Gaul is in the roar of battle.

The conflict of passions in the breast of Evirchoma, on reaching the hostile shore, is described with equal force — her desire to proceed in quest of her husband, and her fear of leaving her babe behind her in the boat. It was now late in the evening:

She glanced by the scanty beam
On the beautiful face of her son,
When about to leave him in her narrow skiff:
" Babe of my love! be here unobserved!"
As a dove on the rock of Ulácha,
When gathering berries for her tender brood,
Returns often without tasting them,
While the hawk rises in her thoughts;—
So returned three times Evirchoma:
Her soul, as a wave that is passed
From breaker to breaker, when the tempest blows,
Till she heard a mournful voice from the tree of the shore.

I have said that the generous Ossian pursued them in another boat, and found them both in the act of dying. The following is his own inimitable description: it is strikingly impressive, and especially the manner in which the faint and dying mother commends her son to his care; and calls forth a sigh from his heart that his own wife Evirallin is no more.

I lifted his helmet: I saw his locks
Disordered, uneven, in sweat.
My cry arose —
And he raised with difficulty his eye.
Death came, like a cloud on the sun:—
No more shalt thou see thy Oscar. ———
The beauty of Evirchoma is darkened.
Her son, unconscious, holds the end of a spear:
Feeble was her voice, and few her words.
I raised her up with my hand,
But she laid my palm on the head of her son,
While her sigh rose frequent. ———
Dear child! vain is thy fondling;

Thy mother no more shall arise.
I will myself, be a *father* to thee :——
But Evirallin is no more. . .

Yet the poem must not be closed without giving you its conclusion; its exquisite moral, and its sublime epitaph.

What is the strength of the warrior,
Though he scatter the battle as withered leaves?
To-day though he may be valiant in the field,
To-morrow the beetle will *triumph over him.*
Prepare, ye children of musical strings,
The bed of Gaul and his sun-beam [standard] by him:
Let his resting-place be seen from afar,
By high branches overshadowed;
Under the wing of the oak of greenest foliage,
Of quickest growth, and most durable form,
Shooting forth its leaves to the breeze of the shower,
When the heath around is still withered.
Its leaves, from the extremity of the land,
Shall be seen by the birds of the summer;
And each bird shall perch, as it arrives,
On a sprig of its verdant branches.
Gaul, in his mist, shall hear their cheerful note,
While the virgins are singing of Evirchoma.
Until all of these shall perish,
Never shall your memory be disunited.
Until the stone shall crumble into dust,
And the oak-tree decay with age;
Until streams shall cease to flow,
And the mountain-waters be dried up at their source;
Until there be lost, in the flood of age,
Each bard, and song, and subject of story,
The stranger shall not ask, "who was Morni's son?"
Or, "where was the dwelling of the king of Strumon?"

The voice of the passions, then, whether of joy or sorrow, of rage or tenderness, is the voice of poetry; and the voice of poetry is, in consequence, the voice of the passions. It is hence the earliest language of every nation; and it is not, therefore, to be wondered at that it should have been employed from a very remote period as the medium of national history, national mythology, and moral precepts; its glowing and animated style being peculiarly calculated to captivate the attention, and the recurrent measure or versification which, under some shape or other, it has assumed, and could not fail to assume, in every part of the world, being admirably adapted to assist the memory.

Hence in the first ages of Greece, as well as of every other nation, priests, philosophers, and statesmen, all delivered their instructions in poetry. Apollo, Orpheus, and Amphion, the earliest bards of the Grecian states, are represented as the first tamers of mankind, the first founders of order and civilisation. Minos and Thales sung to the lyre the laws which they composed; and, till the age immediately preceding that of Herodotus, history appeared in no other form than that of poetical tales. At this time, however, science began to rear her head through the regions of Arcadia; the judgment acquired daily strength; and, while a soberer style was found to be befitting the severer studies, and the simple narrative of national or biographical events, the dialect of the passions was limited to those

branches of speech or writing which require ornament, attraction, or an excitement of the passions themselves: and by such a change verbal composition soon rose to the rank of a very extensive and complicated science; the value of every word became weighed in its root, combinations, and inflections; in its strict and figurative senses; in its proper enunciation and accent. And hence the origin of the elementary studies of etymology, grammar, prosody, and criticism; while the general mint of language, thus prepared and struck off, was still subject to the inquisitorial powers of logic and rhetoric; the art of reasoning or assigning determinate ideas to determinate words; and the art of polishing or adorning the dry skeleton of naked sense with the gay and ornamental dress of trope, figure, and elegant collocation.

Rhetoric, therefore, is nothing more than the natural language of the passions or the imagination which so closely associates with them, reduced to the rules of art. It is the study of those péculiar modes of expression, warm, exclamatory, abrupt, interjective, full of energy, image, and personification, by which the passions characterise themselves when called into action; and which, as the natural symbols of the passions, have the wonderful power, not only during recitation, but on paper alone, when read by ourselves in the privacy of the closet, of enkindling in the mind of the reader or hearer the very feelings of which they are the representatives.

Hence the soothing tranquillity produced by

pastoral poetry; the melting sympathy with which we yield to metrical tales of distress and misery; the rousing, dithyrambic effect of national songs; the sublime enthusiasm of devotional lyrics. Hence the well-planned fictions of the epic Muse excite all the interest of real life; the popular orator, laying hold of the same weapons, subdues every heart to his own purposes; but, above all, hence the magic spell of the drama, that, by personating the characters and scenery of the subject it selects, transports us to the time, place, and circumstance of the representation, and makes us parties to its own story.

The drama, above every thing else, is the language of the passions carried into real life, and enlisted on the side of virtue. I say on the side of VIRTUE, because such power has virtue over the human mind, by the wise and gracious constitution of our nature, that neither epic poetry can excite admiration, nor tragic poetry emotion, unless virtuous feelings be awakened within us. Every poet finds it impossible to interest an audience in a character without representing that character as worthy and honourable, though it may not be perfect; and he is equally aware that the great secret for raising indignation, is to paint the person who is to be the object of it in the colours of VICE and DEPRAVITY. And hence, Aristotle speaks with his usual correctness, when he tells us, that the design of tragedy (and it is to the tragic drama I am now limiting my attention) is

to purify our corrupt tendencies by means of pity and terror. Such was the direct scope of the simple tragedy of the Greeks; the uniform object of Æschylus, who founded it; of Euripides, who improved; and of Sophocles, who perfected it; and all within the short space of little more than twenty years.

And such is equally the object of the more operose and complicated tragedy of modern times, whether French or English; whether turning, as in the former case, upon a series of artful and refined conversations, connected, indeed, with interesting attractions, but carried on with little action and vehemence, though with much poetical beauty, and the strictest propriety and decorum; or whether, as in the latter instance, made to hinge on a combat of strong passions, set before us in all their violence, producing deep disasters; often irregularly conducted, abounding in action, and filling the spectators with grief. It is, indeed, peculiarly worthy of remark, that three of the greatest, if not the three greatest master-pieces of the French tragic theatre, turn wholly upon religious subjects: the Athalie of Racine, the Polyeucte of Corneille, and the Zaire of Voltaire. The first is founded upon an historical passage of the Old Testament; while, in the other two, the distress arises from the zeal and attachment of the principal personages to the Christian faith. So powerfully has each of these writers felt, whatever may have been his private creed, the majesty which may be derived from religious

ideas, and the deep impression they are calculated to produce on the human heart.

To select such topics, however, for such a purpose, demands a very delicate judgment; and no serious mind would readily consent, I apprehend, that they should be resorted to and promulgated as sources of entertainment in the theatres of our own country. I mention the fact with the mere view of contrasting it with what has of late years been the predominant and licentious taste of the French metropolis; and to show the readiness with which this polite and elegant, but gay and giddy people, rush from one extreme to the other of that sober medium which will, I trust, ever limit and characterise our own national feelings and conduct.*

It is well known to have been the opinion of Dr. Johnson, that religious subjects are but little calculated for poetry of any kind; that the fire of the Muses will not cordially blend with the flame of devotion. From this opinion, however, I must beg leave altogether to dissent.

There is no topic so well qualified for enkindling and enlisting into its service all the best and purest passions of the heart; and none, therefore, to which the language of the passions, subject, indeed, to the discipline of a nice judgment, is better adapted, or can be more laudably consecrated. And on turning accidentally to

* It should be recollected that this Lecture was composed and delivered during the reign of Buonaparte.

Sir William Jones's "Essay on the Arts commonly called Imitative," I find this opinion fortified; and the general survey of the subject now offered supported by the authority of this great scholar, whose name and judgment I may fairly put into the scale against those of our celebrated lexicographer.

"It seems probable, that poetry was originally no more than a strong and animated expression of the human passions, of joy and grief, love and hatred, admiration and anger, sometimes pure and unmixed, sometimes variously modified and combined; for, if we observe the voice and accents of a person affected by any of the violent passions, we shall perceive a something in them very nearly approaching to cadence and measure; which is remarkably the case in the language of a vehement orator, whose talent is chiefly conversant about praise or censure; and we may collect from several passages in Tully, that the fine speakers of old Greece and Rome had a sort of rhythm in their sentences, less regular, but not less melodious than that of the poets.

"If this idea be just, one would suppose that the most ancient sort of poetry consisted in PRAISING THE DEITY: for if we conceive a being created with all his faculties and senses, endued with speech and reason, to open his eyes in a most delightful plain; to view for the first time the serenity of the sky, the splendour of the sun, the verdure of the fields and woods, the

glowing colours of the flowers; we can hardly believe it possible, that he should refrain from bursting into an ecstasy of joy, and pouring his praises to the Creator of those wonders, and the Author of his happiness. This kind of poetry is used in all nations; but as it is the sublimest of all, when it is applied to its true object, so it has often been perverted to impious purposes by pagans and idolaters." *

It is true the devotional poetry of our own country that can pretend to any high degree of merit is but very sparing, when compared with what we may reasonably boast on most other subjects. Not, however, that we are without writers of high and deserved reputation, or specimens of admirable excellence and sublimity. Yet we must not judge, as Dr. Johnson appears to have done, from our own country alone: since perhaps, no people celebrated for great refinement in taste and language, have so little cultivated this branch of the poetic art. It is a remarkable fact, that the metrical psalmody of our established church, which ought to be the best, is the worst of all English poetry in its old version, and not always improved as one could wish in its new, though several of the psalms in this later version are exquisitely turned.

And here it is obvious, that the fault does not lie with the subject, for the original Hebrew

* Essay on the Arts commonly called Imitative Works, iv. 550. 4to.

is full of excellencies of every kind. Our poets of the highest reputation, whether epic, dramatic, or lyric, have seldom ventured upon sacred themes; and in the few instances in which they have made such an attempt, they have too frequently proved themselves to be equally unacquainted with the style and character of devotion; which, like those of every other science, (for I am now only speaking of it in its subordinate and exterior attributes) can only be acquired by a peculiar genius for the task, and a long course of study in it. Let any one examine critically the *Universal Prayer* of Pope, or the *Veni Creator Spiritus*, or *Te Deum*, of Dryden, and I have little doubt that he will accede to the correctness of this remark. There is a constraint in these productions, which belongs to the writers nowhere else; an elegant exterior, but without a vivifying spirit; a total want of that happy union of bosom ease and ardour, and raciness, which the French theologians call *unction*, that prove a man to be at home upon his subject, to have drunk deeply of the inspiring stream, and that it circulates freely through his heart; that which renders Addison as much superior to both these poets upon this point as he was inferior to them upon every other; which is deeply impressive in Cowper's devotional pieces; which peculiarly characterises, not only the more lofty and ornamental, but even the mere doctrinal hymns of Dr. Watts, which admit of but little embel-

lishment; and which we sometimes behold in the congregational contributions of persons possessing few pretensions to learning and genius, and who, perhaps, make a boast of their deficiency.

Let it be remembered, that elegance alone will not answer, nor will ease alone answer, nor will general descriptions alone answer; whether of the perfections of the Deity, the beauty of creation, the penitence of the soul, or its ardent longing for the happiness of heaven, or for communion with God on earth. We have at times seen attempts of this kind (and many of us, as I trust, with real grief of heart) by lyrical writers of the first attainments as poets, but the lowest attainments as Christians, in our own day; and whose direct object has been to furnish words to what has been vended along with them under the name of SACRED MUSIC; to cheat the sacred hours of the Sunday, and of those who hail the return of the Sunday, by a show of Sunday-aliment and occupation. Such attempts have had their day, but have never been able to support themselves. In the midst of all their external glitter and polished rhapsody, they have been found vapid and unsatisfactory; an airy, flatulent food, that the soul could never feed or fatten upon. And, on analysing several of these attempts, with a friend of the nicest judgment, and who was, at first, strangely captivated by their pretensions, we found, that by a change in a very few of the terms, chiefly, indeed, by a

mere substitution of human names for divine, they were reduced, with great advantage to themselves, to their proper and natural level of love-ditties and ballads, from which alone they seemed to have been raised, by an irreverent adoption of mere misnomers for the base purpose of finding them a market in what is called the religious world...

On every account, however, I am much afraid that we must yield the palm of devotional poetry, to some of the nations on the continent. The best French writers upon this subject are Racine the younger, son of the celebrated dramatist of the same name, John Baptiste Rousseau, and Pompignan; all contemporaries, and the last of whom had the honour of being ridiculed by Voltaire, Helvetius, and their associates, for having had the boldness to deliver before the French Academy, in 1760, a discourse in favour of Christianity. And when to these I add the name of my late venerable friend the Abbé Dellille, I fear it will be difficult to muster an equal group, possessing like power, in our own country. Spain, however, in this respect, at least rivals, if it do not surpass the master-poets of France; as I believe every one must allow, who is acquainted with the sacred poetry of Melendez, Miguel Sanchez, and the Conde de Noroña. Germany has also a few poets of the same kind of great merit, but it is to Italy we must turn for the best specimens of devotional lyrics in modern times; — Italy,

where, almost from the revival of literature, the devotional muse, though surrounded by corruption, has been courted and warmly caressed by many of her best scholars, her best poets, and her best men. Her sacred verse was at first, indeed, too much interwoven with the mystic sublimity of Platonism, which pervades more especially the spirited and lofty verses of Lorenzo de' Medici. It next allied itself equally with classical mythology, generalizing the "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord," as Mr. Pope has it, of Christians and Heathens; under which system every Pagan deity had his name continued, and was regarded as nothing more than a separate attribute of the true God. Sanazzaro and Pontano, like the Portugese epic poet Camoens, are full of this absurd amalgamation; but from the time of Vida to the present day the devotional effusions of the Tuscan muse have been purged from foreign dross, and in subject as well as in style, while highly empassioned are equally pure, pious, and erudite. Were I to be called upon to point out the two best sacred poets of modern times, I should instantly name Filicaja and Klopstock; both men of exemplary goodness, whose lives were dedicated to religion, and who, while they wrote from the heart, adorned their compositions with every classical excellence. Bion has nothing sweeter or more touching than Klopstock; Pindar nothing more ardent or sublime than Filicaja.

Yet, to determine the question fairly, whether

religious subjects can afford a proper ground for poetry, or the language of the passions, it is necessary to look back to nations of a very remote antiquity, and who cultivated such attempts as a national pursuit. Surely if the erroneous and extravagant mythologies and superstitions of ancient Greece possessed interest enough to concentrate equally the fond attention of the poets and the people, and to be laid hold of as the standard theme of odes, dramas, and epopees; if the sacred fictions of Isis and Osiris, of Ormuzd and Ahriman, of Brahma and Pracriti, were deemed the noblest subjects for song in Egypt, Persia, and Hindostan; and song, too, composed by the most learned hierophants and the most celebrated bards of their day, in colleges expressly founded for the occasion; what ought we not to look for in countries of coeval antiquity, preternaturally illuminated with the principles of genuine religion, and where colleges also were founded of the same mixed kind for the same lofty purpose? What ought we not to expect from the rapt patriarchs of Idumæa, or the inspired prophets of Salem; from the magnificent schools of Dedan and Theman, or those of Naioth and Mount Zion? From the two latter, more especially, since one of their chief, and certainly one of their most pleasing duties, was to compose a regular series of sacred odes and other canticles to the praise of the great Creator, and to sing them daily to the skilful sound of psaltery, tabret, and harp,

in sweet, alternate concert; and accompanied with the symphoneous movements of solemn attitudes and sacred dance. We have not time for examples, pleasant as the task would be, to introduce them; but the question seems to be unanswerably settled, by the general and well-known history of these countries, and the exquisite specimens of their sacred lyrics which have descended to our own day; and which prove unequivocally that the language of the passions, of hope and fear, of joy and sorrow, of compunction and triumph, are directly fitted to become the language of devotion; and that the purest and sublimest religion is capable of giving rise to the purest and sublimest poetry. The Bible, indeed, which is the first book we should prize, and the last we should part with, is as much superior to all other books, whether of ancient or modern times, in its figurative and attractive dress, as it is in its weighty and oracular doctrines; in the hopes it enkindles and the fears it arrays. In its exterior as in its interior, in its little as in its great, it displays alike its divine original.

LECTURE XV.

ON TASTE, GENIUS, AND IMAGINATION.

BEFORE we close our analysis of the faculties of the mind, there are yet three powers, that have a larger claim upon our attention than we have hitherto been able to give them. These are the faculties of TASTE, GENIUS, and IMAGINATION; the alliance between which is so close, that many philosophers have conceived they are produced at the same moment, and cannot exist separately. This, however, is an erroneous opinion, proceeding from a want of clear ideas as to their respective characters—characters which do not appear to have been at any time very accurately defined; and the peculiar limits and distinctions of which I shall take leave, therefore, before we close this course of instruction, to fix by a new boundary.

IMAGINATION, then, is that faculty of the mind which calls forth and combines ideas with great rapidity and vivacity, whether congruous or incongruous.

GENIUS is that faculty which calls forth and combines ideas, with great rapidity and vivacity, and with an intuitive perception of their congruity or incongruity.

TASTE is that faculty which selects and relishes such combinations of ideas as produce genuine beauty, and rejects the contrary.

These definitions are simple, but, I trust, correct; and if so, IMAGINATION is the basis of the whole; TASTE may exist without GENIUS, and GENIUS without TASTE, as I shall presently endeavour to show; but neither can exist without IMAGINATION. Yet imagination is neither taste nor genius, since, though absolutely necessary to the subsistence of these powers, the great mart that furnishes them with their daily food, it may also exist without them.

Let us commence, then, with the faculty of IMAGINATION. Whence comes it that the mind, at first a tabula rasa, a sheet of white paper, without characters of any kind, becomes furnished with that vast store of ideas, the materials of wisdom and knowledge, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? The whole, as I had occasion to prove in a preceding Lecture *, is is derived from experience, — the experience of sensation and reflection; from what have been called objective and subjective ideas; from the observations of the mind employed either about external, sensible objects, or the internal operations of itself, perceived and reflected upon by its own faculties.

Now, it is the office of the reason to hunt out for and accumulate ideas from both the above

* Vol. III. Ser. III. Lect. III.

sources, as it is that of the perception to distinguish them when present, and of the memory to recall them on future occasions. And hence he who has laid in the largest stock of ideas is possessed, not indeed of the most extensive knowledge, but of the most extensive materials of knowledge. For, in order to produce knowledge, we must not only have a numerous stock of ideas, but these ideas must be examined, compared, arranged, combined, according to their connection and agreement, or disconnection and repugnancy. To do this is the office of the JUDGMENT; and hence he who has a power of making such assortment and comparison with clearness and precision is said to have a deep insight into things; which is nothing more than affirming that the faculty of his judgment is correct and acute. I have stated genius to be that faculty by which the mind rapidly or intuitively perceives the congruity or incongruity of ideas; so that genius is intuitive judgment; it is judgment that looks forward at once from the beginning to the end of a chain of ideas, and stands in little or no need of the intermediate links on which proper or common judgment depends for its guidance.

We often, however, meet with persons who have a strong and active propensity to combine ideas, without any attention to their natural agreement or connection. And it is in individuals of this description that the imagination constitutes the ruling power, and lords it over

the judgment. Such combinations are soon made, for they cost no trouble, like those the judgment engages in: and as the persons who are constitutionally prone to make them, possess, perhaps without an exception, a sanguineous or irritable temperament, the nature of which I explained in a late lecture of the present series *, they are also made with peculiar liveliness and rapidity, and I have hence defined the imagination to be that faculty of the mind which calls forth and combines ideas with great rapidity and vivacity, whether congruous or incongruous.

This, however, is pure or simple IMAGINATION, and to observe it in its full force we must select and attend to those states of the mind in which it is altogether set at liberty from the control of the judgment; we must follow it up into the airy visions of sleep, the wild phantasms of delirium, the extravagant fictions of madness, or the dark reveries of melancholy. In all these states it has full play and revels with unbounded career. And it shows us distinctly the error of those psychologists who have regarded imagination, genius, and fine taste, as one and the same attribute. For here we behold the restless power of imagination enthroned without a rival in the centre of the intellectual empire, and yet unaccompanied, except perhaps in a few anomalous cases, with taste or genius of any kind. A long habit of association, in the case of dreaming and delirium, or some predominant feeling in the case of madness or melancholy, may occasionally

* Vol. III. Ser. III. Lect. XI.

give a certain degree of consistency or natural colouring to the ideas as they are successively embodied; and I have hence described the ideas of imagination as characterised by rapid and vivacious combinations, whether congruous or incongruous; but for the most part the consistency is only occasional and momentary; or if permanent, limited to a single subject.

Tried by this test, I am afraid Dr. Akenside, among others, will be found to have fallen into some slight confusion in his idea of imagination or fancy (for he uses the terms synonymously) as collected from his well-known and very admirable poem — a poem in a few places, perhaps, obscure to general readers from their inacquaintance with the Platonic philosophers, but combining as much fire, and feeling, and classical elegance, and rich imagery, and sweetness of versification, as any didactic poem of the same extent in the English tongue. This poem he entitles, "The Pleasures of Imagination;" and the direct scope of it is to prove, firstly, that the highest pleasures of the mind are those furnished by the imagination; and, secondly, that they are derived from the three sources of the Fair, the Wonderful, and the Sublime, as they are discoverable in the kingdoms of art and nature, and are chiefly collected and represented to us by poets and painters:

> Know, then, whate'er of nature's pregnant stores,
> Whate'er of mimic Art's reflected forms,
> With love and admiration thus inflame
> The powers of FANCY, her delighted sons

To three illustrious orders have referred; —
Three sister-graces — whom the painter's hand,
The poet's tongue confesses: the Sublime,
The Wonderful, the Fair. — I see them dawn!
I see the radiant visions where they rise,
More lovely than when Lucifer displays
His beaming forehead through the gates of morn,
To lead the train of Phœbus and the Spring.

Who does not see that, through the whole of this the poet is speaking, not of fancy or imagination in its proper and simple capacity, but of fancy or imagination under the guidance of taste and genius; and that, consequently, he confounds these three faculties, different as they are from each other, under one common name. In like manner Mr. Allison commences the second edition of his "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste," with the following passage: "The emotions of sublimity and beauty are uniformly ascribed, both in popular and *philosophical* language, to the imagination. The fine arts are considered as the arts which are addressed to the imagination, and the pleasures they afford are described, by way of distinction, as the pleasures of the imagination." Now this may be popular language, but it is by no means philosophical. The poet as a poet may talk of the pleasures of imagination, because he limits his ideas to pleasurable objects; and submits them to the selective hand of genius and taste; but will the madman, or even at all times the lover, talk also of its pleasures? Shakspeare tells

us, no; and in proof hereof gives us in his Midsummer Night's Dream an exquisite picture of the different subjects on which their respective imaginations are exercised:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping phantasies that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover, and the poet,
> ARE OF IMAGINATION ALL COMPACT.
> One sees more devils than vast hell can hold;
> That is the madman. The lover, all as frantic,
> Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.
> The poet's eye in a fine phrenzy rolling,
> Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,
> And as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name.

This indeed is the language of philosophy though put into verse. The madman, the lover, and the poet, are described as being joint subjects to the dominion of imagination; while the general current of their ideas, from its vehemence, abruptness, and audacity, is denominated a phrenzy. But the phrenzy of the poet is distinctly stated to be of a superior kind to that of the rest and is distinguished by the epithet *fine*, delicate, refined, polished; and consequently imports skill or regulation; taste, genius, or both together. It necessarily implies a something besides the simple imagination, that unites with and controls it; and hence accurately accords with the view of the subject now taken.

Let us proceed to the faculty of GENIUS. This I have defined to be that power of the mind which calls forth and combines ideas with great rapidity and vivacity, and with an intuitive perception of their congruity or incongruity.

Genius is, therefore, in few words, imagination with intuitive judgment. It distinguishes the man of FINE PHRENZY, as Shakspeare expresses it, from the man of MERE PHRENZY. It is a sort of instantaneous insight, that gives us knowledge without going to school for it. Sometimes it is directed to one subject, sometimes to another; but under whatever form it exhibits itself, it enables the individual who possesses it to make a wonderful and almost miraculous progress in the line of his pursuit. Sometimes it attaches itself to the sweet harmony of sounds, and we then behold an infant of eight or ten years of age evincing the science and execution of an adult and finished musician. Sometimes it rejects the science of sounds and prefers that of numbers; and we behold a boy of twelve years old solving, almost instantaneously, arithmetical questions which would cost an expert practitioner in the common way a labour of many hours. Sometimes we find it enamoured of the beauty of colours or the charms of eloquence; and we are struck with the precocity of perfection which it evinces in either case.

In other instances we see it descending to the arts and labours of common life, and diffusing intuitive knowledge among the multitude.

Go to the busy 'Change; and you will find some individuals allowed by general consent to have a peculiar genius, or talent, as it is often called, for commerce; in other words, who are capable of calling forth and combining commercial ideas with great speed and vivacity, and with that intuitive perception of their agreement or disagreement which leads them to the most judicious results — results, which the surrounding crowd would only be able to attain by a long catenation or process of enquiry. Go into the country, and you will find the same difference among our husbandmen and agriculturists; while some among them have no more imagination than the clods they cleave with their ploughshares, others seem to penetrate intuitively the nice order of vegetation, and never suffer a season to roll over them without wringing from it some important secret; as Aristæus in the Georgics from the pinioned form of old Proteus. Go to our manufacturing and mechanical towns; to Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield; and you will, in like manner, meet with artisans and handicrafts who discover the same acuteness of intelligence, the same rapid combination of consenting ideas, the same superiority of genius or talent in their respective callings beyond that which is possessed by their fellows, as in the cases to which I have alluded already.

Genius, then, wherever it is found, and to whatever purpose directed, is mental power; it

acts by an invisible impulse, and appears to act miraculously. And hence, indeed, its name — a name common to all the world — derived from the Hebrew, copied thence into the Sancrit, Arabic, and Chinese; from the eastern tongues into the Latin, and from the Latin into our own, and almost every other language of modern Europe, and importing in every instance, in its radical signification, a tutelary, a guiding or inspiring divinity.

It is genius, then, that must control the imagination, if the pictures it paints be of any value, if the ideas it combines be combined skilfully or accordantly, if the feelings it excites be pleasurable, or the result it produces be beneficial.

To give full efficacy, however, to the daring flights of the imagination, there is another power of the mind which must associate with the attribute of genius, and that is TASTE; which I have already defined to be that mental faculty which selects and relishes such combinations of ideas as produce genuine beauty, and rejects the contrary.

Imagination, therefore, is as necessary to the existence of taste as of genius; since each equally depends upon this active and vivacious power for the materials with which it is to work. For the most part, taste and genius are united in the same mind, but not necessarily or always so; and hence they are by no means the same thing.

We see evident proofs of this in many of the subjects selected by the lowest class of the

Dutch painters, and by several of the most eminent caricature draughtsmen of the present day. The broad laughter or other distortion of the features, which they so frequently present to us, often discovers a powerful genius in this particular line, and, as displaying the effect of muscular action, may afford to the young painter a useful study; but the ideas are too ludicrous and violent for real beauty, and have, hence, no pretensions to pure taste.

Among the whims and follies which have successively risen into notice in our own country, there appears at one time, among the lower ranks of life, to have been an odd and singular fashion for grinning. The third volume of the Spectator contains a paper that gives a very humourous account of this elegant rage; and informs us that grinning clubs were established in different parts of the country, grinning matches proposed, and grinning prizes adjudged to the winner. Among the competitors in this new Olympic game, there were some who seem to have been endowed with a peculiar genius for the art; and in one instance the prize fell upon a cobbler, who discovered so much accomplishment and excited so much applause, that a hard-hearted young woman, whom he had in vain wooed for five years before, immediately gave him her hand, and was married to him the week following. Now here, as in the Dutch paintings I have just noticed, whatever may have been the genius displayed, every one, I ap-

prehend, will admit that it was genius without taste.

Let us, however, ascend to nobler regions. We occasionally meet with particular instances of deficient taste in persons of the most elevated genius, and whose general taste is acknowledged by every one to be sufficiently correct. As one instance, I may perhaps mention that Reubens in his very excellent picture of Daniel in the lions' den, has given a human expression to the faces of the savage beasts. His intention is clear; it is that of representing them as endowed with human feeling on the occasion. The conception unquestionably implies genius, but its taste will not be so readily allowed. We meet with a similar error in the battle of Constantine, by Giulio Romano, where the face of one of the horses is, for the same reason, animated with a human character, expressive of doubtful thought and suspicion; while the ears and hair of the forehead, for the sake of greater fierceness, are drawn from the features of the bull. Now, in centaurs, chimæras, and other ideal animals, this intermixture of attributes is readily allowable, for here the imagination may sport without restraint; but it is a law of genuine taste, that natural objects should have their natural characters, their proper features and expression; or, in other words, that the principle of association adhered to by nature should be adhered to by those who copy her.

Our best and most celebrated poets furnish

us occasionally with similar instances of genius unaccompanied by taste. Homer himself is not altogether free from this imputation. Let me first set before you one of his most exquisite pictures, in which taste and genius equally combine. The passage I refer to is his delineation, in the eighth book of the Iliad, of a night scene before Troy. Mr. Pope's is an excellent version, but I take Mr. Cowper's, as equally excellent and more true to the original:—

As when, around the clear bright moon, the stars
Shine in full splendour, and the winds are hush'd,
The groves, the mountain-tops, the headland heights
Stand all apparent, not a vapour streaks
The boundless blue, but ether open'd wide
All glitters, and the shepherd's heart is cheer'd:
So numerous seem'd those fires, between the stream
Of Xanthus blazing, and the fleet of Greece,
In prospect all of Troy.

Could it be supposed, that he who could imagine so finely, and describe so delicately, would in the same poem compare the contest of the Greeks and Trojans for the body of Patroclus, which it seems was tugged for in every direction, to a gang of curriers stretching out a hide? Or, that in his Odyssey, he would liken Ulysses, restless and tossing on his bed, to a hungry man turning a piece of tripe on the coals for his supper?

Now, in both these cases the similes are true to nature, and strikingly illustrative; they are full of genius, but they are destitute of taste; they want picturesque beauty. To nature, in-

deed, they must be true; for the merit of Homer as a painter from nature is that in which he stands most distinguished from all other poets. In variety, accuracy, and force, his similes greatly surpass those of any of his successors and imitators; and they form a gallery of delineations which the student of poetry and the cultivator of genius cannot survey with too much attention: —

> Be Homer's works your study and delight,
> Read them by day, and meditate by night;
> Thence form your judgment, thence your maxims bring,
> And trace the muses upwards to their spring. *

In looking very lately over the satires of Dr. Young, which, upon the whole, are written with great force and truth of character, I could scarcely avoid smiling at a simile which, like the preceding, is exact enough in itself, but highly ludicrous from its utter deficiency of taste. In describing the man whose whole pursuits are made up of nothing but trifling and empty joys, he compares him to a cat in an air-pump. Now, this might have been well enough in Hudibras, or any other burlesque poem; but is altogether inconsistent with a vein of serious composition. In the following comparison, on the contrary, he is highly ingenious and successful; and we admire the adroitness with which he brings into various points of resemblance ideas that at first

* Art of Criticism.

sight appear to be perfectly discrepant; for quicksilver and pleasure do not seem to have any natural connection:—

Pleasures are few, and fewer wè enjoy;
Pleasure, like quicksilver, is bright and coy;
We strive to grasp it with our utmost skill,
Still it eludes us, and it glitters still.
If seiz'd at last, compute your mighty gains,
What is it but rank poison in your veins?

There is no subject that has been more frequently made choice of by dramatic writers than the story of Œdipus Tyrannus. We owe it, in the first instance, to Sophocles; and the best copies of it in modern times are those by Corneille and Voltaire. It is unquestionably full of suspense, agitation, and terror; and particularly of that incident in a plot which by the Greeks was termed *anagnorisis*, or the discovery of a person to be different from what he was taken to be. Yet, as a whole, there has always appeared to me to be far more genius in the conduct of the fable than there is of real taste or beauty. The story is, in few words, as follows: — An innocent person, and, in the main, of a virtuous character, through no crime of himself or of others, but by mere fatality and blind chance, is involved in the severest train of all human miseries. In a casual rencounter he kills his father without knowing him; he afterwards, with equal ignorance, marries his own mother; and at length, discovering that he had

committed both parricide and incest, he becomes frantic and dies in the utmost misery. Such a subject excites horror rather than pity. As conducted by Sophocles, it is, indeed, extremely affecting, but it conveys no instruction; it awakens in the mind no tender sympathy; it leaves no impression favourable to virtue or humanity.* It is without the moral for which tragedy was invented.

Genius, then, may exist without taste; in like manner, taste may exist without genius. Of this we meet with a thousand instances every day of our lives. How countless are the numbers that are perpetually poring over the elegant and picturesque poems of Lord Byron and Mr. (now Sir) Walter Scott; or that are perpetually hurrying to Mr. West's impressive picture of the "Healing the Sick in the Temple;" or that of "Christ rejected;" entering with the nicest feelings into the various groupings, characters and scenery which are so exquisitely presented to them; and who, nevertheless, though endowed with a taste that enables them to relish such excellencies, have no genius whatever that could either invent or copy them. In like manner, I have occasionally met with men, who for strength of feeling and elegance of taste are almost unrivalled, and whom the world has long regarded, and justly so, as among the finest critics of the present day on subjects of polite

* See Blair's Lectures, vol. iii. sect. xlvi.

literature; yet, notwithstanding such possession of exquisite and acknowledged taste, who have never been successful in the exercise of genius, and have uniformly failed in poetry and original fiction. It is rarely that taste and genius do not co-exist in the same mind; but it is also rarely, that they co-exist in an equal degree. Ariosto and Shakspeare excel in genius; Tasso and Racine in taste. Mr. Windham had as much genius as Mr. Burke; his imagination was as vivacious and rapid, his combination of congruous ideas as instantaneous, his wit, perhaps, even more ready and brilliant—but Mr. Burke was vastly his superior on the score of taste.

Taste and genius cannot but be favourable to virtue. They cannot exist conjointly without sensibility. While it is of the very essence of vice to [redacted] have its feelings blunted, its conscience seared, their pleasures are notoriously derived from elevated and virtuous sources. There may, perhaps, be a few exceptions to the remark, but I am speaking of the general principle. The lovely, the graceful, the elegant, the novel, the wonderful, the sublime — these are the food on which they banquet; the grandeur and magnificence of the heavens — the terrible majesty of the tempestuous ocean — the romantic wildness of forests, and precipices, and mountains that lose themselves in the clouds — the sweet tranquillity of a summer evening — the rural gaiety of vineyards, hop-grounds, and corn-fields — the cheerful hum of busy cities —

the stillness of village solitude — the magic face of human beauty — the tear of distressed innocence — the noble struggle of worth with poverty, of patriotism with usurpation, of piety with persecution; — these, and innumerable images like these—tender, touching, dignified— are the subjects for which they fondly hunt, the themes on which they daily expatiate. To say nothing of the higher banqueting, "the food of angels," that religion sets before them.

It is true, that the mind thus constituted has its pains as well as its pleasures, nor are its pains few or of trifling magnitude. Wherever misery is to be found it seeks for it with restless assiduity, broods over it, and shares it; and where it is not to be found it fancies it. How often, waking to the roar of the midnight tempest, while dull and gluttonous indolence snores on in happy forgetfulness, does the imagination of those who are thus divinely gifted mount the dizzy chariot of the whirlwind, and picture evils that have no real existence; now, figuring to herself some neat and thrifty cottage where virtue delights to reside, she sees it swept away in a moment by the torrent, and despoiled of the little harvest just gathered in; now, following the lone traveller in some narrow and venturous path-way, over the edge of Alpine precipices, where a single slip is instant destruction, she tracks him alone by fitful flashes of lightning; and at length, struck by the flash, she beholds him tumbling headlong from rock to rock, to

the bottom of the dread abyss, the victim of a double death. Or possibly, she takes her stand on the jutting foreland of some bold, terrific coast, and eyes the foundering vessel straight below; she mixes with the spent and despairing crew; she dives into the cabin, and singles out, perhaps, from the rest, some lovely maid, who, in all the bloom of recovered beauty, is voyaging back to her native land from the healing airs of a foreign climate, in thought just bounding over the scenes of her youth, or panting in the warm embraces of a father's arms:—

> She marks th' erected ear, the bloodless cheek,
> The rigid eye that never more shall weep;
> She hears the horrors of the last loud shriek,
> And sees the vessel plunge beneath the deep.

Such are the painful pictures on which the keen soul of sensibility feeds too frequently in imagination, when the sigh of real misery is hushed, and its generous hand is not needed. But is there nothing to counterbalance the distress? To call forth the tear of joy, as well as of sorrow? And to reward the nice sympathy with which the mind labours? I pursued this pleasing train of contemplation, many years ago, in an elegy expressly directed to the present subject, from which, indeed, I have taken the lines just quoted; and as I do not know that I can answer this important question in prose better than in verse, I will beg leave to close the lecture, and with it the general task I have undertaken,

with an additional extract. Having pointed out to those who are highly gifted with taste, genius, imagination, and fine feeling, the pains and anxieties which such a constitution of mind must necessarily give rise to, the poem proceeds as follows :—

Yet murmur not, nor deem the fates reserve
No drop of solace mid the bitter stream;
Virtue is yours, — and still each trembling nerve
Oft proves an avenue to bliss supreme.

Ye cannot wade through filth that dulness dares;
Your nobler spirits soar above the clod:
Ye must be pure, while yet your bosom bears
The clear, unsullied impress of your God.

Nor does the world, in every scene that springs,
Nor Fancy's self, pourtray perpetual gloom.
Feel ye no joy when sickness smiles and sings?
When worth succeeds? or culprits meet their doom?

Lo! where yon vale unfolds its pictur'd site,
And meads and corn-fields mix their gay attire;
Sheep-cots and herds, and sprinkled cottage white,
Stream, busy mill, deep wood, and tufted spire.

Can ermin'd guilt, when every scheme succeeds,
Feel half the joy that stirs your generous breast,
As, pleas'd ye ponder o'er these simple meads,
Compute their charms, and share their balmy rest?

And mark, untouch'd by city broils, the reign
Of rural comfort, cheerfulness and ease;
Of health, embloom'd from every sweet-briar lane,
And faith and morals wholesome as the breeze.

Go — climb yon castled cliff that meets the sky,
And tells of times tradition cannot reach;
And o'er the ruins, as ye throw your eye,
Of rocks and towers, with many a hoary breach,

Say — does the wreck of nature and of art,
The wild cascade, and echo undefin'd,
The grandeur, and the solitude impart
No pleasing train of image to the mind?

Or would ye change, for all that wealth can stake,
Ambition's plume, or lawless Pleasure's prime,
The feelings, then, that through the bosom wake,
And rouse the soul to ecstacies sublime?

Yet these — and countless sympathies like these,
Of purest zest, are yours, and yours alone:
Guilt knows them not, nor dull unwieldy Ease,
For Sensibility and Taste are one.

And well, thus gifted, may ye bear the thrill
Of social sorrows and ideal wrong;
Th' Eolian harp that heaven's pure breezes fill,
Must breathe, at times, a melancholy song.

THE END.

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